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Introduction
The United States presents the greatest source of global geopolitical violence 
and instability. Much of this comes from the state’s security apparatuses. For 
example, just in the early part of the twenty-first century, 150,000 troops and 
thousands of contractors did little to build regional stability in Iraq. Instead, 
around 10 million Iraqis require humanitarian assistance, another 3.4 million 
are internally displaced, and according to the Lancet Study, between 2003 and 
2006 around 650,000 violent deaths can be attributed to the US invasion (Burn-
ham et al. 2006). In fiscal terms, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
by 2017 the Iraq War will have cost the US over $2.4 trillion, while the Watson 
Institute at Brown University arrives at a figure of $4.79 trillion and counting, 
when one includes US wars in Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, as well as Home-
land Security (Crawford 2016). This outcome was worse than most anti-war 
protestors predicted. The scale of this disaster is even greater when one consid-
ers that this destabilization is a contributing factor in the Syrian Civil War.
Domestically, in direct violation of legal limitations, the National Security 
Agency (NSA) has conducted mass surveillance to assemble electronic dossiers 
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on nearly every US citizen. It is almost impossible not to do so, given that the 
agency scrapes 1.6 per cent of all internet traffic (The Economist 2016). When 
confronted with evidence, the agency denies these programs in front of elected 
representatives. Assisted by extraordinary rendition, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) undertook torture programs at black sites, lied about it, then 
wiretapped and attempted to erase Senate investigators’ records (US Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence 2014). The Justice Department has refused to 
charge the officials involved therein. Similarly, Homeland Security and the State 
Department’s various security projects have blurred the lines between foreign 
and domestic populations, thereby eroding civil liberties. In contradistinction 
to their treatment of whistleblowers who have revealed the extensive civic harm 
caused by these activities, these departments are hostile to public accountability 
and open court proceedings.
On the theme of prosecutorial inaction, the Justice Department has refused 
to prosecute the bankers involved in the widespread financial fraud that trig-
gered the 2008 recession: ‘Too Big to Fail’ became ‘Too Big to Jail’. Yet, between 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
2008, the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry, the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act 2009 and quantitative easing, the US has spent around 
$6 trillion to limit the harms caused by the financial sector. However, most of 
this public spending went to the already rich. Between 2010 and 2012, the US 
experienced the greatest ever increase in social inequality, drastically increas-
ing the wealth gap between the 0.1 per cent and everyone else.
This jump is worrying, but it is also a continuation of a longer trend leading 
simultaneously to capital concentration and pauperization. Aided by produc-
tivity gains born from information technology, the US economy has doubled 
since 1980. So relative to 1960, a typical US worker is twice as productive, but 
real median wages are almost flat, if not declining in some sectors. About a 
quarter of US jobs pay an hourly wage that could not support a family of four 
above the poverty level. Millions of Americans can hardly afford either suitable 
healthcare or adequate food. Effectively, labour’s situation has worsened since 
the 40-hour work week was established in the 1940s because for many occupa-
tions a 40-hour work week does not provide a living wage.
Not only are workers paid less, capitalists have structured and manipulated 
their relationship with the state to ensure they pay minimal taxes. One major 
consequence of this arrangement is that the state cannot undertake sufficient 
welfare redistribution, nor provide sufficient public goods, and this has facili-
tated a massive transfer, an appropriation even, of wealth to the ruling class. 
The degree to which the US is committed to private property cannot be dis-
entangled from the comparatively weak institutional social welfare system. 
Instead, families, civil society, and charity carry the welfare burden. As the 
adage goes, ‘God and guns fill in for the welfare state.’ But Homeland Security is 
not social security. So while workers are producing more value, the benefits of 
Introduction xiii
their labour cannot be seen by them, and it has not been evenly translated into 
broad socio-economic upliftment.
This is unsurprising given that American party politics is in the pockets of 
Wall Street and districts are gerrymandered into stalemate. Campaign finance 
regulations mean that the ruling class controls the barriers of entry to politi-
cal office, and so running a campaign is so costly that even well intentioned 
advocates bend to the wishes of funders and donors. The electorate know this 
and so consistently regard politicians with distain. Nevertheless, they are so 
ill-informed about first causes, that they cannot even comprehend how these 
various parts fit together to form a whole oppressive social structure, meaning 
they are hard pressed to resist class warfare ‘from above’.
With such conditions, policy discussions have degraded to the exchange of 
talking points, misrepresentation, and disinformation. American party politics is 
nothing but a parade of wilful ignorance, avoidance, and hawkishness. Take envi-
ronmental issues for instance. While nearly 70 per cent of Americans acknowl-
edge that Earth’s average temperature is increasing, less than half attribute this to 
human activity. Conversely, as of April 2013, only a third of Americans believe 
that global warming is a very serious problem (PEW 2013). This finding came in 
the same month as CO2 passed 400 parts per million (NOAA 2013,) and the most 
comprehensive study of near 12,000 papers found that of the articles that took a 
position on Anthropogenic Global Warming, 97 per cent endorsed the theory 
(Cook et al. 2013). Similar dynamics are in play in almost any social issue. Capital 
speaks while the working class is silenced.
The Supreme Court of the United States is of little help. The 2009 Citizen’s 
United decision, while holding that political speech is ‘the means to hold offi-
cials accountable to the people’ and ‘indispensable to decision-making in a 
democracy’, perverts it by adding that ‘this is no less true because the speech 
comes from a corporation’. Couched in the rhetoric of rights, but aware of the 
consequences, the Court justified its decision in the utility of corporate speech 
to the public exchange of reasons. But this is nothing but an alibi for increasing 
corporate influence in political affairs. For instance, 50 senators who stalled 
gun control measures in 2015 received a combined total of over $27 million for 
political expenditures from firearms lobbyists.1
Elsewhere, Silicon Valley is producing tools for mystification and  oppression. 
By stock market value Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Alphabet are 
some of the most valuable firms in the United States.2 But this wealth comes from 
massive unpaid labour as users unwittingly turn themselves into  commodities.3 
As Farhad Manjoo (2017) notes, it also comes, ‘from their  control of the inescap-
able digital infrastructure on which much of the rest of the economy depends—
mobile phones, social networks, the web, the cloud, retail and logistics, and 
the data and computing power required for future breakthroughs.’ Knowing 
this, in 2015 the Department of Defense (DoD) established a venture capital 
fund, the Defense Innovation Unit, to help accelerate the production and testing 
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of specific kinds of artificial intelligence research. It is these kinds of software 
that are intended for robotic humanoids like the Atlas, a robot produced by 
Alphabet-owned Boston Dynamics (Markoff 2016).4 Publicly, it stated that 
these autonomous robots are intended for disaster response scenarios or space 
travel. However, given that Boston Dynamics is a weapons manufacturer that 
tests technology with DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), the 
door is open for military uses. So not only do these digital technologies companies 
shape everyday perception, collude to suppress wages and destroy public good, 
they cooperate with state security forces and are becoming arms manufacturers. 
This aspiration is of utmost concern because it leaves the US ripe for tyranny.
Making sense of the devastation in American social life requires seeing how 
a coercive security apparatus marching to the metronome of capital rules over 
those US citizens battling the civil powers that oppose it. And because of the 
central place of the US in the international political economy, this dynamic is 
at the heart of a global ‘democratic recession’ occurring in the early twenty-
first century (cf. Diamond, 2015). Granted, there are virtues in American social 
life, much as in many societies, but they stand adjacent to these social devel-
opments. In part, this is indicative of the great American tragedy; a society 
founded on freedom but built on slavery. The reproduction of this contradic-
tion haunts American history and it appears in the fever of property rights but 
constant dispossession, or extraordinary wealth with immiserating poverty.5
* * *
Presently, US security apparatuses are dramatically reconfiguring. This is for 
several reasons, many of which I will discuss in the coming chapters, but the 
most important is what I call the deployment of digital coercion. When I use 
this term I am referring to the various processes facilitated by digital technolo-
gies that greatly enable American rule. This is because these kinds of technolo-
gies acutely illustrate how the machinery of governance is developed for—or 
co-opted by—the state to manage subjects and processes at near unprecedented 
scale and scope. Working from a position that the constellation of digital coer-
cive practices is central to the social life in capitalism, paying attention to these 
active relationships, as they are shaped by class struggle, both ‘from below’ and 
‘from above’ can tell us much about the tendencies of capital’s rule as it unfolds 
in the early twenty-first century.
Although present in many places, digital coercion can certainly be seen in the 
changing nature of warfare. Let me explain. In 1960 Russell Weigley described 
the ‘American way of war’ a mode of modern industrial warfare employing 
strategic attrition. First deployed in the American Civil War and constantly 
refined until the Second World War, this mode of warfare drafted and mobi-
lized citizen-soldiers to leverage and deploy mass-industrial output as unprec-
edented firepower. However, the development and strategic deployment of 
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nuclear weapons made total industrial strategic attrition unfeasible between 
nuclear-armed states. Subsequently, nuclear weapons initiated the shift from 
the industrial mode of warfare to the political nature of limited asymmetrical 
warfare.
Along with many others (Boot 2003, Echevarria, 2004), I call this reorganiza-
tion of military strategy the ‘New American Way of War’. I suggest it has several 
formal features. These are the quest for minimal democratic oversight, com-
putationally aided global dragnet surveillance, automated attempts to avert 
internal dissent, internal repression of vulnerable populations, and protracted 
conflicts abroad. While I shall add to these observations in the coming chap-
ters drawing attention to their military nature and political ramifications, my 
central proposition is that the totality of imperial relations, both foreign and 
domestic, are geared towards accumulating value, and amongst other process, 
comes about through dispossession, extraction, and exploitation, themselves 
amplified by digital coercion that allow for unprecedented reach. I contend 
that these processes can explain many of the empirical observations about state 
security apparatuses with which I began this book.
This central line investigating military and information technology is an 
uncommon albeit one of the most urgent topics for Communication Studies. 
Sadly, disciplinary stalwarts have made this argument for decades but to lit-
tle avail. Consider how in the mid-1980s, Vincent Mosco lamented how this 
area was ‘ignored’ (1986, 76). In early 2017 he has good grounds to come to 
the same conclusion; that ‘scholars who study media and new communication 
technology tend to ignore the military in favour of examining social media’ 
(2017, 1). This oversight is more perplexing considering that the US Depart-
ment of Defense, with upwards of 1.3 million active service members and aug-
mented with near 750,000 civilians, is one of the world’s largest employers, and 
certainly the biggest single employer in the US (DoD 2017).6 Moreover, with a 
budget of $600 billion in 2015, the DoD is the single biggest purchaser of infor-
mation and communication goods, and so this is a labour process that warrants 
focus and critical attention. It is a ‘bureaucratic colossus’. If anything, it is fair 
to say that Herb and Dan Schiller along with a handful of other researchers are 
the exceptions to this other disciplinary ‘blindspot.’ All in all, Mosco is quite 
correct to chastise communication researchers for this general neglect. And so 
what is required is an analysis of the military that understands battlefields as a 
product of the relationship between war and society as those things themselves 
are coloured by historical forces. To the extent that this book can do that, I aim 
to contribute something to this research agenda.
Aside from the aforementioned themes, and to reiterate, the most impor-
tant area of investigation in this book is the relationship of capital and con-
straint as it is digitally mediated. Selected aspects of constraint are addressed 
throughout my coverage of the various topics in this book, and illustrated by 
cases like state capture, calculated conflict, ghettoization and disposability, 
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uneven-development, and techniques of ideological manipulation. A focus 
on cases like this is not necessarily chronological for the simple fact that not 
all regions are integrated at the same time, nor do all regions require the same 
kind of control at any given point. Jettisoning periodization allows a method-
ological suppleness that has the advantage of seeing how various institutional 
arrangements function within a synthetic whole (cf. Wood 1997, 549).
Accordingly, the aim of this book is simple. It is to plot selected features of 
the American social structure, demonstrating how a capitalist state creates 
structural injustices, stratifications, and inequalities. Examining these ‘laws of 
motion’ further involves a treatment of how intense extraction and exploitation 
creates surpluses that are then used to fund global indirect and informal rule to 
ensure American paramountcy and ultimately conducive conditions for capital 
accumulation. In short, the question of how American capitalism reproduces. 
Accordingly, it is important to resist bifurcating domestic and international 
affairs since these rarely act in isolation of one another; instead, this scope can 
tell us much about the relationship between rulers and ruled irrespective of 
whether these groups live in the US or elsewhere on the planet.
In the opening chapter, I outline my theoretical approach and defend a mate-
rialist critique of digital society, one sensitive to the various components of 
digital rule like new and emerging labour regimes. In the second chapter, I use 
a historical narrative of US state formation to discuss selected aspects of state 
theory. This involves some preliminary discussion of European colonialism in 
the Americas. Throughout this exercise, I try to balance my attention between 
dispossession, inter- and intra-class struggle and changing labour regimes. Vio-
lence receives a central role because of how it supports the accumulation and 
dispossession process. A subsidiary goal is to demonstrate the expanding accu-
mulative drive that seeks to get ahead of inevitable capitalist crises, irrespective 
of whether they occur in fifteenth-century Spain, nineteenth-century Britain, 
or the twentieth-century United States.
Drawing upon an assessment of recent US military budgets and policy state-
ments, the third chapter examines how the security state configures its security 
forces for the twenty-first century. Digital technologies like automated lethal 
robotics such as drones and dragnet surveillance enable the US to increase 
force projection and the maintenance of an imperial system. Chapter Four 
turns towards internal patterns of subjugation. While I touch upon recent 
activism such as Black Lives Matter, prison abolitionists, and the Movement for 
Black Lives, my main purpose is to look at the salient longstanding repressive 
elements in the United States, the very structures which these activists contest, 
all the while demonstrating how the American security state is responsible for, 
and condones this harassment. In Chapter Five I discuss how imperial organi-
zation creates uneven development and then examine the warfare that arises 
from these conditions. Here I pay attention to how territories contended and 
defended for access to resources and markets, were then finally incorporated 
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into imperial domains. Topics in this chapter include the administration of 
zones of violence and zones of pacification.
As code conditions the possibilities of so much of social life, it is important 
for contemporary material analysis. Accordingly, the last chapter addresses 
what Vincent Mosco termed ‘digital positivism’. Herein, I focus on paternalistic 
‘nudges’ predicated upon behavioural economic calculations and bureaucratic 
approval of big data analysis that informs algorithmic regulation. Injunctions 
and interjections drawing upon social theory are therefore required to assess 
how digital technologies of governance and control are used to further capital-
ist state rule. I conclude with some thoughts on the impact of digital coercion 
on a labour regime, suggesting that there will be an increase in unfree labour.
I anticipate that American scholars will likely receive this work in similar 
ways to which European scholars view American studies of their continent, or 
the ways Africans view European studies of theirs: there is certainly a politics 
of outsider observation. Still, while I may not have the knowledge of an insider, 
or be privy to all the subterranean politics within the US social structure, it is 
nevertheless worthwhile continuing to produce, and insist upon, a Southern 
literature that makes the North the subject of study, but on Southern terms. 
This is not because the North is the sole site of history. On the contrary, to my 
mind, this is a complimentary component of understanding the imperial expe-
rience in the South. As many Southern theorists have shown, colonized spaces 
were (and are) experimental sites for rule, military techniques and scientific 
practice, or have made clear that underdevelopment is an intended by-product 
of capital interests in the dominant metropoles (cf. Connell 2007). Insights like 
this underscore that the South has a capacity to write directly and plainly about 
the sites where global oppression and exploitation is initiated. So all this said, 
my interest lies less in satisfying a US audience by pursuing a pure inquiry into 
concepts, and more as an exercise of the South ‘writing back’ identifying some 
of the very features that oppress almost all of us.
In a short book like this one, I cannot marshal all the evidence required to 
prove conclusively the aforementioned propositions. What I do hope to do is 
advance them enough that others might find the general conjecture sufficiently 
compelling to subject it to more scrutiny, lending support where appropriate 
and pruning where necessary. Discarding and reconfiguring select elements are 
likely too. In this spirit, there are items I have left unattended lest this become 
a spiralling multi-volume project. For instance, I hardly raise issues of gender 
in the US social structure, nor do I discuss domestic gun violence, debates on 
reparations, or arms manufacturing. The same is true of many more things. 
This is not absolute neglect stemming from a belief that they do not warrant 
attention, but rather because of a momentary focus elsewhere. Currently it is 
the examination of how digital components of the US social structure exacer-
bate de-democratizing social inequality, jeopardizing basic values and dimin-
ishing prospects for human flourishing.

CHAPTER 1
A Material Critique of Digital Society
In a Marxist vernacular, capital should not be mistaken for an asset class that 
can generate income.7 Rather, historical in nature, capital is a relation found 
sometimes in the exploitation of labour power, sometimes in the products they 
make, sometimes in private property but certainly not limited thereunto. Its 
sole drive is to ‘valorize itself ’ and so accordingly, identifying capital requires 
indirect observations to find a ‘specific social character’ appearing in ‘a defi-
nite social production relation’ in discrete social roles. One common way to 
study capital and the ramifications of its reproduction is to examine the trans-
actions and circulation of commodities. A complimentary avenue, and the one 
explored in this book, is to study the social structure that emanates from the 
uneven pace of extraction and accumulation of value, and how this is under-
written using violence greatly enabled by digital technologies. This involves 
analysing the legacies of how ‘civilized horrors of over-work are grafted onto 
the barbaric horrors of slavery, serfdom’ (Marx 1977, 345). In both cases, there 
is a concern for particular kinds of relations, ones driven by the self-expanding 
drive of value.
Granted, some scholars analyse capitalism strictly as a mode of economic 
organization, presuming it to be a natural manifestation emanating out of 
humans’ trucking, trading, and bartering. Even setting aside this historical 
inaccuracy (cf. Polanyi 1957, Wolf, 2010, Graeber 2011), the preoccupation 
with the hard distinction between the political and the economic must neces-
sarily wither in advance of a more insightful study of the growth of capitalism 
and the uneven development it creates. In the case of the capitalist mode of 
production, it is motivated by the dynamic interplay of capital accumulation 
and labour power. Furthermore, recalling one of Karl Marx’s many insights, 
it is not the things that can be exchanged that is ultimately important, but the 
ability and authority to decide that they can be exchanged in the first place. 
The ability to make a market and extract profits demonstrates the imbalance of 
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power between capitalists and labour. Again, capitalism is a particular kind of 
relationship. This imbalance also reveals that economics is how modern poli-
tics is conducted.
In social analysis, one misses a considerable amount if there is a general 
neglect of how capital sustains a particular structure of power, maintains con-
tradictions, and aggressively conceals itself. Still, even then, the accumulation 
drive is not a smooth or simple expansion. The 2008 Great Recession is a good 
example of how setbacks and crises do occur, but this is a temporary barrier 
until new things are commodified, exploitation is intensified, or resources are 
seized and incorporated into the economy. Each of these processes allows for a 
new phase of expansion, much like nearly a decade after the Great Recession, 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average is at record highs.
At present, capitalism prevails globally despite a culturally heterogeneous 
world and different local politics. This is to say that whatever variety of capital-
ism one confronts, whatever configuration it constructs, whatever veneer it cre-
ates is just particular local contouring. Again, to reiterate a point made above, 
it is not the form that is ultimately important, but the relationships between 
forms. Therefore, despite diverse manifestations and adaptions, capitalism still 
nevertheless has a definable set of principles that produces a distinctive politi-
cal form incumbent with its own rules and norms that applies to the organiza-
tion of authority, obligation, and obedience that in turn colour public affairs, 
international conflict, and most importantly social relations.
One useful way to detect the corroding influence of capital on social rela-
tions is to observe social inequality. To clarify lest there be some confusion: 
Social inequality is not group disparity. Structural inequalities do more than 
distribute wealth upward to the ruling class.8 And they do more than impose 
massive hardships and high hurdles on the truly disadvantaged. They cur-
tail abilities and deprive persons of basic needs. They also generate forms 
of differential power, meaning that the ruling class can undertake collective 
violence at will thereby inducing high levels of social uncertainty and anxi-
ety, which is dealt, almost exclusively, with a punishment regime. There is a 
hidden structure to violence: The technocratic language of industrial trade 
policy can destroy a society as effectively as bombs. Both have precision in 
mind when created. Both from regular use have legitimated and normalized 
the consequences of radical uncertainty that are to be borne almost always by 
persons themselves. As such: social inequality consolidates the ruling class, 
and shatters everyone else.
Following a series of landmarks studies of post-war America, C. Wright Mills 
concluded that decisive state power was in the hands of the military, economic 
and political elites. These groups were interconnected in a social structure 
where capital gave power. This power tended to concentrate; the more secretive, 
the more effective. In contrast to liberal pluralist explanations, this rule was not 
an anomaly, but business as usual (Mills 1948, 1951, 1956). Concurring, Ralph 
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Miliband declared, ‘More than ever before men now live in the shadow of the 
state’ (1969, 1). Therefore, this line of inquiry argued, the unbridled power of 
the capitalist state was a real threat to its citizens. However, contrary to Mills 
and Miliband, one prevailing belief during the late twentieth century was that 
the state was soon to be a redundant unit of analysis in political governance 
and international affairs. This was because multinational corporations had 
transcended the regulatory capacity of any one particular state, while persons 
sensing state decline were reinvesting in cities to open political space to achieve 
their desired quality and way of life.
Nevertheless, even excluding the post-9/11 unveiling of the security state it 
was an error to presume, like the hyper-globalists, that the state had ceased to be 
a viable political actor, or like the hyper-localists that the retreat to cities was an 
adequate political tactic. The state did not disappear in the 1990s; in fact, it was 
present through acts of war, genocide, and economic reconstructing. More-
over, despite the libertarian rhetoric of ‘rolling back the state’ there has been 
instead an enormous centralization of power. Whereas modern democracies 
sought parliamentary or congressional systems, late modern democracies are 
executive democracies; faith is placed in the executive to provide service deliv-
ery and to guarantee civil society. But it also means that the state commands 
the allocation of resources, and keeping in mind where the recession bailout 
money went, this underscores the fact that Mills and Miliband were correct: the 
state has been captured by capitalists. Centralization has also allowed executive 
branches to justify the accrual of instruments of rule that can be used against 
dissidents and rivals. Indeed, historically states have been relentless in using 
force to accrue resources.
Consistent with a long traditional in political theory, I consider the state 
to be an institution that collectivizes violence. As Theda Skocpol writes, ‘any 
state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these 
to create and support coercive and administrative organizations’ (1979, 29). 
Elsewhere Skocpol notes how a state’s system of rule has an extra-national 
dimension while attempting to maintain a domestic order. She writes, ‘states 
necessarily stand at the intersections between domestic sociopolitical orders 
and transnational relations within which they must manoeuvre for survival and 
advantage in relation to other states’ (1985, 8). Preserving rule requires that the 
state undertake the ‘organization of armed forces, taxation, policing, the con-
trol of food supply, and the formation of technical personnel’ (Tilly, 1975, 6). 
Obviously, these resources do not appear overnight. So it is important to note 
that states develop over time, and maintain a path dependency until circum-
stances or social pressure create a new institutional order. This attention to con-
tinuity and change means that is best to study state institutions in light of their 
long causal antecedents, paying particular attention to how the state processes 
social demands into policy as well as the contention over and in institutions by 
various interests, entrenched or otherwise.
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Beyond these observations, the literature on the state tends to split. One 
group comprises of post-colonial and Marxian historians who demonstrate 
how subaltern groups and workers resist, appropriate or help construct the 
state, highlighting how national identities were constituted in part through 
imperial interests. Involved in this project is an extended analysis of how the 
state acquires its reality in the daily experience, oppression, and division of 
the working classes, and how they are put to work on imperial projects. Alter-
natively, orthodox comparative political sociologists are generally more con-
cerned with how state rule is accomplished; as Skocpol summarises it, ‘how 
states formulate and pursue their own goals’ (1985, 9). Tied together, this lit-
erature offers a complimentary analysis of state formation, identity, and capital-
ism. As my interest in this book rests with how the US state’s military apparatus 
secures value and relates to rule, I tend to draw upon the second set of litera-
ture, but I try to keep an eye on who happens to be the subject of state violence.
Of late, social scientists tend towards a nebulous definition of the modern 
state. Emblematic thereof is Schmitter, who defines the state as ‘an amorphous 
complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries performing a variety of not 
very distinctive functions’ (Schmitter 1985, 33, as cited by Hay 1999, 153). 
This is generally at odds with conventional Marxian takes that seek to establish 
that the form and function of the capitalist state, serve the requirements of the 
capitalist mode of production, and aids the reproduction of capitalist relations. 
Nevertheless, beyond the general claim that the state is a nodal point in capital 
relations, there is some disagreement about its precise mechanics. Colin Hay 
groups these mechanics under the labels ‘the state as the repressive arm of the 
bourgeoisie’, ‘the state as an instrument of the ruling class’ and ‘the state as 
a factor of cohesion within the social formation’ (Hay, 1999). While any one 
of these labels may describe any particular capital-state relationship, applying 
more in some cases and less in others, each in their own ways gets bogged 
down when dealing with questions of bureaucratic agency (see Jessop 1990 for 
full details).
One way to avoid this gridlock is to follow Bob Jessop in understanding the 
state as ‘a specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no institu-
tional fixity and no pre-given formal or substantive unity’ (Jessop 1990, 267). 
Jessop’s model views the state as strategically selective, with structures and 
operations that while ‘more open to some types of political strategy than oth-
ers,’ (Jessop 1990, 260) are not beholden to them. For Jessop, there is no guaran-
tee that the state will act as the bourgeoisie’s repressive agents, further the inter-
ests of the ruling class, nor constitute a particular kind of society. Hay sums up 
this contingent approach as ‘there can be no general or fully determinate theory 
of the capitalist state, only theoretically informed accounts of capitalist states in 
their institutional, historical and strategic specificity’ (1999, 171).
I am sympathetic to Jessop’s argument about state actions in a capitalist soci-
ety being contingent, indeterminate, and without guarantee, at least with regard 
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to the intentions of various capitalists themselves. The state’s intervention into 
social life is uneven. Indeed, political aspirations, cadre deployments, and local 
uses of the state apparatus to settle struggles make it appear as if state power and 
action can be wholly idiosyncratic and without an overall inherent purpose. But 
while conceding that the state is not a monolithic enterprise—different agencies 
may advance different practices and visions of state functioning—it neverthe-
less remains important to attend to the nature of the state to understand what 
produces differentials in state functioning and public authority.
In line with the call to be attentive to ‘historical specificity’ I place significant 
emphasis on the state’s effort to preserve and reproduce the social structure by 
being strategically selective and situationally responsive. I call this intention the 
security state, the security kernel to which the ‘amorphous complex of agencies’ 
attaches to, these themselves having ‘no institutional fixity’ because they are 
situationally responsive strategic selections. In this respect, I think the question 
of bureaucratic agency and relative autonomy can be addressed by distinguish-
ing between the securocrats of the security state, who have a narrow agenda 
to maintain their power, and bureaucrats staffing the amorphous complex of 
agencies, whose actions, even if they conflict, are roughly permissible provided 
they do not thwart the securocrats’ goals. This distinction offers one possible 
way of reconciling ‘complexity’ and ‘coherence’ positions staked out in the vari-
ous ongoing debates between state-as-society and state-in-society proponents.
There is another point worth raising: discussion of the state as an ‘actor’ is so 
taken for granted that it is worth remembering that states do not and cannot 
act. Therefore, mentions of state actions or the security state are but shorthand 
for the various people who staff and administer the organization. Granted there 
is much politics and jockeying, inside and between political parties, the federal 
government, the civil service, and the security forces. Brevity and focus exclude 
an extended treatment of this politics, however suffice to say that the Byzan-
tine complex that presently exists seeks to maintain rule and forestall revolt. 
Another important point is that members of the security forces and securocrats 
have a central role in shaping government policy, and in each of their respective 
ways work toward the ‘national interest’. In this way, special attention must be 
given to how rulers acquire their means of rule and the resources required for 
coercion and constraint.
Informed by Marxian analysis, this statist modality seeks to retain the view 
that modes of material production and political domination (overt or other-
wise) are important items to study, it does not restrict itself solely to the internal 
affairs of national entities, but necessarily addresses the international system to 
account for disparate outcomes, like uneven development. Herein this mixture 
of material pressures and the drive to accumulate value pattern the formation 
and development of political and economic relations. One good way to see the 
connection between these items is to examine the ‘economic taproot’ of inter-
national affairs (Hobson 1965, 71). This means the expansionist tendency of 
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capital via imperial action conducted by the state. ‘Imperialism’, John Gallagher 
and Ronald Robinson remind us ‘is a sufficient political function of this process 
of integrating new regions into the expanding economy’ (1953, 5), and can be 
accomplished in many different ways, not necessarily via direct occupation or 
annexation.
To reiterate a theme in my earlier remarks, empire is not just accumulation, 
nor necessarily authoritarian and draconian rule. On the contrary, it is a kind 
of polity. As Charles Maier remarks,
Empire is a form of political organization in which the social ele-
ments that rule in the dominate state…create a network of allied elites 
in regions abroad who accept subordination in international affairs in 
return for the security of their position in their own administrative unit. 
(2006, 7)
Maier adds that empires tend to be differentiated in numerous ways, but that the 
political organization seeks to stabilize these differences by ‘reconciling some 
rituals and forms of equality with the preservation of vast inequality. The empire 
is large enough that zones of violence and zones of pacification can usually be 
kept apart’ (2006, 23). Further, empires are scalar:
They replicate their hierarchical structures and their divisions at all 
spatial levels, macro and micro—at the level of the community and the 
workplace as well as the continent. Hospitals, offices and factories, shop-
ping malls and markets, stadiums, airports and bus terminals, housing 
(from gated communities to urban projects), and so on all recapitulate 
the social structure of the whole. (Maier 2006, 10)
I take this to mean specific accumulation processes are linked to the US social 
structure, inequality and stratification, as well as public institutions. Imperial-
ism also reveals itself in the systematic cooperation between capitalist states; 
this reflects the prevailing balance of power in the international system. Here 
agreements are but a means to maximize returns upon extraction at any given 
time, and should new methods emerge, or should the balance of power shift, 
so strategic selections would change. In effect, peace is less about armistice; 
rather, it is the stability of world order along an American imperative.  This 
understanding of interstate cooperation as tentative, contingent, and without 
guarantee neatly aligns Jessop’s understanding of the state.
There are few other points about imperialism worth mentioning. To begin 
with, the apparent absence of colonial settlement or formal viceroys does not 
indicate the suspension of imperial relations between the United States and the 
other parts of the planet.9 Rather, the important thing is to examine the extent 
to which other countries cater towards the US agenda, these being shorthand 
for the general interests of the US ruling class.
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Furthermore, an exclusive examination of formal organizations like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank, or trade agreements like 
the WTO can overlook the informal set of pressures and influences that seek 
to extort force on other states to do the bidding, however begrudgingly, along 
terms established by the US. In other words, there are pressures to compel par-
ticipation in these organizations and treaties to act in accordance with ‘num-
berless indefeasible chartered freedoms’. So much like how ‘free labour’ refers 
to detachment and destruction of feudal constraints such that human labour 
power could be commodified and exchanged on a market,10 ‘free trade’ refers 
to the process by which the autonomy of particular territories is compromised 
because they are coerced to participate in market exchanges. The stronger party 
sets the tone of these relations, and that strength may not necessarily be directly 
evident in the organizations or treaties themselves. Effectively, a constellation 
of security apparatuses supports the prerogatives of capital accumulation.11
1.1 Radical Political Economy as an Organizing 
Intellectual Framework
In 1999, when Dan Schiller wrote that ‘the arrival of digital capitalism has 
involved radical social, as well as technological, changes’ he was well aware of 
the historical forces that animate our current condition. From his vantage, ‘this 
change does not alleviate, and indeed may increase, the volatility of the market 
system’ (2000, xiv, 206). In 2017, I think Schiller was correct, and that we are now 
seeing state security forces being further integrated into everyday life to police the 
by-products of this market volatility. And so to echo him, I seek to demonstrate 
how inequality and domination are the leading features of digital capitalism.
To guide the analysis in the coming chapters, methodologically I am indebted 
to radical political economy. Unapologetically historical in orientation, this 
approach traces the plurality of trajectories open to state development, but is 
characterized by identifying economics as a prime mover of human affairs. This 
economic foundation of different institutions and their change over time is then 
employed to look at the forces exercised over social life. This understanding of 
economics neatly aligns with Jessop’s remarks about the state being tentative, 
contingent, and without guarantee. In the interest of brevity, I shall not offer a 
pre-emptive defence of this method. Rather, I hope to show the benefits of this 
approach by being able to broadly account for outcomes of security and rule, 
extraction and extortion, exploitation and dispossession. The configuration 
and ratios between these items highlight how this occurs as rulers co-opt and 
make alliances with different classes and subjects, whilst concurrently seeking 
to create and shape certain kinds of subjects. This orientation is analytical, his-
torical, and dialectic.
Guided by the radical political economy tradition, and moulded by 
events like  the Gulf War and the Great Recession, I seek to synthesize much 
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contemporary research on US security state rule whilst simultaneously contrib-
uting to a broader understanding of the dynamics of global capitalism and polit-
ical power in the early twenty-first century, as well as their intersections with 
cultural and social developments. Examining the US security state’s encroach-
ment on civil liberties and the political scramble for positions within the digital 
mode of production I demonstrate how this dynamic structurally contributes to 
the widening social inequality currently being experienced in the US.
This exercise requires strong support, and so I turn to various branches of 
Marxian communication research to account for the inevitable variation caused 
by politics while not losing sight of the general direction of political develop-
ment. This kind of project is a social history concerned with understanding the 
development of structures of oppression and economies of bondage. It includes 
and synthesizes more narrow sectarian concerns to plot them within a broader 
understanding of the totality of history, rather than a fetish for its parts. In 
that respect, there is an analytical utility to grand narratives rationally tested by 
known historical evidence and functional first material causes to envisage how 
structures and patterns unfold over time. The conceptual technique is intel-
lectually productive for adequately understanding the origins, transformation, 
and prospects for social development.
Sadly, grand narratives are epistemologically unfashionable. To explain why 
it is important to know that in the early 1970s American social scientists, in 
line with domestic upheaval in social, economic, and political beliefs and 
institutions, found that the excessive abstraction of explications produced by 
functionalist sociology were nearly entirely devoid of contextual historical pro-
cesses. Functionalism’s implicit assumption that social systems have reached 
stability in the composition of institutions made it inherently difficult to deal 
with social change, and so was ill equipped to understand and explain the most 
basic features of American life in the post-Vietnam War era such as mass pro-
test, racial inequality, urban poverty, and maladaptive political structures.
Following the collapse of structural-functionalism, American social scien-
tists sought to import social theory from Europe and India and as well cul-
tivating revivals of pragmatism, feminism, and communitarianism to enlarge 
conceptual, methodological, and political discussion. These new sources, new 
entrants in general, led to calls for interdisciplinary hoping that cross collabo-
ration would help comprehend the rapid changes to social organization and 
civil life. Much ink was used addressing these kinds of problems within spe-
cific disciplines and produced many handbooks and sourcebooks, theoretical 
manifestos and programs. Boundary policing and disciplinary politics about 
inclusion and exclusion, canon wars, methods all played out at the level of indi-
vidual appointments, search committees, and journal acceptance letters. With 
so much going on, it seemed hubris to claim a conceptual grasp of the whole.
Presently there seems to be a relative conceptual entente characterized by 
efforts to offer a diagnosis of contemporary social conditions. To be sure, much 
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like the aforementioned American social scientists, there is some recognition 
that the intellectual resources at our disposal are insufficient to deal with post-
recession social inequalities, looming environmental catastrophe, and system-
atic oppression of the poor, women, and racialized others. This inadequacy 
comes, in part, from the lack of intellectual synthesis and a prevailing organ-
izing intellectual framework.
Throughout these developments, the radical political economy tradition has 
continued, albeit as a minor literature within the broader social sciences. Not-
withstanding this relatively smaller position, most importantly, within Com-
munication Studies it has maintained due attention to states, conflict, and 
imperial actions (cf. Schiller 1969 as the kernel for this research tradition). This 
is either through research on propaganda (Herman and Chomsky 2002), efforts 
to understand the general regulatory permissibility facilitating capital concen-
tration on the American continent or abroad (Smythe, 1981, Mosco and Schil-
ler 2001), the development of Arpanet (Feenberg 2009), the close connections 
between Silicon Valley, entertainment and militarism (Dyer-Witheford and de 
Peuter 2009, Jin 2013), or the encoded surveillance in emerging labour regimes 
(Cohen 2011, Neff 2012, Huws 2014). Presently, the interest in value theory 
and digital economies harkens back to early attempts to delineate the politics 
and mechanics of industrialism to assess what kinds of structural modifications 
might occur in the present moment as capitalism attempts to consolidate in the 
wake of the Great Recession (Wasko 2014, Fuchs, 2016a).
Like Christian Fuchs, I think Marxian political economics offers the best 
scaffolding for an intellectual agenda that seeks to understand how the vari-
ous parts of society constitute a whole way of life (Fuchs and Winseck 2011, 
267). Scholars within the radical political economy tradition have done much to 
investigate the close connections between the state, its security forces, and capi-
tal. Of course, disagreements abound as intermural debates unfold, but these 
debates underscore an intellectual agenda proudly ‘connected to the struggle 
for a just society’ (Fuchs and Winseck 2011, 268, cf. Greaves 2015). Elsewhere, 
Richard Maxwell writes that Herbert Schiller’s ‘ideas helped foster a distinct 
and robust discourse within critical media studies’ which showed ‘the centrality 
of communication in the imperial “American Century”’ (2003, 1). His focus is 
on the North American element of international political economy where he 
gave central attention to the historical development of states, markets, and con-
flict, social and military alike. Like Schiller in Mass Communication and Ameri-
can Empire, I think there is tremendous benefit to subject foreign policy and 
state security actions to a methodology predicated upon ‘the structural analysis 
of the largest governmental and corporate producers/users of information, as 
well as historical analysis documenting a conscious annexation of this resource 
by US commercial and imperial forces around the world’ (Maxwell, 2003, 30).
However, unlike Schiller, I spend comparably less time examining the global 
resistance and challenges to these aforementioned forces. This is not because I 
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think this resistance is unimportant, or simply because circumstances are dif-
ferent, but rather because in my view the best challenge to American Empire 
comes from the inside, from internal social movements like the Movement 
for Black Lives. Non-exclusionary movements like this one demonstrate how 
a reconstructed Marxism attentive to the legacies of bonded labour in the 
western hemisphere does offer a way out of the intellectual cul-de-sac of fixed 
difference versus false universalism. They also move past the obsessions with 
narrow identities, seeking instead to attend to how the multiplicity of durable 
forms of oppression and exploitation intersect and operate to reproduce social 
inequalities. Moreover, these groups are not just offer an inward gaze, but are 
deeply concerned with American imperial actions worldwide, and so seek to 
build transnational alliances, to take but one example, support Palestinians by 
seeking to reduce American martial support for Israel.
So while this book is not an intellectual history of the radical political econ-
omy tradition, it does use their concepts to produce an analysis of the US social 
structure, the coercive elements of global capitalism, and the particular role 
of digital technologies as coercive in themselves, as well as sites of coercion. 
To this end, I endorse Fuchs and Nick Dyer-Witheford when they write that 
‘Marxian analyses are crucial for understanding the contemporary role of the 
Internet and the media in society’ (2012, 793). This kind of project is vital given 
digital technologies have enabled the militarization in all aspects of social life, 
even areas that were once previously beyond the reach of state violence. This 
creates a certain pattern of rule, both abroad and domestic. It is this pattern that 
I shall attempt to describe in the chapters ahead.
1.2 The Need to Jettison Idealism
Despite the aforementioned literature, one acute problem in Communication 
Studies more broadly is the neglect of the radical tradition and commodifica-
tion, let alone the coercive components of that process. Dan Schiller laments 
that this tradition is the ‘sideshow’ in the discipline (2011, 265). This sentiment 
is not meant to lionize the radical, but rather to suggest that there now exists 
a general historiographic amnesia of the very intellectual tradition that nur-
tured and gave the discipline distinction. Researchers know historical facts, but 
are not historically minded. This amnesia is a methodological limitation that 
curtails empirical inquiry as well as ignores the politicized contexts in which 
academic questions and concepts emerge.
However, more than neglect, the absence of genuine historical sensitivity 
reflects a twenty-first-century idealism. I do not mean that this is a feature 
of this or that current of this or that theory. Nor do I mean it emanates from 
this particular geographic region, or that sociological stratum of researchers. 
I mean that this is generally the disposition of the discipline as a whole and 
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its overall trajectory, and I mean this in metaphysical, historical, and ethi-
cal senses: conceiving of reality as confined to perceptions, then discussing, 
rationalising and evaluating an agent’s actions in these terms is limited and 
partial. Granted, ideas are properties of finite embodied minds, but they are 
also products of historically developing social relations like widespread com-
modity production. A disciplinary anthropology self-confined to conveying 
an agent’s ontology or aesthetics preferences tells us less than what we ought 
to know about the historical specificity of those beliefs, and the reason—often 
elusive to the agents themselves—why those particular beliefs exist at all.
One can see idealism manifest in the revisionist prioritising of agency or the 
fetish of partial sectarian standpoints and the subjective sentimental judge-
ments which arise therefrom. It is also present in studies completely under-
taken without reference to material change, or when researchers emphasize 
‘nuance’ but miss the explicitly entrenched interests of capital. When scholars 
guided by this idealistic tendency confront material analysis, they often dismiss 
it as reductive and ethically lapsed for it is inconsistent with an agent’s textured 
self-description. Nevertheless, a good grasp of historically grounded political 
economy is imperative to understand the structures that shape and situate a 
person’s lived experience, the very forces that give self-description texture in 
the first place. If anything, historical materialism properly executed is anath-
ema to reduction precisely because of the emphasis on the various particular 
elements that constitute totality.
This would otherwise be an academic quarrel if not for the fact that the 
neglecting material change invites politics to become exclusively linguistic in 
character. Discourse is what is fought over, such as whether one presents the 
appropriate sentiments or uses the permitted descriptions. This discourse is 
meant to be corrective to structural injustice, but ironically, politics ultimately 
comes to favour those skilled in the use of language by demanding an under-
standing of linguistic and social codes that the truly disadvantaged cannot 
possibly have already learnt outside of elite higher education, itself subject to 
numerous class barriers. Inadvertently, this politics polices the expression of 
lived experiences. So if language exclusively sets the terms of engagement and 
material evaluation is foreclosed, then there is a great distance between what 
is thought to be true, and what is true. Idealists can thus posture as radicals 
without ever expending any effort to first examine material causes that give rise 
to exploitation, inequalities, and oppression. As with all forms of idealism, this 
allows the beneficiaries of the social structure to escape criticism by being rhe-
torically nimble. In effect, idealism actually disrupts efforts to dismantle alien-
ating socioeconomic conditions, and so it weakens scholarship as well as pro-
viding a poor substitute for political practice concerned with changing social 
relationships to the means of production. This means Bryan Palmer’s adage—
‘Critical theory is no substitute for historical materialism; language is not life’ 
(1990, xiv)—applies as much now, as it did at the height of the ‘history wars’.
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One must not infer from this brief critique of communicative idealism that I 
dismiss agency to follow an agenda. It is quite the contrary. Persons and their 
universal emancipation are ultimately the prime Marxian concern—it is the 
desire for humans to reach their de-alienated species-being: as the adage goes, 
‘from each according to their ability, to each according to their need’. Alter-
natively, in a contemporary register: living according to the utility-sufficiency 
principle persons can fulfil their capacity and flourish. This is what matters. And 
it is only through class struggle from below, that is coordinated actions of per-
sons using what situated agency they have, that emancipation is possible allow-
ing persons to ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon.’ Still, there is much 
that persons do not know, only partially aware of, mistaken about, or guided by 
ideological priors. This is because we live in a social structure where the impera-
tive is to ‘accumulate, accumulate!’ Techniques are thus required to compensa-
tion accordingly, and this is the role of Marxian theory. ‘Theory’, Palmer argues,
is the only way to enhance a history of lived experience, extending under-
standing of the past in ways that can address human activity with an 
appreciation of the confinements that were not necessarily perceived and 
fully comprehended by men and women caught within them. (1990, 94)
To make the point another way: The lived experiences and various beliefs of 
communication researchers influences their studies and approaches. Research-
ers are continually shaped by the interaction of identities and class. In my case, 
this work is informed by growing up in the Global South when the Berlin Wall 
fell. These events facilitated the end of South African Apartheid. Being from 
South Africa, there was an ever-present awareness of how natural resources 
extraction and international trade, client states and interventions, state security 
forces and military raids, race and class shaped biographies and social issues. 
Yet, until theory is used to pry open the relationships between apparently dis-
crete areas, it is hard to understand a ‘whole way of life’ and the long-tail rami-
fications of structural injustices as various parts work together to reproduce a 
stratified social order. Seeking some understanding of the totality of intercon-
nected processes requires paying close attention to ‘definite social production 
relations.’ Ultimately, it is this desire for enhancement that animates the grand 
narrative of several features of a historically specific social structure. But doing 
so first and foremost requires jettisoning reoccurring idealism.
1.3 The Labour Regimes of Digital Capitalism
One way for Communication Studies to do justice to its radical and mate-
rial heritage would be to pay more attention to the coercive aspects of labour 
regimes that are created by a capitalist ruling class located in the United 
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States but which have global ramifications. Nowhere is this more visible than 
in ‘digital capitalism’. Digital capitalism is predicated upon thin margins on 
vast volumes of trades to produce revenue, but also huge inequality and poor 
employment thereby pointing to impending conflicts over the struggle of social 
reproduction. As I will explain, this is because digital communication, with its 
low transaction costs, is both an enabler and site of global capital accumulation 
efforts. This mode of accumulation gathered momentum when national capi-
talism declined towards the end of the twentieth century as the infrastructure 
of money became decentralized and global, transforming not only economic 
sectors but whole economies. This is the key to understanding twenty-first-
century labour regime changes and I will revisit the topic towards the end of 
Chapter 2, as well as in Chapter 5.
To deploy Mills’ terms it is clear that digital entrepreneurs are the ‘new men of 
power’. Bezos, Gates, Huffington, Omidyar, Thiel, and Zuckerberg are the leading 
edge of a billionaire class who have increased their wealth from less than $1 trillion 
in 2000 to over $7 trillion in 2015. Granted, they have different market strategies 
and products, but each pursues the same basic goal: they seek to induce disrup-
tions and efficiencies with little regard for anything other than profit. Developing 
online platform services that profit from uncompensated digital work, this ruling 
class is an unaccountable centre of power notorious for absconding tax obliga-
tions, and who employ relatively few people in their companies. Structurally, the 
result is a rapid transfer of wealth from the many to the few.
In the meantime, it is important to note that in the digital mode of pro-
duction even seemingly minor technical changes can have significant social 
ramifications. Consider that the pending impact of automated vehicles extends 
beyond job losses for professional freight drivers or satellite support sectors like 
independent mechanics, auto parts retail, car washes, and dealerships but also 
includes administrative positions in government licensing departments and 
insurance companies. Still, the same technology can be used for warehouses 
and storage facilities, further reducing the requirement for labour. This exam-
ple illustrates how the digital mode of production does not level the playing 
field, but rather introduces and even amplifies existing social inequalities. The 
resultant concentration of wealth is less because of any one particular develop-
ment, and more because intellectual property governs and facilitates the quali-
fied production, distribution and exchange of commodities. In this sense, this 
property regime is a key site of social struggle. It has several distinct forms:
To begin, the digital market itself is a de facto rent economy; digital rights 
management ensures that product tampering or modification voids use, and 
that resale rights are limited.12 In this sense, the relationship between the pro-
ducer and the consumer is inverted; instead of production serving the interests 
of consumption, the interests of the consumer are subsidiary to the producer. 
The power dynamic in this kind of economy is central to the social costs of 
digital capitalism.
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While on the topic of costs, digital capitalists try to carry as few as possible. 
For example, in the early 1990s, tax havens accounts held ‘more than 20 percent 
of US foreign direct investment and nearly a third of the foreign profits of U.S. 
firms’ (Hines and Rice, 1994). Now the digital economy has put this into over-
drive. As Katherine Rushton reports,
Amazon’s UK operation generated £4.2bn of sales last year [2012], but 
it used a subsidiary in Luxembourg to help it reduce its corporation 
tax bill in the country to just £2.4m in 2012. According to documents 
filed at Companies House, the company received £2.5m in government 
handouts over the same period. (Rushton 2013)
Amazon replied, saying that [it] ‘pays all applicable taxes in every jurisdiction 
that it operates within.’ (see Rushton 2013). Globally, Google has a tax rate of 
6.6 per cent (Mossman 2016), and their own fillings show how they ‘avoided 
about $2 billion in worldwide income taxes in 2011 by shifting $9.8 billion in 
revenues into a Bermuda shell company, almost double the total from three 
years before’ (Drucker 2012). These tax havens are no more than the commer-
cialisation of the sovereignty of fairly fragile or welcoming minnow states; in 
short deliberate attempts to withhold money from redistributive exercises. 
The Panama Papers describe the mechanisms and means the global ruling 
class use to safeguard their wealth. Given the deliberately complex arrange-
ments, Gabriel Zucman (2015) nevertheless proposes a conservative estimate 
that 8 per cent of the world’s financial wealth, or about $7.6 trillion in 2014, is 
hoarded in tax havens. This figure will likely increase as emerging economies in 
the Global South are looted with impunity and as the 0.01 per cent aggressively 
seek to conceal their wealth. As it pertains to the US Ruling Class, American 
companies report most of their profits in international subsidiaries that are 
located in low tax jurisdictions, irrespective of where the goods and services 
are produced. The money is periodically repatriated under tax amnesties but 
without significant penalty. In turn, governments overlook tax havens precisely 
because they are protecting corporate profitability.
A third broad source of problems is a digital divide between labour and 
capital. Marked by differences in marketable skills and technical competency, 
this divide has profound implications for class (de)composition and the labour 
regime. Supporting Christian Fuchs’s (2014) observations above, Enda Bro-
phy (2011, 2015) notes how emerging market economies attempt to develop 
technical service centres, but find themselves betrothed to the risks of capital 
flight. Here foreign direct investments and capital mobility create and maintain 
a labouring class that is just technically competent enough to do menial digi-
tal work, but hindered from developing technical expertise where they could 
become producers, and then competitors themselves.
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The cumulative effect of ownership for accumulation requires ever-increased 
efficiencies of production. Initially, this process attempts to make embodied 
labour—that is the labour time required to make a commodity—the same as 
counterfactual labour, which is the labour time required necessary to make a 
commodity. In effect, persons are treated as if they are machines, able to be ever 
more efficient. However, when increased demands for profits require efficien-
cies beyond what the person’s counterfactual labour might be able to offer there 
is little other option but to automate the labour process. Two options are pos-
sible: either people are left unemployed and underpaid, or subject to a labour 
market which has yet to account for the intervention of mechanization. This 
has disastrous impacts for the relative wellbeing of a society. In short, the excess 
desires for accumulation breaks social goods and introduces new social forms, 
many of which have undesirable social consequences.
Turning attention away from inequalities and towards the organization of 
workplaces themselves, the digital component of digital capitalism facilitates 
the decentralization of the workplace. This means that work occurs at several 
locations. While some workers may find decentralization conducive to their 
immediate interests, over the long run it favours the employer by far. To be 
clear, decentralization is not democratization. A central workplace is an ame-
nable condition to foster labour organization thereby providing unions with 
an opportunity to strike and disrupt production. By contrast, decentraliza-
tion means that chances of successful contention begin to diminish. Instead, 
encounters between organized labour and capital are replaced by individu-
ated direct dealings, with utility and compensation determined on a case-by-
case basis. Increasingly workers compete with each other because they are 
well aware that they are interchangeable. Again, some workers might find due 
reward for their ability and contribution appealing, but overall this favours the 
few as opposed to the many.
Contrary to narratives suggesting otherwise, digital workplaces seek to 
deskill their employees as a way to break the labour costs of highly-skilled 
employees. Deskilling has other benefits too. For one, this process favours the 
employer as it lessens the training cost for employees, limits the employee from 
starting up their own firm, but also allows worker turnover, all the while using 
the divided labour process to thwart workers from recognising a shared strug-
gle. The ruling class and their agents have then spent considerable time pro-
moting the narrative that automation, not politics, is the cause of job losses in 
the manufacturing sector.
In an economy with rampant deskilling, high divisions of labour, and ready 
supply of cheap labour, workers have few opportunities to differentiate them-
selves. Thus, the unique grounds for an individual worker’s wage and salary 
bargaining are structurally undermined. In these circumstances, workers have 
two broad options. First, they could acquire additional skills, but often at their 
own expense or financed with debt. For workers undertaking affective labour, 
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these skills are often intangible and are normally distinctive to personalities. 
Courses teaching affective skills have proliferated even as it is difficult to estab-
lish solid criteria because of the intangible nature of affect. Soon a dilemma 
arises, for as primary skill sets become narrow and sufficiently common, these 
intangibles become methods of distinction and inform hiring decisions.
Where labour docility and corporate sycophancy are desired attributes, hiring 
can be made on the basis of affective servitude, and the willingness of workers to 
embody the corporate ‘brand’, which is nothing less than the entire subordination 
of a person to the goals and purpose of the company as a whole, as opposed to 
simply being a place to work. Further, it is now an accepted norm that companies 
will search for a person’s online profiles to assess whether they would be a suitable 
employee – in some cases even demanding passwords to online accounts.
Skilled workers in research and development or executive management 
are well paid, but they are only a fraction of Silicon Valley’s workforce. Most 
employees are underpaid. Consider that Apple employs about 50,000 people in 
the US, but two-thirds of them work in retail and earn approximately $25,000, 
significantly less than the mean national income at near $40,000. Workers who 
possess skills that are in demand have some geographic mobility, either through 
international operations, or by deciding to work for other companies. Knowing 
this, a skilled worker can be enticed to stay with the company, often through 
stock options. However, as the case of Enron best illustrates, the downside is 
that the stock options are tied to the company’s performance, and given the 
fictitious nature of this value, it can evaporate due to corruption and misman-
agement by majority shareholders and senior executives.
Capitalists favour decentralization and deskilling for an additional reason: 
short-term contracting and a rotating labour force leave little local labour mem-
ory, and employees must heed demands to increase their productive capacities, 
or they are not retained for the next project. The pretence is that workers are 
entrepreneurial subcontractors who collaborate with firms. Nevertheless, this 
more resembles sharecropping insofar that there is an illusion that workers 
are freely choosing their life course (and sometimes they are insofar that the 
system allows them to do so) but these persons are still beholden to a system 
which has shifted the risk from capital to workers. There is also the asymmetri-
cal information of the process that capital withholds from workers. Together, 
this is a designed recalibration of the burden of risk: workers carry what used 
to be done by capital. Simply put, decentralization has radically shifted the bal-
ance of power to employers to the extent that capitalists can push portions of 
risk onto the labour force and population as a whole. One major problem is that 
people now live in precarious circumstances characterized by highly individu-
ated work in workplaces with little room to confront employers.
Unfortunately, most digital work itself lacks meaning, social purpose, genu-
ine agency or discretionary judgement. The intensity to maintain productivity 
gains means that contemporary workplaces are mentally taxing and emotionally 
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draining. Productivity gains mean that there could be shorter workdays, but 
capital seeks to maximize the exploitation of labour. Additionally, longer work 
hours are a means of rule, dissipating a person’s energy, paired with an eco-
nomic culture calculated and built upon consumptive practices meant to shore 
up emotions, status, and boredom (Graeber 2013).
Even the unemployed are often busy undertaking unpaid work simply for 
the honour thereof. Although it can be for the social good, like voluntary com-
munity service, some work is undertaken at corporations or public institutions. 
These kinds of jobs range from internships to research associateships at medi-
cal units and are often undertaken to hide unemployment, maintain skills or 
access to institutional resources, accrue professional networks, as well as main-
tain a personal identity and a belief of social contribution. While these may be 
good reasons to do the work, their circumstances are precious and marginal. 
Moreover, as these jobs are funded out of pocket by the unpaid worker, they are 
in fact subsidizing the employer for what Erik Bahre (2014) describes as ‘the 
honour of exploitation’. This means that unpaid workers draw upon state or 
civic welfare, family or intergenerational wealth, or personal debt to subsidize 
corporations or institution. This is the near ultimate reserve army of labour; at 
capital’s disposal and off the books.
Within professions, unpaid internships are used as class filters. Effectively, 
as Sarah Kendzior puts it, they transform ‘personal wealth into professional 
credentials’ (2013) all the while undermining wages. This aids differential life 
chances as these credentials beget other opportunities. In this framework, the 
rich use divide and rule tactics to create a near global labour market wherein 
wages are in a race to the bottom. At the bottom, forces within the state are mak-
ing life harder for the unemployed by withdrawing social services or putting in 
place humiliating means testing (cf. de Peuter, Cohen, and Brophy 2015).
Altogether, these developments point to a totalising predicament where many 
people will lose their source of income then have to compete in a labour market 
where their skills are redundant, and in which the number of jobs are shrinking. 
With looming machine learning, there is little to indicate that this will change. 
So it is morally callous to simply tell people to work harder or longer hours, or 
to insist that they undertake low-wage easy-entry work, in part because this 
kind of work is currently hard to come by as it is. Along similar lines, as not 
everyone can perform difficult, high skill, high demand jobs it seems contrary 
to human flourishing to enrol people in meaningless make-work projects as 
it wastes valuable human potential and time that a person could use to enrich 
their life. In short, persons are exploited for their surplus until they are surplus.
A fourth point worth considering is the entanglement of the international 
division of labour. To better illustrate this divide, consider Apple, a company 
that at the end of 2016 had nearly $240 billion in savings: it clearly  represents 
issues surrounding material and immaterial labour in digital capitalism. 
 Marisol Sandoval writes,
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For many years Apple’s products have been known as the preferred 
digital production technologies for the knowledge work of designers, 
journalists, artists and new media workers. iPhone, iPod and Co are 
symbols for technological progress that enables unprecedented levels 
of co-creation and sharing of knowledge, images and affects as well as 
interaction, communication, co-operation etc. At the same time during 
the past years Apple has become an infamous example for the existence 
of hard manual labour under miserable conditions along the supply 
chain of consumer electronics. (Sandoval 2013, 319)
Elsewhere, when describing the materiality of digital labour, Trebor Scholz says,
It’s worth remembering that whether a worker toils in an Amazon ware-
house or works for crowdSPRING, her body will get tired and hungry. 
She’ll have to take care of car payments, medical bills for her children, 
and student debts, not to mention saving for retirement. Digital work 
makes the body of the worker invisible but no less real or expendable. 
(Scholz cited by Carrigan 2017)
These bodies—as well as the international division of labour—are often an 
afterthought. Unfortunately, this is why people tend to overlook that ‘the global 
information economy is built in part on the backs of tens of millions Chinese 
industrial workers’ (Zhao and Duffy 2008, 229). These bodies are important 
components in global supply chains. Meanwhile, the management of these 
goods ‘overlap with specific time conflicts with are inherent in worker exploita-
tion and the associated strategies of class rule’ (Hope 2016). Thus, the coordi-
nation of space and time is crucial to understand the labour regimes of digital 
capitalism. But the nature of digital work is the disaggregation of workflows 
and permits the general neglect of how labours and infrastructures combine to 
create these supply chains.
Nevertheless, there is a coming crisis as the Chinese working class aspires to a 
fairer share of profits. ‘The labour force in China, the base of global electronics 
supply chains’, Vincent Mosco writes,
has grown restive in recent years, prompting tighter workplace controls 
and a redeployment of electronic manufacturing sites. It is unlikely 
these measures will do anything more than delay the inevitable choice 
between substantially raising the living standards, including the wages, 
working conditions and political freedom of China’s workforce, or face 
escalating mass civil unrest. (Mosco 2016, 526, cf Sealey 2010)
Accordingly, one contributing factor in China’s ‘historic claims’ over the South 
China Sea is to use nationalist sentiments to help quell and offset brewing civil 
unrest.
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1.4 The State of Data
Gina Neff and Dawn Nafus note that ‘when data mediates so many things, 
control over the meanings of data is a type of power’ (2016, 186). With this 
remark in mind, I turn to briefly give attention to the digital mode of produc-
tion, which Vincent Mosco illustrates by using the case of cloud computing. 
This mode ‘involves the storage, processing, and distribution of data, applica-
tions and services for individuals and people’ (Mosco, 2014, 17, also see Mosco 
2016, 517). It also ‘deepens and extends opportunities to eliminate jobs and 
restructure the workforce’ (Mosco, 2014, 166), by ‘increase[ing] the economic 
efficiency of networks by allowing them to be shared more thoroughly and 
effectively among many users’ (Schiller, 2000, xv).
Set side by side with the decentralized and on-demand workforce, cloud 
computing enables aspects of ‘leaner production’. Co-currently, the minia-
turization and relative cheap cost of sensors means that they can be installed 
almost anywhere to detect almost anything, allowing distributed networks to 
collect a range of data. And so social life is increasingly excessively mediated 
through data or platforms that harness data. To be sure, as the average internet 
user spends nearly three hours per day on social media networks; they create 
consumer data for behavioural analysis. Mosco writes that ‘cloud computing 
and big data are vital for building and managing the global supply chains nec-
essary to sustain the complex networks of transnational capital’ (Mosco 2016, 
526), and if the previous section is correct, then the entangled labour regimes 
do not offer much hope to increase human flourishing: what freedom there will 
be is workers free from the ownership of property.
Despite my assessment, scholars like Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Ken-
neth Cukier make the promissory proclamation that ‘The world of big data, is 
poised to shake up everything from businesses and the sciences to healthcare, 
government, education, economics, the humanities, and every other aspect 
of society’ (2013, 11) Similarly, Erik McAfee and Andrew Brynjolfsson laud 
this this development as a near unparalleled ‘management revolution’ offer-
ing more opportunities for competitive advantage and improved forecast-
ing (2012). This practice is only going to become more common as it is now 
cheaper to store data than delete it.
These ‘celebrants’ suggest that the comprehensive scope of big data will over-
come the problems of limited samples, incomplete data, and other kinds of 
sampling errors showing that was once thought to be idiosyncratic behaviour is 
a product of deeper, hidden variables. Implicit in this endeavour is the assump-
tion that with enough sophisticated statistical tools and a large enough collec-
tion of data, signals of interest can be weeded it out from the noise in large and 
poorly understood social systems thereby overcoming the limits of intuitive lay 
accounts of causal relations thus correcting for perceptive bias.
Notwithstanding the possibilities, the big data hubris has several methodo-
logical oversights. As boyd and Crawford (2012) note, it changes not only the 
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scale and scope of research, but also the ‘objects of knowledge’. To use a mun-
dane example, as most data analysis involves cleaning there is always a moment 
for subjective decision making about categorization. Furthermore, irrespective 
of size, big data is hardly random or representative. So big datasets are not nec-
essarily good datasets. As Alice Marwick writes, ‘Big Data is made up of “little 
data,” here, ‘Each piece of information, by itself, may be inconsequential. But 
the aggregation of this information creates a larger picture that may be more 
than the sum of its parts.’ (2013, 2, 5) Moreover, the proprietary nature of big 
datasets means that there is no general epistemic community to check meth-
odology and results.
This means one needs to understand the conditions of production of data, 
and this includes the potential methodological compromises or compounded 
sampling errors of datasets that are laced together. These limitations curtail 
possible statistical interpretations. So as boyd and Crawford note ‘claims to 
objectivity and accuracy are misleading’. Irrespective of size and scale, datasets 
have limitations to the kinds of queries that can be run, and so have partial 
conclusions.
Compounding these methodological errors, Zeynep Tufekci notes that web-
platforms have sampling and selection issues. These arise ‘when big data sources 
are too few,’ she writes, ‘and when structural biases of these too few sources 
cannot be adequately explored’ (2014a, 1). The design characteristics of these 
platforms matter, as those that design the system, design which questions to ask, 
and so in turn get to dictate the shape of the findings. Jaron Lanier elaborates:
Facebook suggests not only a moral imperative to place certain infor-
mation in its network, but the broad applicability of one template to 
compare people. In this it is distinct from Google, which encourages 
semistructured online activity that Google will be best at organizing 
after the fact. Twitter suggests that meaning will emerge from fleeting 
flashes of thought contextualized by who sent the thought rather than 
the content of the thought. In this it is distinct from Wikipedia, which 
suggests that flashes of thought be inserted meaningfully into a shared 
semantic structure. Wikipedia proposes that knowledge can be divorced 
from point of view. In this, it is distinct from the Huffington Post, were 
opinions fluoresce. (Lanier 2013: 188–9).
Notwithstanding the different appearances of the design of these platforms, 
common to all of them is a process of ‘datafication’. This process is the induc-
tion of previously quantified items, and storing them for later examination or 
sale. Here, ‘Google’s augmented-reality glasses datafy the gaze. Twitter datafies 
stray thoughts. LinkedIn datafies professional networks.’ The problem with a 
datafication design is that it cannot capture historical elements, meaning that 
researchers have a one-dimensional understanding of the present.
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The value of data lies in making connections and seeing patterns in mined 
and aggregated data, about the relationships whatever they might be, whether 
as boyd and Crawford write ‘about an individual, about individuals in relation 
to others, about groups of people, or simply about the structure of information 
itself.’ This is the attempt to quantify and score all aspects of human perfor-
mance. But in trying to measure the things that can be measured, so presuming 
all important job information is quantitative and not qualitative. As the adage 
goes, just because something is easy to measure does not mean it is important 
while counting the countable because they are countable is hardly an improve-
ment. Therefore, there are epistemological category mistakes and this renders 
conceptually flawed interpretations of actions.
Besides epistemic errors, it is important to note that big data has class effects. 
To elaborate, the observational and predictive analysis of big data sets will give 
some an advantage to certain kinds of opportunities. What will emerge is a 
kind of information inequality. Thus, the principle of equality of opportunity 
is eroded if it is not paired with equal access information. To this extent, the 
enclosure and commodification of data will likely follow a similar tale to that 
of land; the need to do so arises from the crisis and limitations of the prevailing 
mode of production, and this instituted change supported by the state through 
law and coercion.
There is a prima facie case that new digital technologies of governance and 
control continue the objectives of Taylorism’s scientific management by seeking 
to retain a monopoly of knowledge over the work process to raise productivity 
and reduce overheads. This management revolution is rhetorically positioned 
as for employee self-improvement. However, more nefariously, by employing 
predictive statistical analysis of performance-outcome and user-generated data 
the field of ‘worker analytics’ seeks to extend managerial control to statically 
capture and assess. Dedicated analytics teams are attempting to use predic-
tive analytics to assist companies ‘grow smarter’. These processes illustrate the 
respective efforts to optimize the exploitation of labour. This fine micro-analy-
sis of workplace behaviour means that workers are vulnerable to dehumaniza-
tion as their ‘time-on-tasks’ are repeatedly logged (see Huws 2016).
The hubris of a relentlessly empirical data-driven approach to the labour 
market, supposedly means the transformation of nearly every aspect of hir-
ing, performance assessment, and management. Efficacy is meaningless if this 
practice is ethically fraught and unduly intrusive. Even so, there is a legitimate 
concern that this kind of approach will lead to systematic bias against whole 
groups of people by increasing the divergent life courses between classes, mak-
ing upward social mobility even more difficult and so solidifying social strati-
fication. Without a person’s consent, their digital footprints are being sought 
to quantify and measure that person’s employability, and hence their ability to 
reproduce themselves in capitalism. The proposed benefits of cost savings and 
increased efficiency are questionable returns for mass surveillance or when 
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automation mistreats human interactions as problems in need of technical 
solutions. This is especially true given the relationships between corporate sur-
veillance of consumers and workers, and the US government’s domestic sur-
veillance of citizens, a topic which I will address at length in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. Altogether, these errors set up the ruling class for a gilded life.
While these developments are worrying in and of themselves, the larger 
purpose of this analysis is for capitalist firms to identify areas where they can 
automate their administrative and clerical labour, either replacing the labour 
regime, or using the threats of these technological interventions to suppress 
wages (Mosco 2016, 522). This is a continuation of the general tend to assess 
the labour process to see what machinery can be substituted for employees. 
Where once manufacturing jobs evaporated, so too is there the looming pros-
pect of ‘knowledge workers’ jobs evaporating.
These cases point to some of the perennial problems of labour, which are 
reduced labour demand, efforts to induce labour docility, and the creation of 
a reserve army of labour, and an international division. Any potential labour 
renaissance has to work around these realities. Nevertheless, labour move-
ments are fragmented and union membership is in decline while it is rare that 
emerging areas of the economy are unionized. Meanwhile, collective labour 
is largely defensive, seeking to hold onto provisions largely at the expense of 
future employees who will likely not be extended the same provisions.
Weak labour rights are unsurprising, for in a market society capital is given 
the lion’s share of policy concern and consideration. It has also allowed capital 
to reinterpret labour law to shift as much of the cost of labour training onto the 
public purse and personal debt, all the while claiming that the profit margins 
are too tight for regulatory tinkering. This rhetoric is doing little more than 
ensuring that electorates do not push for suitable administrative oversight. 
This way capital can maintain control over the production process. Beyond the 
need of a reserve workforce, capital has always fantasised about all other labour 
being self-supported and ready-to-hand.
Central to these labour regimes is the state. The capitalist state maintains 
the rule of law and so enforces private property rights. A high functioning 
state is necessarily symbiotic to markets, providing the basic public goods and 
power supply that enable profit-seeking activity. As a contemporary example, 
the products that digital entrepreneurs peddle are only possible because uni-
versities or the US military supported the initial research. The utility of cellu-
lar devices that connect to the internet or rely upon GPS comes directly from 
US state investment, through either TCP/IP which was a DARPA project, or 
TRANSIT, a satellite navigation system created for the US Navy. All of the fun-
damental research of private commercialized digital technologies—the ones 
currently driving the US economy—has been paid for by the public sector. This 
happened via grants to universities, but also through defence procurement. To 
elaborate, often under the pretext of increasing security, one of the main roles 
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of the Pentagon has been to use tax revenue to subsidize the ongoing develop-
ment of advanced digital technologies until these become profitable. Using the 
public sector to carry the enormous costs, the ruling class has been able to 
sustain research into improved manufacturing of items like transistors, super-
computers, aircraft, satellites, fibre optics, all of which are then are transferred 
to the private sector where profits can be extracted. This is but another way in 
which the security state protects the interests of the ruling class.
Granted, Silicon Valley and the security state do not always neatly align, as 
the iPhone encryption case after the 2015 San Bernardino attack demonstrates, 
but such cases are anomalies. For the most part there is a tight convergence 
between these two clusters of interests. The convergence is evident when agen-
cies of the security state purchase data storage services from Amazon Web 
Services (AWS), or when Eric Schmidt, the former chief executive officer of 
Google, was invited to head a newly formed Pentagon advisory board aimed at 
bringing Silicon Valley innovation and best practices to the US military. This 
development creates ‘a dangerous direct connection between anti-democratic 
forces in the United States’ (Mosco, 2016, 519).
Still, the basic facts of the organization of cloud computing specifically and 
the digital mode of production more generally predispose persons to surveil-
lance. As data moves from being under personal control to being vested with 
remote parties it is susceptible to surveillance and analysis. This is because the 
nature of capitalist firms is to maximize profit-seeking ventures, even if they 
come at the expense of ethical norms like privacy; it is simply a part of their 
everyday business practices (see Mosco 2014). When there are objections to 
this general organization of digital production, it tends to concentrate upon 
cybercrime where hackers have compromised the security of these facilities in 
one form or another and customers have been compromised. But in an ironic 
twist, digital firms deflect and use these events to increase state controls over 
information, thus justifying the growth of the security state’s investigative pow-
ers in the area. All in all, people do not know the full extent of how their audi-
ence power is commodified and how vulnerable they are to subjugation
What political resistance there is to this social structure is itself vulnerable to 
digital coercion because activists’ ‘digital repertoire of contention’ and organ-
izing is predicated upon using tools owned by the ‘new men of power’ or sur-
veilled by the security state. This is particularly acute for the ‘The New Civil 
Rights Struggles’ currently underway in North America; struggles which are 
inflected by matters of identity and class, as well as responses to the intrusion 
and shaping of conceptions security and freedom through algorithmic regula-
tion, whether by corporate entities or by the state.
Movements like #OccupyWallStreet, #BlackLivesMatter, and #StopSOPA, as 
well as the national security whistleblowers like Chelsea Manning and Edward 
Snowden, make the headlines, but they are a fraction of a great many organiza-
tions labouring against structural injustice. Despite their differences, a shared 
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feature of these organized struggles is how their demands for a radically reform-
ative politics is fundamentally incompatible with actually existing capitalism. 
A product of increasing social inequality broadly construed, these new civil 
rights struggles are advancing the outlines of political agenda part reformative 
and part revolutionary and attempts to contend stratifications solidifying in 
the early part of the twenty-first century. The social and political theory behind 
this is orientated towards the repressive dimensions of political and economic 
power of the capitalist state and its security auxiliaries.
Contrary to prevailing ideology, the practices and processes I have described 
above are persistent problems of capitalism: it makes people surplus to produc-
tion without granting them the dividends of that production. As Jean and John 
Comaroff write,
Capitalism flourishes as democracy is displaced by autocracy or tech-
nocracy; where industrial manufacture opens up ever more cost-efficient 
sites for itself; where highly flexible, extraordinarily inventive informal 
economies—of the kind now expanding everywhere—have long thrived; 
and where those performing outsourced services for the north develop 
cutting edge enterprises of their own, both legitimate and illicit; where 
new idioms of work, time, and governance take root, thus to alter plan-
etary practices. (2012)
One cannot be neutral about capital. Nor can one be neutral about the states 
and security forces that maintain its imperial character. And so this is not the 
time for idealism.
CHAPTER 2
Extraction, Expansion and 
Economies of Bondage
As Barry Posen remarks, the US has ‘command of the commons—command 
of the sea, space, and air’ (2003, 7). Explaining how this came to be, this chap-
ter provides an historical account of the relationships between the US state 
and capital. This is done as a prelude for a discussion of late twentieth-, early 
twenty-first-century military digital technological development that follows in 
the next chapter. In presenting this review, I want to emphasize not only the 
politics of labour and class formation, but also the international economy in 
which these reside, particularly the economy of bondage in the western hemi-
sphere. I consider these mechanisms that facilitate dispossession. To assist in 
making this argument, I apply selected aspects of Marxian political economy 
to the American colonies and the polities that proceed them, and tackle their 
contradictions, both material and ideological.
An exercise of this type, spanning more than three centuries, involving mul-
tiple social and cultural influences, geographic regions, and drawing on ideas 
and perspectives from several disciplines, will inevitably be highly selective 
and thematic. So even while I do this, it is necessary to underscore that the 
American colonial and federal experience is not regionally homogenous. In 
The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism, Allan Kulikoff makes this point 
well, saying that, ‘this process was complex, multifaceted, differentiated, con-
tested. It took centuries, not decades, to complete’ (1992, 1). So this chapter 
hardly substitutes for a fuller and robust history of the US. Rather the intent is 
to overview the historical forces that create a path for uneven development in 
the US itself.
To be sure, sympathetic chroniclers of capitalism tend to emphasize indus-
trialization and wage labour as a way to claim praise for the innovative yielding 
of mass produced goods and modern infrastructure that dramatically changed 
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social life over the last 150 years or so. However, this selective retelling neglects 
that capitalism’s wealth accumulation precedes the industrial revolution and 
comes with bloody hands. Capitalism, Marx notes, is intimately entwined with 
predatory violence. The famous passage here is,
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslave-
ment and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the begin-
ning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa 
into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins signalised the 
rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. (Marx 1977, 915)
Marx is well aware of how slavery and colonialism play decisive roles in the 
creation of world trade and are necessary conditions for large-scale machine 
industry. These concerns pepper almost all of his work and can especially be 
seen in his attention to imperial scale administration of dispossession and 
expropriation, extortion and exploitation that occurs in the Americas, East and 
South East Asia, and Africa during the nineteenth century. Even government 
intervention in rural Europe indicates the extent to which the pursuit of free 
trade by the emerging bourgeoisie in powerful European states was predicated 
upon unequal exchange and unfree labour. The brutal oppression and repres-
sion of peasants, serfs, and slaves demonstrates how coercion ties together the 
countryside and the colonial hinterland as sites of extracting surplus value; 
how ‘free trade’ is an exploitative reign underpinned by military capability and 
force. And precisely because this component of capitalism is downplayed, it is 
vital to ensure that constraint is given due attention. But, before doing so I want 
to briefly review orthodox explanation for oppression and repression offered by 
select non-Marxist traditions. I hope that this comparison will provide a base 
with which to highlight the superiority of more radical approaches.
2.1 European State Formation
The theory of state formation roughly attends to the process by which a state 
accumulates power and grows in economic productivity using a system of 
rule that has coercive, administrative, and fiscal dimensions. This system of 
rule builds political and institutional capacities through the consolidation and 
expansion of bureaucracy to extend command and control capacities. Rulers 
use these capacities to eliminate, neutralize or disarm rivals. Here less effi-
cient polities capitulate and succumb to those which are more efficient. In this 
framework, war-making leads to state consolidation, integration, and pruning 
of political polities, eventually converging on a basic type of polity, but whose 
variation hinges upon differential mixtures of coercion and capital.13 Randall 
Collins provides an excellent summary of this process:
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The state originates as a military organization, and expands by military 
conquests (e.g. Prussia) or alliances (e.g. Dutch); military costs are the 
biggest item in the state budget; the ‘military revolution’ in size and 
expense of troops, weapons and logistics leads to creation of adminis-
trative apparatus (bureaucracy) to extract revenues. From here on sev-
eral historical pathways can be followed: resistance by aristocrats and 
populace to revenue burdens and administrative encroachment can 
lead to state breakdown and revolution, or alternatively to authoritar-
ian restoration, or to state disintegration; what happens to states which 
take the latter pathways is usually a fatal geopolitical weakness that ends 
the independent history of that state. In the long run, the states which 
survive are those which successfully expand their tax extraction and 
administrative organization; and this penetrates into society, breaking 
down patrimonial households, inscribing individuals as citizen-subjects 
of the state, and thereby creating mobilizing conditions for modern 
mass politics, and for state welfare administration. (Collins 2004, 5)
Herein, the distribution of income is shaped by the way rulers extract their 
resources and the kinds of alliances they form with different strata of produc-
ers. However, as weapons and military planning become more complex and 
expensive so the production of violence will lead to the professionalization 
of war making. Specialization factors into the creation of a strong centralized 
state, as the state only has to negotiate with those who are able to contribute 
substantially to their coffers; the distribution of income becomes skewed as 
rulers ally with the richest fraction of the population; perhaps imposing a 
lower extraction rate for example. Thus, a highly extractive fiscal system and 
social inequality will prevail. Distribution becomes more unequal the smaller 
the number of rulers relative to a population. The ruling elite controls capital-
extraction in its territory through monopolizing the means of coercion while 
offering protection and security to its subject-populations. On occasion, there 
have been organizational and technological changes that have broadened the 
political base of government; democratizing them, reducing inequality and the 
uneven distribution of income and power. In this respect, equality is the result 
of a particular uniform distribution of resources in relation to a specific tech-
nology of production.
Complementing the aforementioned relationship, Charles Tilly notes 
that around 1400 CE, European political elites used loans from merchants 
to hire mercenaries and expand their territory. But by the 1800s mercenary 
armies were no longer cost effective, their loyalty could not be guaranteed, 
nor could they field the same number of troops as a state with a professional 
army. Similarly, the strategic contribution of the cannon rearranged the state’s 
internal distribution of power, removing it from feudal lords—leading to their 
demise—and concentrating it in the sovereign. City-states could only resist 
28 Capital, State, Empire
the power of cannon once they built wide earth-based walls that could deflect 
and absorb the impact of cannon shot. This particular distribution of power 
devastatingly combined authoritarianism, economic stagnation, and inequal-
ity into a social form.
What apparently broke this distribution of power was the industrial produc-
tion of relatively cheap guns and the creation of conscripted armies. Absolutist 
regimes, well aware of what would happen to their power, tried to stave off 
nationally conscripted armies, but the military advantages offered by univer-
sal conscription allowed new technological developments to be deployed to 
match the changes in the scale of warfare. A concurrent development was that 
the cost of warfare increased, and thus more financial resources were required. 
To collect and administer this capital extraction, rulers had to develop admin-
istrative capacities to manage logistical support for the centralized means of 
coercion and finance: taxes had to levied; debts collected; investments man-
aged and security forces paid (see Finer 1997, 98, Tilly 1990, 189–90, Tilly 
1975, 73–74, Giddens 1985, 111–116). The finance to support these admin-
istrations came from taxing the wealthy, and exploiting the labour power of 
subject-populations. In return, some of these classes were granted limited 
political rights of representation, and the state had to invest in some services 
to keep its legitimacy; the state had to acquiesce to particular classes’ political 
contention to retain their rule.
From approximately 1900, warfare became relatively more expensive. States 
therefore required additional revenue, soldiers, and labour power to conduct 
warfare. One option was to extract resources in the form of taxation and labour 
from their subject-populations. This development provided an opportunity 
for the working class to contend for political representation. In many cases, 
these contentions were successful. Thus, the advent of modern industrial war is 
linked with the extension of political rights (cf Levi 1997, Scheve and Stasavage 
2010). But wider political representation meant that populations were more 
reluctant to engage in protracted wars, and this constrained the state’s external 
violence.
From the study of state formation, Tilly classifies states according to rev-
enue/extraction and coercion/violence spectrum. He identifies three main 
means of rule: coercion intensive, capital intensive and capitalized coercion 
(Tilly 1990, 30). Coercion intensive sees rulers use coercion to extract rents 
as resources are not under their direct control. Capital-intensive rule occurs 
when rulers have direct control of resources and can exchange them to fund 
war-preparation. Capitalized coercion arises when wealth is relatively evenly 
distributed throughout the society. In response, rulers tax subject populations 
or conscript their labour power. Tilly suggests that coercion-intensive and cap-
ital-intensive states tend not to need to rely upon the consent of the governed. 
Rulers simply need to control agents who will do their bidding. By contrast, 
because wealth is diffused through the population a capitalized coercion state 
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must strike a bargain with its subjects. In return, a state enters a contract com-
mitting to obligations with subjects, and setting standards for compliance and, 
thus acquiring legitimacy.
The expansion of administrative apparatuses has a consequence for state pol-
itics. It prompts civilians to make claims upon these administrations and rulers. 
Tilly calls this ‘the central paradox of European state formation’ describing the 
process as ‘the pursuit of war and military capacity…as a sort of by-product, 
led to a civilianisation of government and domestic politics’ (Tilly 1990, 206). I 
understand him to mean that as rulers come to rely upon using civilian life as 
resources for war, so civilian populations become better positioned to bargain 
with rulers. Simultaneously since the administrative class could also petition 
rulers to provide more resources to them, they made claims themselves under 
the bargain of withdrawal of services. This increased the extent to which civil-
ians decreased the asymmetrical power ratio between the state, themselves, 
and other functionary groups. This is known as the ‘civilianization of politics’ 
through the changing civilian constituency of politics.
The civilianization of politics represents an opportunity for civilians to con-
strain rulers. As civilians enter into arrangements wherein they bargain com-
pliance, this, at once, gives them advantage in the political bargaining process. 
This is because as rulers demand funding for their military, so civilians can 
withhold these funds. As Tilly writes, ‘Under these circumstances, the most a 
ruler can hope for is grudging consent.’ Grudging consent ‘depends critically on 
how rulers acquire the means to rule.’ While resources vary over time ‘the prin-
ciple remains the same: Effective rule depends on the continuous production 
of crucial resources. If the resources dry up, rulers lose the means of enforcing 
whatever decisions they make and state capacity collapses.’ Non-democratic 
regimes differ from democratic ones insofar that they gather resources through 
coercion as opposed to extraction. Subsequently, there is some space in demo-
cratic societies to set limits on extractive activates. Citizen-Subjects have ‘sub-
stantial power to accept or reject their demands’ by exercising their ‘voice’. Tilly 
proposes that there is ‘political value [in] grudging consent’ because ‘it means 
that citizens and their representatives remain properly wary about the harm 
that rulers may do’ (all Tilly 2009, 1).
For Tilly, democracy is the ‘outcomes of continuous negotiations between 
rulers and ruled over how resources for governance are acquired and subse-
quently how they are used’ (2009, 3). He argues that a sustainable democracy 
is unlikely without a state extracting resources from a set population, for if the 
state does not need to extract resources, then the voice of citizens has no bear-
ing upon how governance is conducted. Tilly writes that, ‘In mature democra-
cies, most negotiation between leaders and citizens centres on government’s 
performance—how resources are used’ (2009, 3). He proposes that it is the 
ruler’s desire to seek control that leads them to bargain with the population. 
Resistance to unjustified extraction is the path towards democracy, resistance 
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to extraction requires that rulers bargain with populations, thus promoting 
democratization. How rulers acquire rule provides the conditions under which 
the civilianization of politics may be possible. Still, by taking advantage of ten-
sions between rulers and the ruled, there is scope to balance compliance and 
grudging consent such that citizens get service delivery, and the state maintains 
nominal control. Democratization turns on how citizens can collect to resist 
the excessive extraction of the state, and ‘develop the breadth, equality, binding 
and protection of their voices’ in a manner to express when the state is out of 
bounds (2009, 7).
While Tilly offers a rich account of the formation of modern states, he none-
theless has several shortcomings. The first set concerns a lack of sustained 
examination of the changes in production and their effects. For example, the 
rise of the factory system allowed for the mass production of armies through 
quickly redeploying the industrial apparatuses. The second point that he over-
looks is the introduction of legal regimes that dispossess peasants and workers 
of their land and labour. This mode of legitimation even required citizens to be 
drafted to mass produce armies, thus sanctioning the use of their lives for the 
accumulation drives that underpin the initiation of warfare. Simplified, mass 
labour and mass production allow mass armies.
To illustrate some of Tilly’s oversight, consider the role of Classical Politi-
cal Economists in the formation of English capitalism. Adjacent to their for-
mal economic theorems, they nevertheless advocated for policies that contra-
dicted their stated laissez faire principles, insisting that non-market forces were 
needed to accelerate capitalism in rural areas. Similarly, their preoccupation 
with urbanization, converting peasants and other small rural producers into 
workers reveals how the Classical Political Economists were unwilling to let 
market forces shape the economy. Under the pretence of an efficient division of 
labour, this conversion was coercive for it saw the preoccupation for internal 
organization of firms and factories imposed on all aspects of life including the 
relationship between individual firms and households. As a result, the separa-
tion of agriculture and industry meant that people were pressed to reproduce 
themselves through the market.
Rigging the economy in favour of the landed gentry, then later the bourgeoi-
sie, this state interventionalism took many forms, most notoriously in Games 
Laws and enclosure. Both were brutal, albeit useful instruments to separate 
people from long standing rights and depriving them of traditional means of 
support and sustenance. Intervention also appears in efforts to restrict the via-
bility of traditional occupations. All these imposed hardships were directed to 
coerce people from the countryside to urban areas to undertake wage labour; 
it was effectively a way to keep people from being able to reproduce them-
selves outside a wage labour system and was paired with laws to limit resist-
ance thereof. Once in cities, the newly urbanized were subjected to many moral 
and disciplinary campaigns to make them suitable for wage labour. In parallel, 
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the legal system criminalized vagrancy, permitted debtor’s prisons, and legiti-
mated dispossession. Eventually, lacking any real alternatives, there was little 
choice but for people to work for subsistence wages. In describing these prac-
tices, Marx said ‘The expropriation of the direct producers was accomplished 
by means of the most merciless barbarianism, and under the stimulus of the 
most infamous, the most sordid, the most petty and the most odious of pas-
sions’ (1977, 928).
Even today, too often there is a general failure to appreciate the coercive bed-
rock of labour contracts. The presumption that through volition, economic 
forces will achieve naturally optimal arrangement neglects the class struggle, 
both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ involved in shaping the very conception 
of what a ‘naturally optimal arrangement’ looks like and to whose interests it 
serves. This is because it cloaks dispossession.
In contrast to the Classical Political Economists, Karl Polanyi sought to bring 
attention to the actual historical experience wherein people were separated 
from their means of production. Famously, in The Great Transformation Karl 
Polanyi writes, ‘laissez faire was planned’ (1957, 141). Part of this institution-
alism that emerged in nineteenth-century Britain involved Classical Politi-
cal Economists promoting the forced reconstruction of society along a ‘self-
regulating market economy’, the result of which was colonialism, world wars 
and severe economic depressions. The general orientation was that the market 
had become the prime institution in society, subjugating other kinds of social 
institutions and interactions, and ideologically justified through a ‘stark utopia’ 
(1957, 3). This transformation was a qualitative change from traditional society 
to a market system, politically induced through the ‘fictitious commodification’ 
of ‘land, labor and money’, (1957, 252) using ‘written records and elaborate 
administration’ to track exchanges (1957, 48).
When reproduction almost always hinges upon the market it ‘subordinate[s] 
the substance of society itself to the laws of the market.’ This involves the 
institutionalization of ‘scarcity’ which had to be taught (1957, 216). A market 
society tends to ever expand the range of commodification, and is not exclu-
sively economic, but rather a particular institutionalized kind of economy, 
one that rests upon power differentials and the ability to use force, that has 
specific social relations that spring from the commodification of property 
and production. In summary, not every economy is a capitalist market; not 
every exchange is a market exchange. Subsequently, this calls attention to 
understanding the institutionalization of the market system.
When human life is overly exposed to market fluctuations, well-being and 
survival are market-conditioned. In these conditions, suspending this kind 
of exchange would threaten the society itself. Polanyi had a notable hostility 
towards liberalism because he regarded its promotion of individualism as a 
misguided philosophical anthropology that neglects that humans are social 
creatures. He forcefully argues that the market society, rather than being the 
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epitome of human nature, corrodes it. Accordingly, petitioning and demanding 
institutional security against the market system is thus rational self-preserva-
tion. Collective organizing to form a resistance movement to the market soci-
ety is a matter of life or death.14 But it spawned a concurrent resistance move-
ment that is best encapsulated by the conceptual phrase, the ‘double movement’.
While state formation literature could take a more sustained treatment of 
military-capital relationships, the general findings are not surprising to those 
familiar with Marx, who conceived of the state as a relationship between the 
police and management orientated internally, and militarily and diplomatic 
efforts orientated externally, and these processes themselves mediated by alli-
ances and political manoeuvres with particular classes.
2.2 American State Formation
European Liberal democratization and the development of capitalism was a 
prolonged process with many complex and deep variables. Still, without get-
ting too caught up in the debates seeking to pinpoint how, why, and when 
capitalism developed, it would nevertheless be a mistake to overlook how the 
profits from the slave trade factored into early industrial capital accrual. Con-
sider, for instance, that in The Price of Emancipation, Nicholas Draper shows 
how emancipation in British colonies in August 1834 led to more than 40,000 
property compensation awards totalling £20 million, currently worth around 
£17 billion. Similarly, Walter Johnson writes, ‘the payments constituted about 
40 percent of total government expenditures that year’ (2013, 1). Most of this 
fiscal transfer went to the gentry and the ruling class, thereby demonstrat-
ing the value of slavery to the British Empire’s economy, and how it provided 
part of the financial input for the growth of English Capitalism. This hardly an 
exclusive feature of English Capitalism; as C. L. R. James said, ‘Negro slavery 
seemed the very basis of American Capitalism’ (1938, 29). For this reason, 
Matt Karp in This Vast Southern Empire (2016) highlights the role of British 
emancipation in prompting segments of American Capitalists to advocate for 
an expansionist foreign policy to maintain an economy of bondage based on 
property rights. With these anchoring remarks in mind, in this section I cover 
the role of coercion, labour power, and class in American economic and politi-
cal development.
For present purposes, this begins with Spanish expeditions in the early 
sixteenth century. With brevity in mind de Solis, de Mendoza, de Ayolas 
and Cortes’ colonial practice in the Americas involved capturing indigenous 
leaders and then expropriating their wealth whereupon they established 
themselves as rulers taking control of existing methods of taxation, tribute 
and forced labour. Bartolome de las Casas’ A Short Account of the Destruc-
tion of the Indies provides a substantial account of cruelty, dispossession and 
exploitation:
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To realize their long-term purpose of seizing all the available gold, the 
Spaniards employed their usual strategy of apportioning among them-
selves (or en-commending, as they have it) the towns and their inhabit-
ants…and then, as ever, treating them as common slaves. (de las Casas 
cited by Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 14)
As an example of this practice de las Casas describes how a king agreed to fill 
a house with gold in exchange for this freedom. The king sent his subjects to 
acquire gold but it was insufficient for the Spaniards. For this, under a legal 
pretence, they laid formal charges against the king for breaking the contract. 
Finding him guilty, he was sentenced to torture for ‘not honoring the bargain’. 
De las Casas said,
They tortured him with the strappado, put burning tallow on his belly, 
pinned both his legs to poles with iron hoops and his neck with another 
and then, with two men holding his hands, proceeded to burn the soles 
of his feet. From time to time, the commander would look in and repeat 
that they would torture him to death slowly unless he produced more 
gold, and this is what they did, the King eventually succumbing to the 
agonies they inflicted on him. (de las Casas cited by Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012, 14)
De las Casas’ testimony did little to alter colonial practice; instead these meth-
ods were refined. For instance, in 1569 Philip II sent Francisco De Toledo to 
oversee colonial extraction. As Viceroy of Peru, De Toledo instituted the forced 
removal of indigenous populations to towns, the co-option of Inca traditions 
of forced labour for mining. Other ‘reforms’ included the introduction of head 
taxes—a fixed sum payable in silver—and mandated the indigenous population 
to carry goods for the Spanish elite. These techniques were, Daron Acemoglu 
and James Robinson write,
designed to force indigenous people’s living standards down to a subsist-
ence level and thus extract all income in excess of this for Spaniards. This 
was achieved by expropriating their land, forcing them to work, offering 
low wages for labor services, imposing high taxes, and charging high 
prices for goods that were not even voluntarily bought. Though these 
institutions generated a lot of wealth for the Spanish Crown and made 
the conquistadors and their descendants very rich, they also turned 
Latin America into the most unequal continent in the world and sapped 
much of its economic potential. (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 19)
In combination with expansion through dynastic alliance making it the leading 
European power in the period, this wealth funded Spain’s European ambitions. 
This expansion compelled several conflicts, such as an eighty-year war with the 
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Netherlands, war with the French for Italian provinces, an undeclared war with 
England with the famous Spanish Armada, and later the Thirty Years’ War, a 
devastating major European conflict. Spanish debt rose from 1.2 million ducats 
to 6 million between the 1530s and 1600, while dispossession in the Americas 
yielded a growth from 200,000 ducats to 2.2 million in the same period (Fukuy-
ama, 2012, 359). But as Hans Koning notes,
For all the gold and silver stolen and shipped to Spain did not make 
the Spanish people richer. It gave their kings an edge in the balance of 
power for a time, a chance to hire more mercenary solders for their 
wars. They ended up losing those wars anyways, and all that was left 
was a deadly inflation, a starving population, the rich richer, the poor 
poorer, and a ruined peasant class. (Koning as cited by Zinn 2003, 18)
The relative decline of Spanish hegemony provided an opportunity for the 
Dutch and the English to break the Iberian trade monopoly in the Atlantic 
and Pacific. The primary institutional instruments of this exercise were char-
tered companies, the Dutch East India Company, Dutch West India Company 
and the English East India Company respectfully. However, while some Dutch 
territorial footholds were established along Atlantic Africa and the Americas, 
often these were captured, like New Amsterdam by the English in 1644, or 
locals rebelled, like Brazil in 1654 (Wolf 2010, 129–130).
England was initially in the shadow of the Dutch and Spanish. As a late 
entrant into the colonialization of the New World, and thus missing out on the 
gold and silver mines and labour in South America, the English had to direct 
their efforts towards North America. Early English colonies at Roanoke and 
Jamestown could not replicate the models of violence that the Spanish used. 
This was because relative to South America, the population was significantly 
less dense in North America, and therefore fewer people to compel into forced 
labour. Nor was there much of a forced labour tradition in North American 
indigenous populations that could be grafted onto colonial rule. In addition, 
despite better weaponry, the colonists were outnumbered and emaciated. Still, 
Howard Zinn is correct to note that Jamestown was established ‘inside the terri-
tory of an Indian confederacy’ (2003, 13) which meant that English aggression 
and expansion caused skirmishes and raids that escalated into massacres on 
both sides. As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson summarise, ‘the underly-
ing circumstances were just too different’ (2012, 22).
As the Virginia Company could not undertake forced exploitation, nor was 
there gold and silver to acquire, the only remaining option was to import 
labour to work the land—corn for subsistence, tobacco for export—and 
impose ‘a work regime of draconian severity for English settlers’ (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012, 23). There was a redirection from exploiting the indig-
enous people to exploiting the colonists, but given the open frontier and 
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options of living with the indigenous population, this was difficult to enforce 
at less than subsistence food rations. A new strategy was employed in 1618. 
It involved allowing settlers to acquire 50 acres of land and in 1619 the estab-
lishment of a General Assembly. Acemoglu and Robinson conclude, ‘the only 
option for an economically viable colony was to create institutions that gave 
the colonists incentives to invest and to work hard’ (2012, 26).
While this kind of explanation is fashionable in contemporary development 
economics, Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis skirts actually existing histori-
cal material conditions. First, their explanation ignores how the land grants 
occurred because English colonial governors declared that Indians had natural 
but not civic rights to land and so could be dispossessed. Conveniently, this 
meant Indians had no legal standing in colonial courts. Second, it ignores the 
extent to which English weapons were superior to those of Indian origin. The 
last error is overlooking the role of imported slave labour, which began in 1619. 
(By then, at least a million slaves had been imported from Africa to Portuguese 
and Spanish colonies in South America and the Caribbean). As Zinn remarks, 
‘everything in the experience of the first white settlers acted as a pressure for the 
enslavement of blacks’ (2003, 23).
These errors are apparent when one examines labour regime change. 
For example, in Tobacco and Slaves, Alan Kulikoff ’s (1986) study of the 
seventeenth-century Chesapeake region, he analyses the transition from 
indentured servants of English origin to slave labour of African origin. The 
change in this labour regime turns upon the decline in the price of tobacco 
between 1620 and 1680. Mostly this decline was offset by improvements in 
productivity, yields, and imported slave labour, meaning that the cultivation 
of tobacco nevertheless remained profitable. Indeed, the indentured English 
servants who completed their contracts—under harsh conditions it must 
be said—were able to acquire land and servants themselves. These freed-
men were able to become relatively rich, eventually forming their own hier-
archy and family dynasties which they converted into political office and 
influence. The political influence of these dynasties rose so that the English 
consolidated their American colonies to ward off Dutch and increasingly 
French competition in the region.
From about 1680 onwards, tobacco profits had declined to the point where 
it was difficult to cover production costs. This meant fewer opportunities for 
newly freedmen to become landholders; the by-product of which was regional 
class stratification as classes simply reproduced themselves. Only when tobacco 
prices rose in the 1740s did prosperity return, but this was hardly compara-
ble to the tobacco boom in the seventeenth century. Similarly, around 1700 
the development of a naturally increasing population allowed for generational 
replacement for whites, and around 1720-1730 for blacks. A growing slave pop-
ulation was revolutionary and created a material basis for the development of 
a ruling class as the rich could invest in slaves who in turn would produce vast 
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quantities of tobacco. As Zinn remarks, ‘Slavery grew as the plantation system 
grew’ (2003, 31).
Importing African slaves brought with it an associated set of problems: they 
were reluctant workers, and so owners sought coercive activities and mistreated 
them. While an inefficient labouring class, slaves nonetheless reduced produc-
tion costs. Owners spent a considerable amount of time trying to make slaves 
effective and efficient, as well as creating a ruling class ideology. This was the 
basis of their class formation; it revolved around controlling the means of pro-
duction and reproducing their capital stock. But it also involved constant fear 
of slave rebellions, resistance, and insurrection, particularly when aided and 
abetted by sympathetic whites.
Slavery was a popular method of acquiring labour power, and by the mid-
eighteenth century about half of the households in the Chesapeake region 
owned slaves, and it was likely that the slaveowners’ children would inherit 
slaves too. This inheritance meant that there was growing class differences 
between rich gentry and poor yeomen planters. The rebounding of the tobacco 
commodity price in the 1740s limited, but did not eliminate, social conflict 
between the two classes. Slavery also reduced class tensions for it cultivated 
a racist ideology that helped consolidate the planters as a united group even 
though there were two distinct class relationships. As to profitability, shortly 
after the American Revolution, James Madison reportedly boasted that on an 
upkeep cost of about $13, he would make about $260 per slave per year.
Nevertheless, there remains the question of why the colonists did not enslave 
the indigenous population. The absence of a forced labour tradition is not a suf-
ficient explanation. In explaining this, some scholars suggest that African slaves 
were apparently more suited to intensive labour (See Wolf 2010, 203 for details). 
However, this explanation does not seem satisfactory, for even if one accepts the 
racist premise, it does not account for the costs of importing slaves. Another 
kind of explanation points to the proximity of the indigenous population, pro-
posing that slavery would have increased native rebellions, but this skirts the 
fact that rebellions and revolts already occurred. Eric Wolf points out a more 
hideous calculation: that the English ‘subcontracted war’ and displacement to 
various indigenous groups, using one group to displace another in preparation 
for English settlement and expansion. The indigenous population were also 
useful assets, allies and clients for the English, Dutch, and French as they fought 
one another. Slavery would hinder that process. Lastly, native America groups 
signed treaties to return runaway slaves in exchange for guns, which then later 
could be used in the inter-colonial conflicts (See Wolf 2010, 203).
Throughout this political development, it is important to note how American 
crops were a component of a global commodity chain that brought profits to 
Europe. Indeed, C. L. R. James in The Black Jacobins cites the French socialist, 
Jean Jaurés’s observation that ‘the fortunes created at Bordeaux, at Nantes, by the 
slave trade gave the bourgeoisie the pride which needed liberty and contributed 
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to human emancipation’ (1989, 47). It is this historical contradiction that James 
set his sights on arguing about the economic importance of Caribbean colonies 
to early French industrial growth. Developing this line of inquiry Eric Williams’ 
Capitalism and Slavery argues that the capital accumulation achieved via slavery 
helped British agriculture, the growth and development of banking institutions, 
insurance, and the initial industrial infrastructure. More recently, Sven Beck-
ert shows how ‘the growth of cotton manufacturing soon made it the center of 
the British economy,’ becoming ‘the driving commodity behind the Industrial 
Revolution…there was of course inventiveness and innovation in other indus-
tries, but cotton was the only one with a global scope’ (2014). Accordingly, the 
abolition of it in the British Empire might have taken the guise of a moral cause, 
but it had more to do with economic rationalizations—and indeed one might 
add once British naval power underwrote global trade, abolition was meant to 
preserve British power through denying this cheap source of labour power to 
other European states.
The Dutch’s presence having receded and the expulsion of the French fol-
lowing the French and Indian Wars gave Britain hegemonic control of North 
America. But it also meant that the British tightened control over the col-
onies, partly to extract colonial wealth to fund the war effort, doing so by 
implementing revenue generating administration like the Stamp Act of 1765. 
This occurred against a backdrop where American colonial trade had become 
vital to the British economy, growing from about £500,000 in 1700 to nearly 
£3 million in 1770. But these two developments meant that the British need 
for the American colonies was not reciprocated. With the removal of the 
French, there was an opportunity to act on this asymmetry.
2.3 Intra-Ruling Class Struggle and Bargained Settlement
By 1760, stable local political and social elite had formed, with imperial loyal-
ists and nationalist factions. Nationalists wanted to redirect much of the rebel-
lious energy towards English imperial agents, whereas the imperial loyalists 
wanted to suppress it. From a material vantage, the American Revolution was 
a fraction of the local elite seeking to capture and consolidate power from the 
British as well as thwart local rebellions from slave and underclass alike. The 
goal was to install themselves as the ruling class and thus oversee land and 
labour on their terms.
In the revolutionary movement, the key political battles were in the Northern 
Colonial cities. Artisans were relatively easy to co-opt to the cause, as they were 
interested in protectionism, and resented British competition. The property-
less population presented a different kind of problem, as following the French 
and Indian Wars many were unemployed and starving, thus prone to mob vio-
lence and property damage. Practically, this necessitated finding a means by 
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which to bring these various classes together. Mostly it was accomplished by 
attributing the cause of grievances to the British, arguing that poverty was the 
result of imperial wars. Wary of a turn on local elites, this rhetoric deliberately 
skirted how unlimited property accrual caused poverty. Polemic pamphlets 
like Thomas Paine’s Common Sense forged this movement, although local elites 
were cautious of the direct democratic impulse in the population. As a remedy, 
they sought to constrain it by designing a strong central government so as to 
project unity and common interest.
Waging the Revolutionary War proved difficult for the Colonists for several 
reasons. First, because in the Southern Colonies militias were required to main-
tain control over slaves, where depending on the region comprised anywhere 
between a quarter and half of the population in places. Wealthy Northerners, 
who owned these slaves, were less inclined to use these resources lest they lost 
their investments. At the time, approximately 10 per cent of the population 
owned about half of the wealth in the country, and owned a seventh of the 
population as slaves. Similarly, poorer southern colonists resisted revolutionary 
mobilization, because ‘they saw themselves under the rule of a political elite, 
win or lose against the British’ (Zinn 2003, 75).
Initially the militias drew from those that had property, but they had to sup-
plement their numbers by commissioning the poor, some of whom joined 
hoping that military service would bring income but also yield upward social 
mobility. Despite the nationalist elite’s stake in the successful outcome of the 
war, the poor did the majority of the fighting. When and where drafts took 
place, there were provisions where the rich could pay to get out of their service, 
or could provide a substitute.
The militias provided an additional benefit as a means of converting neutral 
or reluctant colonists into believing in the grander cause, and to paper over 
the continuing simmering class tensions that arose when, for instance, the 
wealthy hoarded commodities. Still, as Zinn remarks, ‘when the sacrifices of 
war became more bitter, the privileges and safety of the rich became harder 
to accept’ (2003, 74). Altogether, these conditions led to several mutinies. In 
response, some colonies made constitutional concessions, such as lowering 
property qualification franchise thresholds, but this was only to the extent that 
the prevailing rule remained.
A second set of difficulties emerged in the early part of the war when losses at 
Bunker Hill and Brooklyn Heights among others revealed the colonists lack of 
military power, let alone decisive power. Due to guns being unaffordable—cost-
ing at least several months wages—less than a fifth of eligible colonial citizens 
owned firearms. Even when the Revolution began, the Continental Army were 
under-armed, and this continued until Yorktown, where thousands of weapons 
were captured. So while the colonists did have a few minor wins, it was only 
when the French joined the war, providing a naval blockade limiting British 
supplies and reinforcements, that the colonists were able to gain momentum. 
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Ultimately, the nationalist’s victory can be attributed to geopolitical struggles, 
and not the strength of the revolutionary force itself.
After the war, the prevailing nationalists redistributed land confiscated from 
loyalists. They mostly allocated it to themselves, making a very wealthy rul-
ing class. That said, they did use land allocation as a tool of support, particu-
larly with smaller farmers, as well as reducing the number of tenant farmers, 
who had been a political nuisance in the years before the Revolutionary War. 
Nevertheless, despite these land allocations, the class structure itself remained 
unaltered: Northern merchants easily moved into houses confiscated from the 
Loyalist elite. Edmund Morgan’s analysis is that ‘the fact that lower ranks were 
involved in the contest should not obscure the fact that the contest itself was 
generally a struggle for office and power between members of an upper class: 
the new against the established’ (1978, 178). The aforementioned rhetoric, mili-
tary service, and land redistribution were techniques to disguise social inequal-
ity and rally support for an otherwise oppressive class structure. This is not to 
indicate that there were no interclass conflicts in the new ruling class, but rather 
there was broad agreement that they had installed desirable circumstances for 
themselves. Through informal means if possible and formal means when nec-
essary, the ruling classes’ interests were steadily upheld.
The nation state was a popular symbol of support that could create consensus 
and consolidate rule for capitalists. As Zinn writes,
the manufactures needed protective tariffs; the moneylenders wanted 
to stop the use of paper money to pay off debts; the land speculators 
wanted protection as they invaded Indian lands; slaveholders needed 
federal security against slave revolts and runaways; bondholders wanted 
a government able to raise money by nationwide taxation, to pay off 
those bonds (2003, 83).
This is a theme in American history, the mobilization of lower class energy 
for upper class politicians to advance their narrow goals, wherein the ruling 
class does recognize and attend to grievances only to the extent that recognis-
ing and addressing them is an effective tactic of rule, which then legitimated 
and upheld the belief that the political representatives were attending to social 
problems.
Within American cities like Boston, New York and Philadelphia, a working-
class consciousness was forming. Most of it was aspirational in character as 
artisans sought democratization, with specific demands including a more 
direct, open, and inclusive process of decision making, equitable taxes, price 
controls, although there were some direct attacks on wealth and the right to 
acquire unlimited property. This is particularly acute when one examines the 
class rebellions that occurred from 1740 onwards. Zinn’s synthesis of evidence 
shows that these rural rebellions were ‘long lasting, social movements, highly 
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organized…aimed at a handful of rich landlords, but with the landlords far 
away, they often had to direct their anger against farmers who had leased the 
disputed land from owners’ (2003, 59). In response, mild legislative reforms 
were enacted, but so were penalties for contention. Again, this is indicative 
of another theme in American politics, where distance, social or geographic, 
means that protest and anger is misdirected, thus hindering the chance of 
broader solidarity emerging.
The Revolutionary War had terrible consequences for Indians. With the Brit-
ish defeated, the Americans directed their attention towards the dispossession 
of Indian lands. This process was often accompanied by genocidal violence, 
which was a continuation of the tacit policy implemented by the British. Simi-
larly, encroachment and displacement were practices that continued. Wealthy 
Northerners encouraged poor Americans to push westwards into Indian Ter-
ritory, hoping that their settlement would take the brunt of the Indian’s repris-
als. This expansion reveals a contradiction where Americans fought an anti-
imperial war while simultaneously undertaking imperialist actions themselves.
By contrast, the war had mixed results for blacks. Many free blacks had fought 
for the British so the colonial victory meant they fled to other parts of the 
empire. In Northern states the practice of slavery declined, albeit slowly, from 
30,000 slaves in 1810 to 1,000 in 1840. The free blacks in the North began to 
petition for political rights and access to public programs; some were granted, 
others denied. In the South however, slavery expanded as cash crop plantations 
grew. Cotton production figures bear this out; whereas in 1790 there were a 
thousand tons of cotton produced, by 1860 this had increased to a millions 
tons. The number of slaves quadrupled, from 500,000 to 4 million in the same 
period.
The outcome of the Revolutionary war cemented a foundation where blacks 
were either slaves or occupied a lower social status, Indians were subject to 
genocide, women were subordinate, the Southern property-less population 
remained poor, and the Northern urban working class received minimal divi-
dends, while merchants joined the ruling land holding class. The control that 
the ruling class exercised on the social structure meant that formal elections 
were insufficient to take on entrenched interests and the social inequality it 
reproduced. Indeed, the purpose of the federal government was to enforce a 
kind of law and order that favoured those with large property holdings. Ensu-
ing this paramountcy involved co-opting small property owners to build a 
broad base of support so that coercion could be kept at a minimum.
The next major political development, at least with respect to the shape of 
the social structure, was an inter-class struggle to define which kind of capi-
talism would prevail in the US. The tension in the lead up to the American 
Civil War was less between the working poor in the industrial North and small-
hold farmers in the agrarian South than it was between expansionist Northern 
capitalists who sought free labour and tariffs and Southern landowners who 
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believed these changes would undermine their prosperity. Even so, these two 
groups were financially interdependent upon one another. For example, Beck-
ert shows how ‘the growth of cotton manufacturing soon made it the center of 
the British economy,’ becoming ‘the driving commodity behind the Industrial 
Revolution…there was of course inventiveness and innovation in other indus-
tries, but cotton was the only one with a global scope’ (2014). Most importantly, 
however, in this system slaves were not only the means of production, but 
functioned as financial collateral for expansion of the cotton industry, but also 
industrialism. The role of mortgaged bodies accounts for why slavery persisted 
even as the Northern workers were a more productive labouring class. Interde-
pendency rests on revisionist historiography often initiated and undertaken by 
scholars like Cedric Robinson among others, who stress the deep interconnec-
tion between slavery and industrialism, that these modes of production are not 
only compatible, but complimentary in actually existing capitalism. Robinson 
calls this ‘racial capitalism,’ drawing attention to bonded labour and the racial-
ized positions of those recently dispossessed through exaggerated differences 
that permitted targeted violence to ensure subjugation.
As an industrial scale conflict, the Civil War leaned on labour power: the 
working class for the Union, and slaves for the Confederacy. This is evident 
in the Emancipation Proclamation, issued in January 1863. Silent on slaves 
in the Northern-affiliated states and so contrary to idealistic revisionism, the 
proclamation sought to undercut the labour power of the South. (It was the 
subsequent Thirteenth Amendment that declared an end to slavery). Later, W. 
E. B. Du Bois noted how ‘slaves had enormous power in their hands. Simply 
by stopping work they could threaten the Confederacy with starvation.’ (2013, 
109) And indeed this was the consequence of about 500,000, or about 1 in 5 
slaves, fleeing plantations. Many joined the Union forces, swelling the ranks 
of the black component to 200,000 troops. Together, these developments were 
decisive to the Union war effort.
As like the Revolutionary War, again the wealthy like J. P. Morgan, John 
D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and James Mellon could purchase military 
exemption. Accordingly, the disproportionate burden placed on poor white 
soldiers led them to resent fighting for black emancipation and capitalism, 
and so led to several revolts in Northern cities in 1863. Similarly, in the South, 
where about two thirds of the population did not own slaves, lived on subsist-
ence wages and in squalor, there was marked social inequality with the rich-
est families owning about half of the regional wealth. As and when Southern 
soldiers realized they were fighting for the rich, this weakened their morale 
thereby compromising their combat effectiveness.
In the immediate post-war era, overseen by occupying forces, South-
ern Blacks were able to elect Black representatives to state legislatures and 
Congress, integrate schools and became politically active. Black women, 
like Sojourner Truth, were active and asserted that they too required rights, 
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 otherwise they would be subordinated like slaves had been before. But while 
there were formal improvements in status and legal racial equality, material 
relations did not radically alter. For example, while some confederate land 
was expropriated and sold at auction most of this was beyond the reach of 
former slaves. Rather these auctions were a wealth transfer to Northern inves-
tors and speculators. Additionally, blacks were effectively made serfs through 
various ‘black codes’ mechanisms. These enforced unfree labour conditions 
reproduced black subordination.
Furthermore, Southern white oligarchy organized hate by creating the Ku 
Klux Klan and similar terror organizations. The function of these groups was 
to reduce Blacks to their pre-Civil War status. Lynching and raids, beatings 
and burnings were widespread and commonplace. Courts refused to support 
the goals of black civil rights and even permitted segregation (cf Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 1896). Given these conditions, some blacks went north to escape 
violence and poverty. Still, the North itself was not absent racism: several 
states had differential property qualification thresholds for franchise between 
blacks and whites that existed up to the Civil War, while many denied Blacks 
the right to vote altogether. Eventually by 1900, segregation policies and prac-
tices were legal in many Southern states. Racism functioned to similar effects 
in the North.
The post-war reconstruction saw a coalition of Northern Industrialists and 
Southern businessmen-planters emerge, of whom many were worried that the 
1873 depression would lead the existing riots of farmers and working class 
escalating to threaten the existing economic order they headed. As Du Bois 
wrote ‘in America in 1876 a new capitalism and a new kind of enslavement of 
labour’. Solidified by the 1877 compromise, this new capitalism swapped the 
withdrawal of occupying Union troops and political autonomy in the South for 
support of the Northern political agenda and land speculation. Further, as Ala-
bama, Tennessee and Georgia had coal and iron deposits railroads were built 
to extract these resources. And depending on who was to be enriched, the land 
on which the railways were to be built was bought above or below market rates. 
As such, the purpose of the 1877 compromise was to manage inter-ruling class 
conflicts peacefully, while managing and undermining working class rebellion, 
while adopting policies that ensured the stability of the social structure, and 
thus policy changes, if any, could be anticipated, and would not create major 
deviations.
Between rural displacement and immigration, urbanization led to over-
crowding in American cities. Compounded by economic crisis from indus-
trialization, high food prices, slums and disease there was simmering discon-
tent, and the white working class lashed out at blacks, and immigrants, in part, 
because the use of black and immigrant labour drove down the cost of labour, 
but also fragmented the working class. Though these conditions did spawn a 
radical labour movement which directly attacked the idea of private property, 
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courts declared trade unions to be illegal restraints on trade, although these 
judgements were protested. And while throughout the Reconstruction Era, 
presidential power authorized the military to use violence to break up national 
strikes and marches on Washington, 1877’s nationwide strikes from railway 
labourers signalled the extent to which the ruling class needed this compro-
mise. Labour did organize and won victories through protracted strike action, 
but overall, these concessions ensured that the order itself was preserved. It also 
underscored for labour that they were not sufficiently powerful to defeat a capi-
talist state, particularly when divided by race, gender, and language. As such, 
the 1877 compromise indicated capital’s advancement would come through the 
intense exploitation of white, black, Chinese, immigrant, or female labour, each 
rewarded and oppressed differently to create terraced segregation in the class 
structure. So besides women, Indians, and immigrants, the white working class 
were also not fully benefiting from reconstruction.
Concurrently with these politics, the Reconstruction Era saw steam and 
electricity displace human labour, the creation of a rail network, and tele-
phones and typewriters increasing the speed of business. Mechanization in 
the agricultural sector displaced farmers to cities. Technical improvements 
meant the deeper coal deposits could be extracted. Businesses merged to try 
to impose monopolies, price cartels were established. There was an active 
redistribution of wealth to the rich, facilitated by state legislators and federal 
power. Indeed, the railway industry captured Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, inverted its original purpose of consumer protection. This gave the 
impression of government supervision, but in practice it was nominal. Simi-
larly, the Fourteenth Amendment, established to protect blacks, was inter-
preted to provide protection for corporations. Furthermore, the post-1877 
compromise was the creation of a ‘steel navy’, which entailed buying steel 
from Carnegie at artificially inflated prices. As these examples show, corrup-
tion at all levels of government, intense exploitation of labour, and disposses-
sion facilitated the creation of fortunes.
Reconstruction saw many working class rebellions, national strikes, indus-
trial sabotage, and tenant struggles. The labour movement, with vital female 
involvement, won concessions in the late 1880s for shorter working hours and 
higher wages, establishing new norms for the workplace. Labour candidates 
did win in city mayoral elections. Guided by socialist principles, this labour 
insurrection was more organized in the 1880s and 1890s than the spontaneous 
ones in 1877. But labour fights were vicious, and the police killed members 
of the radical labour movement at regular intervals. Outside of urban areas 
and between 1860 and 1910, the US Army systematically waged war on the 
Indians on the Great Plains as a prelude to the railways expropriating land for 
their purposes. The Indians resisted this advance as well as they could given the 
preceding centuries of genocide. While hegemonic, capitalism’s power was not 
total nor without resistance.
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2.4 Consolidation and Collapse, Contention and Cooperation
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the consolidation of industry and the 
introduction of new machines by large capital investment meant that bankers 
controlled the American economy. But repeated financial collapses and crises 
meant that the rate of profit tended to fall, so capitalists sought to improve 
productivity through instituting Taylorist principles in the workplace, which 
as Harry Braverman indicated, was to make labourers interchangeable, par-
ticularly suited to immigrant labour, further divesting the division of labour 
in production of any trace of unique humanity. Pressures for increased pro-
ductivity came at the expense of workplace safety standards. In 1904, 27,000 
workers were killed on the job, continuing from the previous century’s trends. 
In 1914, the Commission on Industrial Relations found that 35,000 workers 
were killed, and 700,000 injured. There was no compensation for families for 
these accidents.
Due to racism and union leadership, especially in the American Federation 
of Labour—who represented 80 per cent of unionized workers—blacks were 
excluded from the same labour organizing efforts, which was particularly hard 
as they earned about a third less than white counterparts. Leaders of the AFL 
were co-opted by the ruling class, and used force to coerce its own members. 
Du Bois in 1915 said ‘the net result of all this has been to convince the Ameri-
can Negro that his greatest enemy is not the employer who robs him, but his 
fellow white working-man.’ Still other union activity from radicals, like Eugen 
Debs and Mother Jones and others in and around the Industrial Workers of the 
World, kept socialist politics going, aiming beyond higher wages to seize the 
means of production.
Still, the 1893 depression underscored for the ruling class the overseas mar-
kets for US goods would relieve the problems of under-consumption and pre-
vent another economic crisis that would fuel class war ‘from below’. So once 
the North American continent was under American rule, capital needed to 
expand elsewhere. The 1898 Spanish-American War was just such an exercise. 
The event provided an opportunity to take territory from a European power 
and establish an economy suited to the US ruling class’s interests, either as an 
export market for goods, or as a place to trade goods like fruit and tobacco at 
lower costs. Through a combination of annexation and peace treaties, the US 
acquired Wake Island, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Guam, as well as the Philip-
pines. With Cuba, the Plait Amendment forced Cubans to subordinate their 
sovereignty to American military and economic interests, and so is a good 
example of formal indirect rule. American Prosperity depended on extract-
ing wealth from foreign markets, and as Woodrow Wilson said, it could be 
accomplished either by ‘righteous conquest’ or by being ‘battered down’. The 
result would be the same, ‘an open door to the world.’ (Wilson, various, cited 
by Zinn, 2003, 339)
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The Spanish-American War also made the US ruling class acutely aware 
that capital’s expansionist commodification exercises had to be securitized. As 
Alfred Mahan argued, these newly acquired territories had to be supported by a 
military infrastructure to connect markets and control the conditions of trade. 
So extraction, exploitation and dispossession required not only the predomi-
nance of economic strength, the co-opting of local authorities, but coercion to 
ensure that these practices continued on American terms. So much like how 
the state security forces had been used to subordinate the American working 
class, thereby catering to the interests of domestic free trade, so too was the 
same logic applied to foreign trade.
The advanced capitalist countries in Europe were feeling similar pressures. 
The decline of British hegemony stoked competition for control of territory 
between advanced capitalist states, causing a resource acquisition race in 
peripheral regions. Du Bois was very perceptive when he observed that the First 
World War was over Africa. Much like how the British had to colonize North 
America because it was what remained, so too was the war about late industrial 
powers seeking sites of extraction for their own colonial system; Africa offered 
much in terms of raw resources, cheap labour, and unexplored regions. Du Bois 
also noted how colonial expansion, dispossession and exploitation was a means 
of preserving rule and quelling social unrest by appeasing the working class. 
Improved standards of living came from exploiting and repressing ‘the darker 
nations of the world-Asia and Africa, South and Central America, the West 
Indies, and the islands of the South Seas’. This surgically removed the radical 
spirit of a working-class consciousness.
Formally, Woodrow Wilson sought to keep the US neutral, but there was 
commercial advantage in selling military supplies to the British. Indeed, it was 
imperative to do so given a recession in 1914 as growing industrial unemploy-
ment posed a political problem. From 1915 to early 1917, the US sold goods 
worth $2 billion to the Allies. This industrial policy bound war and prosperity 
together, but it also signalled a draconian approach to radical labour organ-
izing. For instance, the Espionage Act (1917) was employed to quell dissent, 
while the radical newspapers and magazines were barred from using mail ser-
vices. Furthermore, the state undertook mass arrests of union leadership under 
the pretence that radical labour was undermining the war effort. Irrespective of 
whether this was true, the greater function was to remove sustained organized 
opposition to the ruling class.
A similar pattern occurred in the Second World War. Initially the US sought 
to profit off the conflict by selling weapons to the Allies and Soviets; their 
involvement in the conflict occurred primarily because their economic inter-
ests were threatened. In line with this explanation, and as the Atlantic Char-
ter illustrates, American involvement in the conflict occurred because the US 
saw it as an opportunity to exercise some control and influence over the post-
war international order. Indeed, this was an economic necessity as the Second 
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World War saw the rapid decline of British hegemony and the rapid rise of the 
USSR, a state itself concerned with imperial ambitions. Lastly, both wars were 
an opportunity to repress class struggle ‘from below’.
Returning to the pre-war period, one major development was that women 
won the right to vote in 1920, but were divided along the existing party lines. 
Concurrently the decade saw unemployment decrease and general wages 
increase. Nevertheless, these positives papered over deeper systemic problems, 
like for example, prosperity concentrated at the top echelons of society or mass 
opinion controlled by large-scale publishing houses. With Andrew Mellon as 
the Secretary of the Treasury under Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, the top 
income tax bracket fell from 73 per cent in 1920 to 25 per cent in 1928, with 
capitalist newspapers cheerleading these politics.
Triggered by the stock market crash of 1929, The Great Depression revealed 
the problems in the social structure, which included extremely high levels of 
social inequality and economic misinformation. However, the biggest con-
tributing factor was capitalism itself with its monistic drive for profit at the 
expense of all other things. Mass unemployment followed as industries cut 
back on production, farms turned to dust, and tenants evicted. Government 
inaction contributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt winning the 1932 election. His 
administration enacted the New Deal and other legislative reforms to reorgan-
ize capitalism to induce stability thereby removing the conditions for sponta-
neous rebellions and general strikes by the working class and avert a revolu-
tion. Although an incomplete appraisal of this development, Paul Krugman 
nevertheless offers a good starting point for this particular discussion. In The 
Conscience of a Liberal, he contends that Capitalists have waged a prolonged 
and deep campaign to re-capture the state and to reclaim the economic wealth 
that had been ‘taken from them’ by Roosevelt’s New Deal. At the time, the cen-
trality of the market had produced a ‘vast inequality in wealth and power, in 
which a nominally democratic political system failed to represent the economic 
interests of the majority.’ The public policy interventions offered by the New 
Deal and subsequently the Great Society programs attempted to overturn this 
wealth distribution. For the most part, it was successful. Krugman writes that 
the richest 0.1 per cent ‘owned more than 20 percent of the nation’s wealth in 
1929 but only around 10 percent in the mid-1950s;’ and he calls this ‘the Great 
Compression of income inequality’ (2007).
Notably, the New Deal ‘invigorated the economy’ through assisting the work-
ing class. Redistribution combined with war production created a ‘great boom 
in wages’ that ‘lifted tens of millions of Americans…from urban slums and 
rural poverty to a life of home ownership and unprecedented comfort.’ So high 
was material prosperity that Peter Gomes wrote of ‘an era of unprecedented 
economic growth and prosperity, where more people have more faith in the 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank than in the president of the United 
States’ (2000, xvi). Roosevelt Era Progressives were also in the business of fend-
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ing off socialism by removing the conditions that made their cause appealing. 
So appealing was this that in 1910 Victor Berger was the first Socialist Party 
member elected to Congressional office, and where soon after the Socialist 
Party were able to make an inroad into municipal government, having 73 major 
elected officials in 1911. Capitalism remained intact after the New Deal; the 
rich still maintained the commanding heights. What appears to be the increase 
of democratization, through for example, reforms to decentralize power at the 
municipal and state level was but a way to install a slate of big business surro-
gates that were able to impose a consensus.
The Progressive Period was one of begrudging reform, to quiet protest not 
making structural changes. Capital sought to co-opt labour and thus dissipate 
the revolutionary energy in order to maintain the long-term stability of the 
social structure. This involved providing workers with compensation and acci-
dent insurance, better occupational health and safety, often through state legis-
lation, although the Supreme Court said these kinds of laws were an unconsti-
tutional deprivation of corporate property without due process. This reveals a 
fracture in the ruling class between those who wanted to maximize immediate 
yields and reformists, who sought long-term stability even if it meant giving up 
short-term profits. Emblematic of the reformist position was Harry Truman’s 
Baylor speech where he tried (unsuccessfully) to argue for the creation of the 
International Trade Organization (ITO), which while removing US domestic 
economic protections and tariffs, would yield greater access to new markets, 
facilitating capital accumulation. This cleavage represents the prevailing split 
in the ruling class, the kind that developed in the twentieth century, and their 
intermural disputes over the perverse calculus measuring the tolerance for 
exploitation and extraction.
Despite the failure to create the International Trade Organization, the 
reformists were able to somewhat quell the blunter and more brutal edges of 
capital labour relations. Nevertheless, as C. Wright Mills’ New Men of Power 
(1948), White Collar (1951), and The Power Elite (1956) collectively show, Post-
war American society was organized around elitism, political apathy, technoc-
racy, and oligarchy. In these books Mills describes the social structure of the 
United States, where organized labour leadership traded the advancement of 
their self-interest for representing their declining members against industrial 
transformations, an expanding professional class sought to secure their social 
and occupational status by embracing consumerism, and an overlapping elite 
where democratic mechanisms barely blunted their desires and position.
As Tilly might argue American mass prosperity in the post-war period was a 
result of social contention based primarily on the payback from labour power 
for wartime military service. Even then, mass prosperity was white, male, and 
geographically concentrated in major American centres. People outside of that 
bracket did not really receive the dividends of growth, all of which underscores 
how capital co-opted this segment of society to reproduce the social  structure. 
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Still, due to protracted struggle, Civil Rights legislation was introduced to 
counter structural racial prejudice, and involved removing barriers for blacks 
to higher education, forced desegregation of schools and universities. Further 
helped by The Higher Education Act of 1965—a needs-based federal finan-
cial aid—Black enrolments increased, and these students took the energy and 
power of the Civil Rights Movement into the classroom. Beside counter-cul-
tural forces and radicalism by students who did not have to work and had lots 
of free time to organize, there was a dynamism on US campuses.
2.5 Neoliberalism and the Great Recession
Dissatisfied with the repercussions of the New Deal and the Great Society, and 
concerned with their relative decline of power, the libertarian faction of the 
US ruling class rallied, investing in the post-Eisenhower Republican Party. 
Rationally exploiting sentiments in American politics, they sought to appear 
anti-establishment, and built a broader coalition to mobilize religious and cul-
tural commitments to their advantage, albeit with internment success in the 
immediate post-war era. Still, they sought to frame the Civil Rights, feminist 
and counter-cultural movements as threats to the established social structure. 
Indicative of this view is Samuel Huntington. Commissioned by the Trilateral 
Commission for a report, his assessment was that ‘the 1960s witnessed a dra-
matic renewal of the democratic spirit in American.’ Huntington characterized 
‘the predominant treads of that decade involved the challenging of the author-
ity of established political, social, and economic institutions’ including ‘a per-
vasive criticism of those who possessed or were even thought to possess exces-
sive power or wealth.’ (1975, 59–60). As Huntington portrays it, social services 
mandated by items like civil rights increased ‘governmental debt from $336 
billion in 1960 to $557 billion in 1971’ creating ‘inflationary tendencies’. Simi-
larly, unionization of governmental employees was a problem as governmental 
officials were tasked to ‘avoid imposing higher taxes to pay for the higher wages’ 
(Huntington 1975, 103). Huntington leaves out how many of these governmen-
tal employees were black, for they were aided by justifiable affirmative action 
that was absent from the private sector. The main problem, however was an 
‘excess of democracy’; the solution was rule via expertise (1975, 113). He con-
cludes his assessment with a revealing fatal conceit:
The vulnerability of democratic government in the United States thus 
comes not primarily from external threats, though such threats are 
real, nor from internal subversion from the left or the right, although 
both possibilities could exist, but rather from the internal dynamics of 
democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and participant soci-
ety. (Huntington 1975, 115).
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These remarks reveal the extent to which the ruling class see an informed and 
active democratic citizenry as a threat to their social positions. Thus, from their 
vantage point it is in their interest to weaken the education system more gener-
ally through underfunding and to cultivate political apathy wherever possible.
The libertarian wing had the best opportunity in the early 1970s. The cumu-
lative effect of military defeat in Vietnam, economic stagnation, Nixon’s decou-
pling the dollar from the gold standard, as well as the oil crisis in response to 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War along with several other factors, underscored the 
need for the ruling class to reassert its control over the social structure. Waging 
a long campaign—Jane Mayer’s Dark Money (2016) provides a case study of the 
Koch family, one node in this general turn—and test-running economic poli-
cies in Latin America (see Peck 2010, Harvey 2007), Reagan’s election was the 
defining moment for the reactionaries. This was because supply side economics 
gained presidential affirmation. Krugman writes that supply side economics 
‘claimed without evidence that tax cuts would pay for themselves’, but without 
much support from ‘professional economic research’. In their implementation, 
this economic thought has wrought considerable damage and harm, mostly by 
diminishing the prospects for Americans for economic progress. By contrast, 
‘if gains in productivity had been evenly shared across the work force, the typi-
cal worker’s income would be about 35 percent higher now [2007] than it was 
in the early seventies.’ Increasing social inequality is a telling indicator of class 
struggle ‘from above’.
Emblematic of the tone of the era, Charles Peters’s A Neoliberal’s Manifesto 
(1982) described a movement that ‘no longer automatically favours unions and 
big government or oppose the military and big business.’ Presented as a revolu-
tionary project that rejected the politics of economic redistribution, this move-
ment implemented a kind of public policy where the first impulse was always 
to let social issues be addressed by market driven solutions, by for instance 
the privatization of public goods. Herein neoliberalism can be understood as 
a method of statecraft, one that certainly advances and caters to the interests 
of the US capitalist ruling class, but perhaps most importantly redirects public 
contention from specific and known rulers to abstract and impersonal markets 
(see Krippner, 2011).
Throughout, these general developments severely weakened organized 
labour’s position and jobs were outsourced to other parts of the world. The 
ramification was to suppress uneducated wage labour. If the working class 
hoped that the election of Bill Clinton was to reverse these actions, they 
were sorely disappointed as his administration declared the ‘end of big 
government’. Throughout this period, the productivity of graduates greatly 
increased, the result of which was that middle-class prosperity without a 
degree evaporated as social inequality accelerated. As wages for uneducated 
labour declined, entry into the higher echelons of the workforce was predi-
cated upon receiving a university degree—the cost of which is more than the 
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mean yearly income—university enrolments increased throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s. Good portions of these admissions were by blacks and Hispanics, 
who, because of structural injustice, were more likely to require Pell Grants. 
The point is that debt bondage dramatically increased, thereby condition-
ing citizens to adopt an instrumental rationality in order to escape potential 
bankruptcy. This ideology has little scope—or time—for contemplative dis-
sent. Accordingly, it well serves the ruling class.
Turning to the efficacy of the campaign, Krugman cites figures that show that 
in the 1920s, the top decile of income earners hoarded 43.6 of total income, 
with the top one per cent hoarding 17.3 per cent. In 2010, after forty years 
of prolonged political manoeuvre, the top decile hoarded 44.3 per cent, while 
the top one per cent hoarded 17.4 per cent. In this fashion, it is a kind of rent 
seeking and the arbitrary inequality comparable to that of the ancien régime. In 
this respect, the reactionary movement is a revolutionary force, for it does not 
intend to conserve or protect any particular institutions or values aside from 
those that serve wealth.
These issues were leveraged to justify constructing a right-leaning econ-
omy. The purported economic goal of this project was to insulate wealth from 
redistributive exercises, thereafter using re-regulatory efforts to implement a 
‘trickle-up’ economic arrangement that divert the yield of economic growth 
and advantages to designated population groups. Here, re-regulatory denotes 
not the removal of stale policy and laws, but rather the attempt to change the 
regulatory framework to make it more favourable to the ruling class. Deregula-
tion is simply a rhetorical move that seeks to diminish concerns over the rise 
of a new regulatory apparatus. In part this was to lift restrictions on capital, but 
also to promote the capacity for flexible accumulation, that being the easier 
entry and exit of capital to assist in attaining higher returns on investments. 
Essentially, technocrat state officials and other agents of the ruling class used 
macroeconomic policy sought to increase rates of return on financial assets, 
but in doing so eroded the bargaining power of the American working class.
Explanations for the success of the reactionary movement either tend to 
prioritize economic issues over social conservatism, or stress the role played 
by evangelicals in electoral politics, or point to the manipulation of wide-
spread racism. While there is something to these explanations, partisan advo-
cates thereof primarily err by mischaracterising the central ideological axis 
upon which the conservative imagination rotates. This rotation concerns the 
belief that domination and hierarchy is just. The willingness to dominate oth-
ers unites social and economic conservatives, as well as racists. It is accepted 
because domination is a required characteristic to ensure accumulation 
continues unabated. To bring several aforementioned observations together: 
education is prohibitively expensive, and so in addition to existing class bar-
riers and filters already safeguarding access thereunto, debt bondage is a tech-
nique of indirect rule, the aim of which was to hollow out radicalism thereby 
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inducing supplication of the professional class, whose support is vital given the 
marginalization of general labour. The backlash from general labour remained 
mystified, and re-directed to minorities to aid in dividing those who otherwise 
share an interest in emancipation.
Libertarians’ concerted push back has changed the American intellectual 
landscape, particularly liberal thought. In their political retreat from New Deal 
and Great Society social programs liberals have conceded, perhaps even capitu-
lated to, the general political terrain to the libertarian agenda. Exemplary of 
this trend is the career of John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (1971) is primarily 
concerned with economic questions: the legitimacy of allocation, the moral 
imperative of redistribution, and welfare are all efforts that require attention to 
the consequences of property relations, the control of production, and assump-
tions informing distribution. Drawing upon Keynes, who argued that a pri-
vate property-based market tended to be unstable due to high unemployment, 
Rawls and fellow liberals came to doubt that it was an adequate foundation for 
a stable, free society. Instead, their prevailing belief was that private property 
crippled the working classes, rendered them bonded to the economic system, 
created inequalities further alienating people from their liberty and thereby 
hindered persons from selecting their own ends.
However, in the face of criticism, some legitimate, much less so, Rawls’s critics 
pulled American political philosophy towards the management of apparently 
intractable differences in culture, language, and religion. Administrative con-
cerns displaced critical elements. Co-currently, difference increasingly referred 
to identity, not social inequalities, while the encumbered debates over the pri-
ority of the right over the good obscured the right to goods. For wealthy cul-
tural elites—left neoliberals—issues in personal aesthetics became problems to 
study, the result of which was to convert private belief and practice into matters 
of public politics, all the while ensuring that class became at best a subsidiary 
concern in the high strata of US intellectual politics. In short, the emancipatory 
necessity of understanding objective social relations was replaced by the reac-
tionary urgency to mobilize subjective concerns.
Still, this is not to give post-war twentieth-century American liberal thought 
a pass. One major problem with robust welfare state liberalism is that is often 
preserves the class forces that seek to stop it from existing. From the vantage of 
radical critique, not only does the liberal state provide insufficient freedom, it 
is unstable and unable to maintain the affordances it does offer. Even then, it is 
too susceptible to the pull of capitalist ideology. Here. By this, I mean that by 
being receptive to the ideas that preserve incumbent interest, liberalism offers 
a radical diagnosis but incremental change.
Incrementalism is present in Ben Bernanke and Mark Carney’s respective 
recession assessments. In May 2013 they gave speeches conceding that the 
presumed ‘end of monetary policy history’, a focus on macroeconomic stabil-
ity above all else, contributed to the financial instability that caused the Great 
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Recession (Bernanke, 2013, Carney, 2013).15 Employment, output, the exchange 
rate, credit and assert prices were, for example, considered only in relation to 
this bearing and filled under ‘constrained discretion’. The downside was that 
generally legislators, policy-makers, and central bank technocrats failed to link 
liquid capital flows and financial imbalances in many advanced economies.
Initially the 2008 crisis was treated as a limited event. Most explanations and 
analysis concentrated on micro factors such as rogue financial actors, shadow 
banking enterprises, or the nature of markets themselves.16 But when ‘Echoes 
of the Great Depression’, were observed, Carney writes, this:
motivated a swift and aggressive response. Major central banks pro-
vided hundreds of billions of dollars in extraordinary liquidity through 
a combination of repo facilities, standing facilities, securities lending 
and reciprocal swap agreements. (2013, 9)
These measures sought ‘to provide the stimulus to support activity and price 
stability. The links between price and financial stability were increasingly evi-
dent.’ The collapse necessitated that,
In the fall of 2008, in response to the rapidly deteriorating conditions 
in global financial markets, a weakening U.S. economy, and an abrupt 
drop in commodity prices, G-10 central banks, including the Bank of 
Canada, conducted an exceptional, coordinated interest rate cut of 50 
basis points. (Carney 2013, 8)
The need for coordinated action like the move away from inflation targeting 
to financial stability and expanding the role of central banks highlights how 
interconnected the economic system is. Now central bankers have been tasked 
to play a supervisory role, ‘it conceptualizes and carries out both its regulatory 
and supervisory role and its responsibility to foster stability.’ Carney describes 
this as the need to ‘complete the contract’ with a public at large (2013, 18).
When attempting to stabilize the post-Recession economy the US and 
Canadian central banks focused on monitoring and evaluation exercises with 
regulatory policy and practices to detect the financial vulnerabilities that exist 
in deeply connected and systematically important financial systems. These 
central banks also sought to understand how shadow banking, asset markets, 
and the non-financial sector contributed to the collapse. Overall, Bernanke 
and Carney agreed that better research and hypothetical stress tests could lead 
to better management when these circumstances reoccur.
Notwithstanding these aspirations, the US Reserve Bank has to work with 
indirect legislative frameworks such as the Dodd-Frank Act, which are statuary 
designed to fail. For instance, the United States Government Accountability 
Office suggests that Financial Stability Oversight Council mission is ‘inherently 
challenging’, This is because:
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Although the Dodd-Frank Act created FSOC to provide for a more 
comprehensive view of threats to U.S. financial stability, it left most of 
the fragmented and complex arrangement of independent Federal and 
State regulators that existed prior to the Dodd-Frank Act in place and 
generally preserved their statutory responsibilities. As a result, FSOC’s 
effectiveness hinges to a large extent on collaboration among its many 
members, almost all of whom come from state and federal agencies with 
their own specific statutory missions. (US Government Accountability 
Office 2012, 8)
Perhaps for this reason, Carney observes that ‘Globally, central banks are now 
being simultaneously accused of being ineffective and too powerful’ (2013, 3). 
Accordingly, Bernanke and Carney suggest the need for a reconceptualization 
of the practice of the reserve banks. Still, inflation targeting maintains rentier 
income at the expense of employment policies. This is not so much irrational 
exuberance as structural entrenchment.
Given the technical cloaking of these issues, Dean Barker is correct to note, 
‘the public and even experienced progressive political figures are not well 
informed about the key policies responsible for this upward redistribution, 
even though they are not exactly secrets.’ (2011, 1). So these ameliorative, pre-
ventative, predictive, and re-conceptual approaches outlined above are likely 
to be ineffective at averting capitalist economic crises as they lack a broader 
historical understanding of capitalism itself and the indirect and invisible coer-
cive mechanisms that support the reproduction of its expansionist tendencies. 
‘It may be’, Ellen Meiksins Wood said twenty years ago, ‘that we are seeing the 
first real effects of capitalism as a comprehensive system. We are seeing the 
consequences of capitalism as a system not only without effective rivals but also 
with no real escape routes. Capitalism is living alone with its own internal con-
tradictions’ (1997, 558). Ominous and unsettling, Wood’s words speak to the 
wider setting of US militarization, a topic I directly discuss in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3
Calculation, Computation, and Conflict
During the First World War, massive artillery barrages caused the majority of 
causalities on the Western Front; indeed, many more soldiers were killed by 
falling debris than small arms fire (cf. Middlebrook 1971).17 This was partly 
due to the stable fronts that in turn compelled a change in military doctrine, 
and so whereas artillery had once primarily supported infantry manoeuvres, in 
stalemate warfare they became paramount elements in controlling battles. One 
American observer wrote that,
the artillery has now reached such a position of importance that suc-
cessful attack or defense is impossible without it…Infantry officers do 
not hesitate to say that infantry should not leave its trenches until the 
artillery preparation has really smashed all targets...also, the infantry 
can advance only so far as their artillery can escort them with fire. (cited 
by Grotelueschen 2001, 5)
As the Allied adage went, ‘artillery conquers, infantry occupies’.
This new doctrine quickly depleted Britain’s stock of shells and caused politi-
cal scandal in 1915. In response, David Lloyd George was appointed as the 
Minster of Munitions, but nevertheless the Asquith administration fell in 1916, 
replaced by one headed by Lloyd George himself (see Adams 1978). One task 
of his government was to better plan the strategic production and distribu-
tion of these shells. Britain would go on to produce nearly 260 million shells 
through the course of the war, underscoring the importance of artillery domi-
nance.18 Once having arrived at the Western Front via rail lines the shells were 
distributed to gun crews and a different kind of calculability took over. Tacti-
cally the first gun in the battery would fire; forward observers would report the 
landing and gun crews would recalibrate; the process was repeated until the 
guns zeroed in on the target. To increase effectiveness, engineers and signal 
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corps installed telegraph or telephone lines for forward observers, but these 
lines were often cut off by enemy artillery fire and would need to be repaired or 
replaced – a task made hazardous by enemy snipers and rifle fire.
When the communication infrastructure was intact, the staff at the artillery 
headquarters had to calculate targeting using variables like distance, eleva-
tion, charge, weather, height differences, and the distances between enemy and 
friendly troops. Ordinarily it took anywhere from 15 minutes to 1 hour to co-
ordinate artillery strikes: after the initial call for artillery from the front line 
commander the signal went to the staff headquarters to calculate the trajectory 
and who then relayed the information to artillery commanders. If any branch 
of the established command was out of contact, it was difficult to get artillery 
fire approved. Delayed and poor communication or incomplete geographic and 
weather information could risk friendly fire incidents. Similarly, because of the 
slow turnaround times front line commanders could not seize opportunities 
as they might occupy ground set to be bombarded by their own side. So poor 
communication of calculations reduced operational effectiveness.
After the war, there were several country specific approaches to this prob-
lem. Common was the allocation of mortars to infantry units for line of sight 
operations, where teams could make accuracy corrections themselves, lessen-
ing their reliance on divisional command. The German and Soviet armies also 
developed short-range line of sight guns to support infantry units. Germany 
combined precision airpower with armour, and trained their officers to oper-
ate without divisional oversight to radically exploit battlefield opportunities. 
France expanded their staff and added long-range cannons to divisional artil-
lery units, but this proved unable to respond to rapid moving fronts in 1940. 
Conversely, the British standardized their artillery and added mechanical cal-
culation machines to allow artillery staff to calculate ballistics faster. The British 
also sought to decentralize artillery command by providing radios to forward 
observers to shorten the command structure.
While the US was a late entrant into the war, the American Expedition-
ary Force’s (AEF) frustration with trench warfare left a strong impression 
within the US military. Whereas the AEF observed, adopted and incorpo-
rated elements of European artillery doctrine, their officers, especially Gen-
eral John Pershing, believed that this mode of warfare was ‘based upon the 
cautious advance of infantry with prescribed objectives, where obstacles had 
been destroyed and resistance largely broken by artillery.’ This over-reliance 
on artillery produced a conservative infantry subject to ‘psychological effects’ 
that lacked the ability to create a decisive offensive. Drawing upon established 
American military thought and practice in Mexico and the Indian Wars under 
Manifest Destiny, and the conditions on the Western Front, Pershing advo-
cated for aggressive infantry manoeuvres assisted by artillery to rout, pursue, 
and destroy enemies. He called this ‘open warfare’, the purpose of which was 
‘to bring about a decision the [enemy] army must be driven from the trenches 
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and the fighting carried out into the open’ and ‘an aggressive offensive based 
on self-reliant infantry.’ (Pershing as cited by Grotelueschen 2001, chapter 1).
Upon review of their combat performance, the US undertook several research 
and development programs to make military power more effective. One initia-
tive was to continue to develop armour, but as these weapons had to manoeu-
vre under battlefield conditions there were limits to the calibre of guns that 
could be mounted on chassis. Another initiative installed automated analogue 
computation equipment on battleships so that the rates of accurate fire could be 
increased (see Mindell 2002, chapter 2), however the operational conditions of 
land warfare differed from those at sea, so this solution was not easily transfer-
able. One notable difference to other military reconfigurations was that the US 
miniaturized radios to the point that they could be carried and operated by a 
single person. Radios were deployed at the company level, so field officers and 
NCOs could order artillery support, making them more self-reliant. To make 
this system more effective, the US pre-calculated ballistics data for any given 
scenario. This effort involved a small army of mathematicians and technical 
staff aided by the ENIAC computer. Additionally, throughout the 1930s the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) undertook a programme to land survey parts of 
Europe to make extremely detailed and accurate maps. Altogether, this meant 
that US artillery was able to respond quickly to calls for support than other 
military peers.
This brief overview of the development of early twentieth-century artillery 
warfare is indicative of several key initial developments in computational war-
fare in late capitalism: the general characteristics are the increase in scope and 
scale of coordinated calculability between the strategic and tactical level. Build-
ing upon these insights, in this chapter I advance a working conjecture that the 
development and expansion of detection and the tracking media facilitates the 
social reorganization of coercive power that can in turn increase social strati-
fication.
3.1 Cold War Social Science
The marriage of radio, surveying, and calculability was very successful for the 
US military in the Second World War. In the post-war period, the US sought 
to replicate the success of this kind of mapping and calculability of populations 
in the ramp up to the Cold War. To counter a rising USSR, the US required 
constant technological and intellectual innovation to compete and foster eco-
nomic growth. One method to achieve this objective was to use universities 
as the foundational research and development arm for blue-sky military and 
corporate imperatives. The US government and subsidized industry invest-
ments in academia sought to create a stock of exploitable ideas as components 
for strategic competitive advantage. Perceiving the character of this problem 
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requires setting aside the objectified private agendas of various stakeholders, 
and instead seeing higher education as part of public and economic policy 
about knowledge production to support imperial rule.
Roger Meiners (1995) points out ‘By 1950 over $150 million a year was being 
spent by at least fourteen federal agencies, [while] over two–thirds of all budg-
eted university research came from federal money.’ Meiners continues,
Much of the initial funding for social sciences research came through 
the Department of Defense. The Office of Naval Research sponsored 
research in the fields of human relations, manpower, psychophysiology, 
and personnel and training. The Air Force, through the RAND Corpo-
ration and the Human Resources Research Institute, sponsored studies 
on topics such as group motivation and morale, role conflict, leadership, 
and social structure in the military community.
The initial post-war boom in veteran students aided this research agenda as 
over one million extra students enrolled in 1947. Meiners (1995) notes that in 
1946, total university enrolment stood at 2.6 million students, double that from 
1938, while from 1956 to 1966, federal spending increased by near $3 billion 
(Brock 2010). Using the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, the US sub-
sidized about 2.2 million military personnel though higher education, many 
of who would not have been able to attend otherwise (Olson, 1973). Costing 
around $5.5 billion, this seemingly egalitarian public policy was designed to 
create a staff for the Cold War industrial enterprise.
Within this broader transformation of American social science, one notable 
initiative was the US funding of the Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) 
at Columbia University. For example, Elihu Katz and Paul Lazersfeld attempted 
to understand the behavioural influence of mediated messages in mass print 
and broadcast communication to better influence target populations, irrespec-
tive of whether those populations were domestic or abroad (see Pooley 2008). 
Presuming quantitative survey methods to be more rigorous than other kinds 
of social inquiry, Katz and Lazersfeld began refining public opinion research 
programs, and importing techniques from actuarial statistics to test difference 
messages to detect whether the composition of content registered different 
efforts or not.
In a similar vein, Daniel Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society under-
scored the belief held by many US media researchers in the early Cold War 
that mass media could induce social transformations. Informed by his wartime 
occupation as a propaganda analyst in the Psychological Warfare Division (Shah 
2011), Lerner’s book was the product of an another notable BASR project, which 
had been funded by the US State Department to assess the effectiveness of Voice 
of America in influencing public opinion in the Middle East. Lerner advances 
a psychosocial theory of modernization wherein groups moved ‘from farms to 
flats, from fields to factories’ (1958 47). Urbanization would be a catalyst for the 
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development of modern institutions, paramount of which was a market system. 
When combined with high rates of literacy and contemporary media consump-
tion, Lerner proposed that this would create ‘empathy’, an effect where behavior 
becomes associated with Western beliefs and values. This geopolitical theory, 
while being less rooted in European colonial assumptions about racial attributes 
than pre-war social theorists, still nevertheless maintains sufficient residual trace 
elements of racial superiority of the American variety, albeit coded in the lan-
guage of cultural adaptability. 
3.2 The Strategic Return to Centres of Calculation
While telling about the goals of the US, Katz and Lazersfeld’s as well as Lern-
er’s programs do not match the scale of the US Army’s Human Terrain System 
(HTS). Initialled in 2006 and costing $725 million until discontinued in 2014, 
HTS was the most expensive social science programme ever undertaken. (Most 
of these funds went to two defence contractors, BAE Systems and CGI Federal). 
Conceived at the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
then headed by General David Petraeus, the programme embedded social sci-
entists in combat brigades both to ensure better sociocultural understanding 
of the populations under occupation as well as to address institutional rac-
ism in the US Army.19 Together this social scientific ‘soft power’ was meant 
to aid counter-insurgency operations. Numbering more than 500 personal 
at one stage, five person HTS teams were embedded collecting data, gather-
ing information and undertaking psychological operations (See Nigh 2012, 
Human Terrain Team Handbook 2008). To outsiders these teams presented 
less lethal options to manage occupation, and fitted into the population cen-
tric counter-insurgency doctrine TRADOC was developing.20 Eventually 30 
Human Terrain Teams were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, however many 
personnel had inadequate language skills or lacked local cultural knowledge. 
Moreover, the programme was beset by accusations of institutional racism, 
ignoring sexual harassment, and of participating in interrogations (Varder 
Brook 2013). These problems might have been tolerated had the programme 
been an operational success, but brigade commanders found the HTS teams 
ineffective (Clinton et al. 2010).
Post-surge, as the US Army reduced troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the HTS 
programme sought to retain relevancy by repurposing themselves to be able to 
gather information about local populations in areas where the US Army antici-
pated conducting operations. But this redirection was not met with much enthu-
siasm as the US Army faced budget cuts and so the programme ceased being 
funded. Roberto Gonzalez (2015) argues that another contributing factor was 
HTS’s close connection with Petraeus, who lost power after he was dismissed 
as the Director of the CIA following the Petraeus-Broadwell scandal. Still, the 
decline of counter-insurgency operations and Petraeus’s scandal are secondary 
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reasons for the cancelation. Rather cancellation represents, as Gonzalez writes, 
‘the broad shift in Pentagon priorities, away from cultural intelligence and 
towards geospatial intelligence’ (2015). Notwithstanding the long association 
between anthropology and the intelligence community documented by David 
Price (2008, 2016), as one critical geographer writes, ‘It’s algorithms, not anthro-
pology, that are the real social science scandal in late-modern war’ (Belcher 
2013, 63). These priorities return intelligence collection to the strategic centre of 
calculation and to the various agencies of the state. The proceeding sections are 
case studies of drone warfare and mass surveillance and are used to analyse the 
ramifications of covert computation.
3.3 Automated Lethal Robotics
All branches of the US military are researching or seeking to develop robotic 
instruments of war. The US Navy is attempting to build armed submarines and 
helicopters such as the Fire Scout. At the time of writing, the US Marines are 
testing Gladiators, small tracked vehicles armed with machine guns that are 
intended to operate in front of advancing troops, while the Army uses Pack-
bots to assist in bomb detection and detonation. Using funds provided by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), several companies are 
iteratively making hominoid-esque robots like Boston Dynamics’ Atlas. Bio-
mimicry extends to pack animals such as the BigDog and drones that look 
like birds (McDuffee 2013). Suffice to say that even if the military budget were 
to shrink, these kinds of robotic systems are deemed crucial pieces of future 
military capacity, force, and planning. To examine this trend, I use the case of 
drones. Here I follow Derek Gregory (2011) and understand these technologies 
as part of a ‘scopic regime’, by which he means to draw attention to the specific 
techno-culture manner of employing sensors and optics to display and coordi-
nate warfare.
First used for tactical reconnaissance, drones have become a near indispensa-
ble battlefield technology with offensive capabilities. From 2002, when a couple 
of strikes targeted Salim Sinan al-Harethi and Nek Mohammad—with an esti-
mated High Value Target to Total Deaths ratio (HVT:TD) of 1:5—the offensive 
use of drones escalated from 2005 onwards. Eventually, between 2009 and 2010, 
there were 161 strikes, killing 1,029 persons with a HVT:TD ratio of 1:147, sug-
gesting indiscriminate targeting (Hudson, Owens, and Flannes 2011). And still, 
Gen former director of the NSA and CIA, General Michael Hayden, has said 
that ‘Our tolerance for collateral damage is far too low.’
The most recent phase of the drone program is characterized by an increase in 
attack frequency, sanctioning targets of opportunity, and likely larger payloads 
exacerbating civilian deaths. From 2011, the Obama administration announced 
plans to begin an aggressive new drone-warfare campaign in Yemen directed 
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against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia (Mazzetti 2011), as well 
as providing drone support to foreign nations such as Uganda and Burundi in 
addition to anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean (Turse 2011). Due to 
the multiple areas of operation, state secrecy, and absent reports, it is difficult 
to estimate the number of casualties drones have created.
Drone warfare has been marked by so-called ‘signature strikes’. Daniel Klaid-
man describes signature strikes as ‘targeting of groups of men who bear cer-
tain signatures, or defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, 
but whose identities aren’t known’, (2012) and Greg Miller describes them as 
‘surgical, often lethal, and narrowly tailored to fit clearly defined U.S. interests.’ 
This is particularly distressing when the US military is testing software that 
will program drones to automatically hunt, identify and engage targets without 
a human pulling the trigger. (Finn 2011). Combined with revelations about 
NSA mass surveillance there is little to inspire confidence that future signature 
strikes will not automatically scrape big data gathered through data mining.
The Obama administration overruled the use of signature strikes, prefer-
ring instead Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes (TADS). However, as Miller 
reports, TADS are aimed at ‘wiping out a layer of lower-ranking operatives 
through strikes that can be justified because of threats they pose to the mix of 
U.S. Embassy workers, military trainers, intelligence operatives and contrac-
tors scattered across Yemen.’ But by that definition, it seems that TADS and sig-
nature strikes are practically one and the same (Miller 2012). And if anything, 
one can infer from Miller’s report that the US has inserted trainers, operatives 
and contractors into Yemen in an effort to erode the threat presented by AQAP 
(al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) (but itself likely inducing blowback).
The American public is told that extrajudicial casualties from drones are pri-
marily militants but these claims remain unsubstantiated and under investi-
gated even as strikes have become routine (Sokol 2010). The Brookings Insti-
tute estimates that 10 civilians are killed for every militant. It seems the official 
line is similar to that provided in the Vietnam War; ‘anybody dead was consid-
ered a VC.’ This method is used in areas as widespread as from Northern Mali 
on the Islamic Maghreb and the Philippines’s Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islami-
yah (Oumar 2012, Ahmed, 2012). The lack of judicial oversight, superseding 
legal constraints, extra-judicial killings, massive collateral damage, secret ‘kill 
lists’, and the uncertainty caused by the lack of transparency and accountability 
leaves little information for a proper public debate. The Obama administration 
claims they follow strict internal reviews to prevent abuses, but there is no way 
to verify these claims. What has happened is the installation of an undemo-
cratic and illiberal self-regulating centralized authority yielding lethal force. 
Therefore, the intellectually responsible position is to be suspect of this politi-
cally centralized bombing.
The US state claims that greater transparency, while desirable, must be weighed 
against revealing the sources and methods of the intelligence community, and 
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the ‘requirement of non-acknowledgement’. The former reason seeks to preserve 
a tactical edge over enemies, but this does not explain why representatives or the 
judiciary cannot provide oversight. The later reason indicates cooperation with 
other countries whereupon operational involvement is unacknowledged, and 
official credit of tactical successes are taken by the host country. Here the Yemen, 
Philippines, and Mali governments insist they carry out strikes to preserve their 
sovereignty, even while lacking the capability to do so (Booth and Black 2010). 
However, by not acknowledging external involvement, this is withholding cru-
cial information from their citizens.
Given the states in which they are used, drones destabilize already frail politi-
cal systems by inflaming social volatility and isolating populations from politi-
cal elites and governance structures that are seen as powerless to stop this terror 
(Crilly 2011). In Pakistan, for instance, the CIA wants the drone campaign to 
continue unabated, whereas the State Department argues that the drones risk 
destabilizing a nuclear power (Entous, Gorman, and Rosenberg 2011). As it has 
been conducted, drone warfare seems strategically misguided, lacks decisive-
ness and incurs significant political and diplomatic costs. Target populations 
live in constant terror of being attacked. And non-combatants’ deaths and feel-
ings of asymmetrical vulnerability, even if they are not ideologically sympa-
thetic to local combatants, create incentives for the target population to retali-
ate against convenient targets. Altogether, drone warfare, rather than bringing 
stability has simply compounded violence and instability. But it appears as if 
this cost is acceptable because it gives an under-informed public the impression 
that potential conflicts and attacks are being averted.
In 2011, the United States operated approximately 60 drone bases planet 
wide (Turse 2011, Whitlock and Miller 2011), and the Obama administration 
planned for more bases in Japan, South Korea, and Niger. Similarly, in the first 
half of 2013, the US Navy on separate occasions successfully launched and 
landed an automated X-47B drone from an aircraft carrier and its software is 
being tested for inflight refuelling. These developments can increase surveil-
lance and reconnaissance capabilities, but to see them as isolated or minor 
events is to miss the point that they are a key part of a constantly expanding 
project of global surveillance, one that involves a complex labour process. To 
elaborate upon the last point, Gregory cites figures that 185 persons required to 
support one Predator drone flight (2011, 194). So military labour power is still 
required to man ‘unmanned’ weapons systems.
Despite requiring good operating conditions (Turse 2012), and being easy to 
target necessitating deployment to safer operating areas, proponents promote 
drone warfare as more precise and discriminating, hence more militarily effec-
tive and even ethically obligatory (cf. Strawer 2012). They cite additional bene-
fits such as payload variability for weapons and surveillance, as well as their long 
range and extended flight times all at a relatively low production and operating 
cost, compared to manned aircraft (basic models cost $4.5 million). Proponents 
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further suggest that the moral questioning of this mode of warfare is factu-
ally incorrect, confused, or misguided. For instance, Peter Beaumont does not 
distinguish between which weapon has caused injury and death (Beaumont, 
2012). He argues that the central question is whether a weapon system is used 
in line with prevailing international conventions and norms:
In conflict, within the existing framework of international humanitar-
ian law, whether an attack is justifiable and legal is defined both by the 
nature of the target and proper consideration of whether there will be 
civilian casualties and whether they are avoidable. (2012)
Therefore, Beaumont concludes, ‘the notion of drone warfare [is] not more 
horrible than a Tomahawk cruise missile fired from a distant ship or a bomb 
dropped indiscriminately on a village by a high-flying F-22 or MiG.’ By infer-
ence, what matters is the existence of a targeted killing programme, not the 
instrument. Moreover, an excessive focus on the instruments blurs the key 
issue, which is the willingness to use deadly force to further imperial aspira-
tions. The right question to ask of drone warfare, Beaumont thinks, is whether
as a military tool, drone warfare is actually effective; whether its use is 
justified when set against the political fallout that the drone campaign 
has produced and whether drones have actually reduced the threat 
posed by militants.
This subjective utilitarian view of military tools is not an engagement with moral-
ity and ethics, but simply a political calculation regarding technology use where 
drones are just another tool to apply lethal force. In this respect, Joseph Singh, 
a researcher at the Center for a New American Security sees no qualitative dif-
ference between drones and piloted aircraft in terms of the application of lethal 
force. He writes, ‘any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not 
significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones’ (Singh 
2012). Other commentators present the false choice between national insecurity 
and assassinations as if there were no better ways to achieve security and peace. 
Another kind of discussion that takes place is the presumption that Drones are a 
moral imperative. ‘You can far more easily limit collateral damage with a drone’, 
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared in 2013, ‘than you can with 
a bomb, even a precision-guided munition, off an airplane.’ (Gates cited by Wolf 
and Zenko, 2016) But this is a falsehood. Using the publicly available data, Ame-
lia Mae Wolf and Micah Zenko (2016) compared airstrikes and drone strikes, 
finding that ‘drone strikes in non-battlefield settings — Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia — result in 35 times more civilian fatalities than airstrikes by manned 
weapons systems in conventional battlefields, such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghani-
stan.’ The ground truth reveals the equivocation of these bulk moral arguments.
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Opponents of drone warfare, like Michael Ignatieff, suggest that drone pro-
liferation has changed the nature of warfare (2012). In a passage worth citing 
at length, he writes
In his essay ‘Reflections on War and Death’ French philosopher 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau “asks the reader what he would do if without 
leaving Paris he could kill, with great profit to himself, an old mandarin 
in Peking by a mere act of his will. Rousseau implies that he would not 
give much for the life of the dignitary.” Imagine if great numbers could 
so exercise their will. What violence would be unleashed, how many 
prostrate bodies around the globe who never knew what hit them? 
(Igantieff 2012)
The passage remarks that the ease of killing without consequence lowers the 
threshold for public acquiescence to conflict. Reduced-risk operations lessen 
political aversion to commission attacks in official and unofficial conflict areas. 
This enables conditions where strikes become more frequent and militaries 
less prudent in their use of force relative to the industrial mode of war. This, 
in turn, contributes to and exacerbates existing conditions (such as political 
repression and famine in the case of Yemen, sectarian turf wars in the case 
of Pakistan, or a failed state in the case of Somalia) thereby producing more 
enemies. The deception is that ‘these new technologies promise harm without 
consequence’, but Ignatieff says, ‘there is no such thing.’ Gregory provides a har-
rowing aphorism ‘The death of distance enables death from a distance’ (2012, 
192). Proponents of drone warfare miss the point that distance—physically and 
psychologically—is an ethical matter.
In the final analysis, it appears as if foreign drone strikes serve two functions. 
The first is to engender domestic political satisfaction amongst an otherwise 
blasé public; the second is that the greater part of the Middle East is a labora-
tory for operational testing in advance of future conflicts. Not to put too fine 
a point on it, the military adventurism in the Middle East is, in part, a techno-
logical proving ground for the other aspects of the New American Way of War. 
The apparent ease of operational deployment means that missions can be run 
with minimal accountability; hence, military force is more aggressive and less 
discriminating. This is important to consider given that military technological 
pathways are prone to becoming locked in by the market in one way or another. 
There is little to suggest that effects from the efforts to robotize the battlefield 
will be any different.
The current research agenda for drone includes automated lethality and 
the capacity to operate from aircraft carriers as the development of X-47B 
Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrates. To date, there has not been suf-
ficient attention to the kind of battlespaces, the kinds of weapon systems that 
could (and will be) deployed, nor the vanishing boundary between domestic 
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surveillance and battlefield technology deployments by combat systems like the 
X-47B. Absent too is a discussion of the extent to which the domestic deploy-
ment of drones as surveillance systems in combination with the de facto hand-
held computing devices acting as tracking devices, and how this might erode 
liberties of all kinds. Another key area to see this domestic and foreign line 
being erased is in the aforementioned cyber warfare.
To end this section, it is worth bearing in mind that while my discussion of 
automated robotics warfare has focused on drones, their use on the ground 
is as significant. The US Army (2017) has a Robotic and Autonomous Sys-
tems Strategy that describes how ‘Unmanned Ground Systems’ can comple-
ment existing military labour by improving soldiers’ situational awareness and 
improve firepower. The mid-term goals of are to ‘Increase situational awareness 
with advanced, smaller RAS and swarming; Lighten the load with exoskeleton 
capabilities; Improve sustainment with fully automated convoy operations; 
Improve maneuver with unmanned combat vehicles and advanced payloads’ 
(2017, 7). That most of these robotics are conceptually to attuned to operate 
with ‘increased congestion in dense urban environments’ (2017, 1), it is telling 
about the US militaries thoughts about the nature of future combat operations 
and kill chains.
3.4 Extrajudicial Drone Strikes
Vincent Mosco describes drone warfare as ‘a global system combing electronic 
surveillance and algorithmic decision making’. (2017, 2) As he correctly notes, 
the development of automated lethality and the deployment of drones cannot 
be disentangled from extrajudicial signature strikes in non-declared war zones 
that often result in significant civilian casualties. To begin, while periodically 
frowned upon, US Presidential sanctioned assassination was a common tac-
tic throughout the twentieth century—Eisenhower on Lumumba, Kennedy on 
Castro, and Johnson in Vietnam—it has now come out of the shadows and been 
used to gain political capital and electoral clout. To justify this development, the 
Obama administration has written legal opinions, but which it claims must be 
necessarily secretive. What details have been made available are limited; Presi-
dent Obama has attempted to reassure citizens that drone targets must pose 
‘a continuing and imminent threat to the American people’. The White House 
maintains that ‘lethal force must only be used to prevent or stop attacks against 
U.S. persons, and even then, only when capture is not feasible and no other rea-
sonable alternatives exist to address the threat effectively’ (White House, 2013). 
This carefully worded criterion does not differentiate between an American citi-
zen and an enemy combatant. When questioned by Senator Rand Paul whether 
the president could authorize a targeted attack against a US citizen in the United 
States, Attorney General Holder replied that there could be:
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an extraordinary circumstance in which it would be necessary and 
appropriate under the Constitution and applicable laws of the United 
States for the president to authorize the military to use lethal force 
within the territory of the United States.
This reasoning implies that domestic drone strikes on American citizens are 
permissible in certain conditions. Moreover, it is indicative of the state men-
tality which has sought to expand mass surveillance through legal contortion 
which little resemble International norms for governance, transparency, and 
accountability and which likely make John Yoo proud. Peter Van Buren puts it 
brilliantly:
Prior to [al-Awlaki’s] killing, attorneys for his father tried to persuade 
a U.S. District Court to issue an injunction preventing the government 
from killing him in Yemen. A judge dismissed the case, ruling that the 
father did not have “standing” to sue and that government officials 
themselves were immune from lawsuits for actions carried out as part 
of their official duties.
This was the first time a father had sought to sue the U.S. government 
to prevent it from killing a son without trial. The judge did call the suit 
“unique and extraordinary,” but ultimately passed on getting involved. 
He wrote instead that it was up to the elected branches of government, 
not the courts, to determine if the United States has the authority to 
extrajudicially murder its own citizens.
The extrajudicial killing of an American citizen seemed to [the judge] 
to be nothing but a political question to be argued out in Congress and 
the White House, not something intimately woven into the founding 
documents of our nation. (Van Buren 2014)
Equally worrying, is then Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2012 interpretation of 
the Fifth Amendment, where he said,
that a careful and thorough executive branch review of the facts in a case 
amounts to ‘due process’ and that the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment 
protection against depriving a citizen of his or her life without due pro-
cess of law does not mandate a ‘judicial process.’
Effectively, the standards for due process—which supposedly curb the abuses 
and excesses of the state—are determined by the state itself, without judicial 
oversight. As we shall see in the following section, these actions cannot be 
disconnected from Holder’s extensive use of the Espionage Act to prosecute 
whistleblowers (see Carr 2012), nor his prosecutors from seizing records from 
journalists (see Bronner, Savage, and Shane 2013).
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3.5 The Order of the Internet of Things
The US’s attempt to weaponize communication has long been a part of post-
war politics and has shaped the rule that the state imposes order. During the 
Cold War, for example, J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
deployed counter-intelligence programs to disrupt civil rights activists and the 
peace movement. Agents collected information on targeted individuals (up to 
half a million citizens) to discredit them. Pressured by the outrage following 
revelations about the scope and centralization of this intelligence gathering, the 
House and Senate Intelligence Committees became permanent features of Con-
gress, and in 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi established guidelines to limit 
federal investigative powers. But this oversight and curtailing of power was less 
motivated by the revelations themselves, but rather because Hoover’s FBI turned 
their powers inwards to the ruling class, transgressing the order of things.
The limitation on investigative power was temporary, and beginning in Rea-
gan’s first term many suspended techniques were reauthorized in one form 
or another. This continued irrespective of which party controlled the various 
branches of power. For example, during the Clinton administration, the Com-
munications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (1994) required telecom-
munications companies to make their designs accessible via backdoors to law 
enforcement surveillance. Following the Oklahoma City Bombing the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996) expanded this program author-
ising targeted surveillance based not upon investigating acts, but their asso-
ciations. The response to 9/11 near completely remove all barriers to full-scale 
total state organized data collection and created a funding boom as the newly 
established Department of Homeland Security sought to coordinate and install 
a digital surveillance apparatus. The Patriot Act (2001) allowed state agencies to 
visit public events and collect information on persons and organizations, even 
those that did not appear to have criminal intent.
The basic contours of the mature state security institution begun to be revealed 
in a few years after 9/11. In October 2004, New York Times investigative report-
ers James Risen and Eric Lichtblau discovered the NSA’s domestic warrantless 
surveillance programme. When asked for comment, the Bush administration 
pressured the New York Times to hold the story, claiming national security. Bill 
Keller, then executive editor, decided again publishing. It was only after learn-
ing that Risen planned to publish the article in a book—State of War—that the 
newspaper published the story in December 2005. From Risen’s reports, the 
decision involved deliberations that included Arthur Sulzberger Jnr talking with 
President Bush in the Oval Office. Subsequently, Risen and Lichtblau’s reporting 
was awarded a Pulitzer Prize, but the expansion of the security state continued 
unabated. I now turn to provide a brief overview of that development.
While the NSA has a long history of information gathering, after 9/11 the 
agency greatly expanded by building facilities in Georgia, Texas, Alaska, 
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Washington, and Utah, in addition to directing more resources to overseas 
stations. The agency’s goal is to pre-emptively monitor and identify any indi-
vidual’s ‘communications fingerprints’. Currently with a budget of $10.8 billion 
per year and 35,000 workers, the NSA is a security leviathan. It undertakes 
mass surveillance for the White House, Pentagon, FBI and CIA, but also the 
Departments of State, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, and the United 
States Trade Representative. But despite extensive service for these depart-
ments, there is a near total invisibility of these activities to the public, and is 
the inverse of the NSA’s extensive efforts and ambitions ‘to answer questions 
about threatening activities that others mean to keep hidden’ (NSA 2007).
The department’s intelligence programs include Social Network Analysis 
Collaboration Knowledge Services, which attempt to register social organiza-
tion hierarchies; Dishfire collects and stores text messages; Tracfin records 
credit card transactions; Orlandocard installs skyware on personal devices. 
These programs illustrate how surveillance has moved beyond the mandate 
for a military advantage to encompass a survey of the general population, 
home or abroad. Public records and third party record compliance from 
banks, social media sites, and GPS location information can augment these 
profiles (Risen and Poitras 2013a). Concern about these activities is down-
played as just ‘metadata’; still, even if just metadata, it is still very revealing as 
basic data analysis can be used to infer a person’s associates, build behavioural 
patterns, or predict actions. Indeed, General Michael Hayden, former direc-
tor of the NSA and CIA, has said, ‘We kill people based on metadata’ (cited 
by Cole, 2014, 1). This does not bode well given automated lethality discussed 
above. As such, US mass surveillance has established new norms that other 
states do and will follow, in effect making all traffic, private and public, on the 
internet fair game. Intrusive surveillance of this sort directly creates condi-
tions where citizens can easily be subjugated—the Snowden files show this is 
not an abstract threat.
An internal NSA strategy policy document (2012) reveals that the agency 
views its mission as ‘dramatically increas[ing] mastery of the global network’ 
and acquiring communication data the agency deems of strategic value from 
‘anyone, anytime, anywhere’. Former NSA Director General Keith Alexander’s 
motto ‘collect it all’ best captures this directive (Greenwald 2014, 95). To do so 
the agency has petitioned for legal and policy accommodations and adaptions, 
undertaken liberal interpretation of existing laws, or disregarded them alto-
gether to pursue their objective. They have even spied on the standardization 
bodies that set particular encryption specification. This aggressive surveillance 
has been rebuked by Judges in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FICA), even while the court has authorized these programs. This is a secret 
legal process, so citizens are unaware of the extent to which they were subject to 
surveillance and their rights compromised. Nevertheless, all these actions are 
justified by appealing to the demands of the information age:
Calculation, Computation, and Conflict 69
The interpretation and guidelines for applying our authorities, and in 
some cases the authorities themselves, have not kept pace with the com-
plexity of the technology and target environments, or the operational 
expectations levied on the N.S.A.’s mission. (NSA 2012)
Still, the NSA has bragged about operating in ‘the golden age of Sigint’ (NSA 
2012, 2). Similar to the Pentagon’s Human Terrain System—a militarized 
anthropology whose ostensible purpose consists of a computerized system of 
statistical demographic information on occupied populations with the aim 
of providing actionable military intelligence—so too do NSA projects seek 
to profile populations. One project, Mainway, in August 2011 was collecting 
data from nearly 2 billion phone records per day. From what little is publically 
known, this project used Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments act to force 
American service providers to give data on Americans’ calls to foreign nations. 
The 2013 NSA budget requested funds to increase data collection capacities to 
record 20 billion events per day as well as a system that can integrate different 
data streams within the hour to create bulk data, then to share that data for 
more effective analysis (Risen and Poitras 2013a). Little else is known because 
FICA proceedings and rulings are classified.
To build upon this point, under current law, aspects of the NSA’s data-mining 
practice is legally binding (cf. Smith v. Maryland 1979 and Patriot Act 2001) 
and is understood by the NSA to apply ‘without regard to the nationality or 
location of the communicants’ (as reported by Risen and Poitras 2013a). But 
prima facie this scope presents a serious attack on free speech and liberty. As 
Josh Levy crisply observes, ‘The chilling of free speech isn’t just a consequence 
of surveillance. It’s also a motive’ (Levy 2013). The constant threat of direct 
monitoring with privacy being de facto non-existent, and the affective anxiety 
caused by it, is anathema to liberty. Authoritarians claim these measures are for 
public safety, but in practice, surveillance is internally directed to preserve the 
regime, not to ward off external threats. Such social conditions fracture civic 
life as it is impossible to trust others. In addition, the prospect using evidence 
acquired without due process, or trumped up evidence, in an attempt to fore-
stall protest. The point is not whether this or that administration will or will not 
act in this way, but rather that the infrastructure is in place with the implicit 
latent rationale that it ought to be used; the state establishes an infrastructure 
that it ‘won’t control’, rather than ‘can’t control’. These conditions are primed for 
institutional abuse.
When these items are discussed in public, the US state opportunistically 
mobilized a rhetoric of national security interests, cyber warfare and preven-
tative security to exploit public fears of terrorism to install ever more moni-
toring devices to justify mission creep and security drift. Human rights lan-
guage is also co-opted to justify security. But this is an inversion of what has 
actually happened, as since launching the Global War on Terror, the US has 
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pushed aside legal safeguards that protected civil liberties, subordinating them 
to the interests of the state. This has happened without public disclosure, nor 
robust and informed debate about the desirability and consequences of these 
goals and methods. This is near obvious when examining the proportional-
ity of policy actions that what is taking place is systematic pervasive surveil-
lance. Arguably, contemporary surveillance is more pervasive than under most 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of the recent past. As Heidi Boghosian, 
notes ‘corporations and our government now conduct surveillance and milita-
ristic counterintelligence operations not just on foreign countries but also on 
law-abiding U.S. citizens working to improve society’, and whole ‘lives are sub-
jected to monitoring, infiltration, and disruption once they are seen as a threat 
to corporate profits and government policies’ (2013, 21). Indeed, the NSA has 
been collecting information in anticipation of discrediting dissidents, but this 
collection fails to meet the standard of probable cause.
It would be unwise to underplay the danger and significance of this emerg-
ing capability to expand the range and kind of harm, and the implications for 
national and international security (for an extended treatment of this issue see 
Kello 2013), too much that remains unknown about technological volatility 
and defence complications that could lead to strategic instability. Emblemati-
cally, there is tremendous confusion over Stuxnet, the first publicly disclosed 
cyber weapon. Due to a lack of information about the weapon itself, there are 
many unanswered questions about who deployed it, and the extent of sabotage 
done to the Natanz uranium-enrichment plant and the IR-1 centrifuge control 
system (Langer 2013). Mass surveillance and Stuxnet has initiated a cyber arms 
race to build capacities, gather resources, and train staff. But this is a race with 
no direction and without an understanding of pace.
Despite the NSA’s effort to reassure American citizens that its actions are not 
as nefarious as press reports indicate, and that all data queries relate to foreign 
intelligence efforts such as counterterrorism, counterproliferation and cyber-
security, time and time again, claims about the NSA’s lawfulness and conscien-
tious protection civil liberties are demonstrated to be false. Similarly, its claims 
of thwarting attacks are drastically overstated. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court Judge John Bates in a recent ruling painstakingly catalogued ‘pervasive 
violations’ of previous court orders, rampant ‘unauthorized electronic surveil-
lance’ of US citizens, and a ‘history of material misstatements’ about how NSA 
programs worked (Bates as cited by Gosztola 2013). So the agency has a cred-
ibility gap.
The danger of massive data gathering exercises takes on another dimension 
as domestic government agencies begin acquiring drone programs to assist 
with law enforcement. For instance, the FBI, Homeland Security, and Coast 
Guard deploy these resources for border patrol and drug interdiction. It would 
be an error to downplay these concerns as in previous instances the NSA has 
shared criminal evidence with law enforcement agencies, who in turn then 
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 misattribute the source of their information to retroactively manufacture legal 
chains of evidence to justify arresting a suspect (Menn 2013). This makes a 
mockery of due process principles.
The NSA also partners with universities. Likewise, consider the Minerva 
Research Initiative, a DoD research programme that funds university research 
into population and media dynamics of civil unrest. With an allocated budget 
of $75 million over 5 years, Minerva’s aim is to ‘to improve DoD’s basic under-
standing of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape regions 
of the world of strategic importance to the US.’ A typical example is a Cornell 
based project that uses ‘digital traces’ to model ‘the dynamics of social movement 
mobilisation and contagions’ to determine ‘the critical mass (tipping point)’. Case 
studies include ‘the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the 2011 Russian Duma elections, 
the 2012 Nigerian fuel subsidy crisis and the 2013 Gezi park protests in Turkey.’ 
Another project, based at the University of Maryland, aims to understand how 
climate change influences civil unrest. These projects seek to conduct ‘study of 
emotions in stoking or quelling ideologically driven movements to counteract 
grassroots movements’. Most notably, in 2012 university-based researchers used 
Facebook privacy policy to skirt informed consent and conducted an experi-
ment where user’s timelines were modified to measure how ‘emotional conta-
gion’ spreads (Kramera et al. 2014). One of the lead authors, Jeffrey Hancock had 
previously worked on other Minerva funded projects like Modeling Discourse 
and Social Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes.21
Social media research is not limited to universities acting on behalf of the 
security forces; sometimes they conduct this research directly. For example, 
the Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity programme examines 
Twitter to predict civil disorder. General Michael Flynn, the then director of 
the Defence Intelligence Agency, is on record as indicating that social media 
has opened up new areas of inquiry. ‘The information that we’re able to extract 
form social media’, he said, ‘it’s giving us insights that frankly we never had 
before’ (see Tucker, 2014, 1). Each individual project looks inconspicuous, 
but much like the development of military hardware at US universities during 
the Cold War, when seen in totality it is anything but. To one analyst’s eyes, 
‘Minerva is farming out the piece-work of empire in ways that can allow indi-
viduals to disassociate their individual contributions from the larger project.’
These cases show how the US continues to weaponize social science, using it 
as an instrument of imperial rule. This practice has drawn criticism from the 
American Anthropological Association who argue that the Pentagon lacks ‘the 
kind of infrastructure for evaluating anthropological research’ in the case of 
the HTS. They called for such research to be overseen by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF). Accordingly, the DoD and the NSF signed a memoran-
dum of understanding to cooperate on Minerva. But, as the AAA writes, this 
arrangement ‘undermines the role of the university as a place for independ-
ent discussion and critique of the military’. But it seems the horse has already 
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bolted: the American Psychological Association has sought to protect James 
Mitchell and Bruce Jesssen, psychologists who assisted the CIA in its torture 
programme (in addition, members of the American Medical Association were 
present at torturing).22 Republican Senator Tom Coburn had various proposals 
to restrict political science research to areas that provided benefits for national 
security.23 These developments wither social science.
The security forces have partnered with ICT companies to use their 
resources, sometimes via political pressure to provide keys to their encryption, 
other times via court orders to install backdoors into software. Still it is not just 
overt; reports indicate that the CIA pays AT&T about $10 million for metadata 
search series (Savage 2013). As AT&T provides infrastructure for other tele-
communications companies, they are able to provide information of those that 
use the infrastructure, not just their customers. As the CIA is prohibited from 
domestic surveillance, the contact has ‘safeguards’ to ensure privacy protection 
with international calls with one end in the US. AT&T is said to ‘mask’ several 
digits of the phone numbers. But given database triangulation, this is hardly a 
barrier. Besides, as Savage reports, there is still the possibility of inter-agency 
cooperation where the CIA can refer these numbers to the FBI, which then 
can subpoena AT&T for uncensored data (Savage 2013). AT&T has a history 
of extensive cooperation with the state. It facilitated the Bush administration’s 
warrantless wiretapping surveillance program, embedded employees with the 
FBI and DEA.
Data companies collect and amalgamate online and offline information to 
understand behaviour. ChoicePoint, owned by Elsevier maintains 17 billion 
records on businesses and individuals. Or consider that one of the leading 
companies in this area, Acxiom, processes about 50 trillion data transactions 
per year, and averages 1,500 pieces of data per consumer. The pieces come 
from tracked online information combined with public records such as credit 
reports, criminal records, Social Security numbers, to build a profile of a per-
son making genuine anonymity almost impossible. Reminiscent of Alexander’s 
remarks above, Scott Howe, Axciom’s CEO, has said, ‘Our digital reach will 
soon approach nearly every Internet user in the US.’
The scope of this information brokerage rivals that of the NSA, yet this busi-
ness remains near entirely unregulated, and with little public understanding of 
this business sector. Data collection happens through consent for direct data in 
return for services, but also through the passive collection by private entities 
by unknown, little known or involuntary means. It may seem as if the data-
brokers do not endanger human rights, at least relative to governmental sur-
veillance, but this neglects that the US government, federal and local agencies 
purchase data from these sources. In this respect, government access to cus-
tomer data blurs the lines between agencies tasked with serving the public and 
corporate profit seeking. The consequence of aligning consumer marketing and 
state security is possible inference-based discrimination or police targeting.
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There are uncomfortable relationships between corporate surveillance of 
consumers and workers, and the US government’s domestic surveillance of 
citizens. Telecommunications companies and retailers routinely capture eve-
ryday consumer data and hand over to the state. In the wake of the Snowden 
revelations, as a public relations exercise ICT companies proclaim they are 
complying with the law, but as the AT&T-CIA case shows, voluntary coopera-
tion does continue. Still, statements indicating legal compliance can be mis-
leading insofar that broadly applicable laws have not been revised in light of 
technical developments. Where there are revisions, the new statutes often cater 
towards the ruling class’s interests. Consider that companies like Booz Allen 
Hamilton sponsored legislation like the Digital Accountability and Transpar-
ency Act 2014 or the Cyber security Information Sharing Act, 2015. While there 
has been targeted protest on bills like CISPA and SOPA, this activism has not 
generally sought to situate this legislation as but the latest iteration of a drive 
to formally entrench the security state. This is worrying, given that US legisla-
tors are woefully under-informed about mass surveillance, and so susceptible 
to manipulation campaigns, it makes it difficult to justify this public policy as 
having democratic legitimacy.
While the NSA has claimed great success, there is little evidence to support 
these claims. As Democratic Senators Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, and Martin 
Heinrich (2013) made clear in a New York Times op-ed,
The usefulness of the bulk collection program has been greatly exagger-
ated. We have yet to see any proof that it provides real, unique value in 
protecting national security. In spite of our repeated requests, the N.S.A. 
has not provided evidence of any instance when the agency used this 
program to review phone records that could not have been obtained 
using a regular court order or emergency authorization.
Despite the massive investment of funds and resources, investigations have yet 
to say whether the NSA’s programs have yielded results that have stopped terror 
activities. Using intensive and extensive surveillance in Afghanistan, there was 
little tactical success nor enough insight to produce strategic success (Savage 
and Weisman 2015).
However, even if mass surveillance did meet its ostensible goal, and even if there 
was public oversight, principally it is right to oppose it. This is because it creates 
docile, non-threatening and productive subjects. Glenn Greenwald puts it well:
The danger posed by the state operating a massive secret surveillance 
system is far more ominous now than at any point in history. While 
the government, via surveillance, knows more and more about what its 
citizens are doing, its citizens know less and less about what their gov-
ernment is doing, shielded as it is by a wall of secrecy. (2014 208–209)
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Debates about efficacy miss the point that mass surveillance unduly infringes 
upon a person’s dignity. Constant surveillance and monitoring induces people 
to performing a particular kind of subjectivity, limiting the scope for dissent 
or plain difference of opinion. The shrugged response of ‘nothing to hide, they 
have nothing to be afraid of ’ underestimates the extent to which people moni-
tor their actions because they do not want to attract the attention of the state. 
In other words, they go out of their way to do nothing contentious. But when 
people face the prospect of authorities holding them accountable for specifi-
cally framed records, it is nothing less than a direct attack on their freedom of 
speech, belief, consciousness: in short their very personhood.
As vast portions of people’s lives are mediated it is near impossible to live 
without constant sharing of data, recording or conducting activities on digital 
devices. The current Supreme Court ruling on data indicates that authorities 
must obtain a warrant to search a cellphone, but Fourth Amendment ‘expec-
tations of privacy’ are forfeited when this information is transmitted. With 
real-time transmissions, this practically means that there is no expectation of 
privacy and that the cellphone of every person is turned into a tracking device 
making them susceptible to dragnet data collection. This underscores the point 
that mass surveillance and the interception of communications is not selective. 
It operates by the presumption of guilt, grants no respect for privacy rights 
nor the need to justify interference, thus nullifying civil liberties. As networked 
computing is central to economic activity and social life there is no practical 
distinction between the offline and online world. In this respect, digital liber-
ties are civil liberties and their widespread compromise is unacceptable.
Others acknowledge state monitoring, but downplaying the need for absolute 
privacy. Indeed, it is seen as a negotiation of selective disclosure in exchange for 
access to digital services. But this requires a person to be digitally literate about 
the implications of what they are granting access to, and that opt-outs are avail-
able. Still, the worry is about breach of rights, undue pre-emptive data record-
ing that tracks every aspect of a person’s life. Given that the value of data lies 
in its secondary application, it is impossible to specify any one particular risk 
at this point. That said, one can generally anticipate some: the consequence of 
near continuous ever present surveillance through ubiquitiously handheld cel-
lular devices, internet browsing, and sensors which have normalized a culture 
of obedience are anathema to a democratic society and will ultimately prove 
corrosive for meaningful social relations.
While their disclosures provide a partial overview of NSA’s operations, 
whistleblowers like Edward Snowden and journalists like Risen reveal how the 
security state, with the assistance of corporations such as AT&T, Facebook, 
Google, and Verizon, has built an extensive intelligence-gathering infrastruc-
ture using programs like PRISM, XKeyscore and other strategic information 
operations to build dossiers. When whistleblowers speak up or journalists 
investigate these actions, agents of the state use intimidation tactics or  character 
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assassination. As  Chelsea Manning, Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, 
and Barrett Brown can attest, incarceration or exile are also viable options. 
Consider the treatment of Risen. In State of War he details how Operation Mer-
lin, a covert CIA operation undertaken in the Clinton administration to delay 
the Iran nuclear programme had the opposite effect.24 Following publication, 
both the Bush and Obama administrations undertook a protracted effort to 
pressure Risen to reveal his sources. Using the Espionage Act of 1917, the Jus-
tice Department indicted Jeffery Sterling, a former CIA officer. While there was 
evidence of correspondence between Risen and Sterling, pre-trail filings indi-
cated that the Justice Department believed that to convict Sterling, they required 
Risen to testify because Sterling revealed classified material in interviews, so 
Risen was an eyewitness to the felony. After several years, Justice did eventu-
ally concede that Risen could avoid testifying about his source, this framing of 
the case and protracted pressure infers that reporting on classified material is 
deemed an act of co-conspiracy in espionage by the US.
Without a federal shield law, reporters claim First Amendment protection, 
but Bransburg v. Hayes (1972) is often interpreted to mean that journalists have 
no special right to testify in a criminal case.25 Justice Powell did indicate that 
this privilege,
should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between 
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant 
testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital 
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with 
the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
This is hardly reliable protection, particularly when Eric Holder’s Department 
of Justice prosecuted and imprisoned a number of people for disclosing classi-
fied information to the press, even if it was about matters of public interest like 
warrantless surveillance or CIA torture programs. Indeed, these efforts found 
the Justice Department had undertaken extensive wiretapping and recording 
of Associated Press reporters to investigate leaks. Upon this becoming public 
knowledge, in July 2013 the Justice Department issued new guidelines when 
dealing with the press in investigations, but this was predicated upon protec-
tions only when reporters were undertaking ‘ordinary’ newsgathering, this 
itself being undefined and so open to draconian law enforcement. This raises 
the question of whether the DoD or the Justice Department considers protest 
movements and social activism—which are normatively vital for a democratic 
polity—a threat to national security.
To conclude, part of the success of the US security state has been its ability 
to mobilize privately organized industrial strength, and has directed the divi-
dends to new technological developments cementing state-capital relations in 
the military industrial complex while periodically intervening into popular 
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culture to create soft power. The state’s control of data presents opportunities 
to limit dissent and marginalize internal rivals, while commodification of data 
points to the urgent need for sustained digital liberties activism. While one 
should not discount the role and lobbying done by the emerging cyber-indus-
trial complex, or the politics involved, it is clear that the US has ‘weaponized 
the internet’ (Weaver 2013), making it an instrument of control and oppres-
sion. Therefore, it is important to underscore the point Zeynep Tufekci (2014b) 
makes that ‘How the internet is run, governed and filtered is a human rights 
issue.’ At stake is the very moral agency of people’s lives, and the infringement 
of a person’s right by a state set on reducing citizens to nothing but subjects.
CHAPTER 4
Internal Rule and the Other America
Identity cannot help but be a by-product of inequality and exploitation, of capi-
tal’s discretion to assert difference and distinction all the while maintained by 
brute force or systematic racism. ‘Racial regimes do possess history, that is, 
discernible origins and mechanisms of assembly. But racial regimes are unre-
lentingly hostile to their exhibition. This antipathy exists because a discoverable 
history is incompatible with a racial regime’, Cedric Robinson says, and with 
its ‘claims of naturalism’ (1997). Many strategies are used to install this regime, 
including violence like assassinations and state repression of biracial unions. 
The black experience in the US is of good example of this process.
Despite the US state’s attempts to justify police militarization, this kind of 
targeted violence undergirds a system of domination – structured often along 
race and class lines. Whereas the previous chapters addressed strategic calcula-
tion and rule, this chapter turns towards domestic issues detailing the status of 
public institutions in the US and their relationship to the production of patterns 
of subjugation. The specific cases are certainly not intended to be exhaustive of 
all the institutional arrangements in the US state, but rather to be indicative and 
emblematic of them. Continuing the theme of constraint, I examine who bears 
the brunt of these efforts. In response to the recently highly publicized police 
shootings of unarmed black people, social movements like #BlackLivesMatter—
now part of the Movement for Black Lives—have shown the extent of state sanc-
tioned violence against black and brown bodies, where the torture and loss of 
black life at the hands of the state is deemed acceptable, and where black people 
are deprived of their basic human rights and dignity by a ‘blue wall of terror’. 
These movements have also sought to demonstrate how these practices are them-
selves linked to broader structural injustices, such as the US prison industrial 
complex, the militarization of inner city communities. So while police brutality 
is a problem, it is best thought of as an indicator for greater troubles in the social 
structure of the US. It is in this direction that this chapter will travel.
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Throughout this treatment, I want to underscore that I am neither ‘speak-
ing for’, nor ‘speaking of ’, but rather ‘speaking about’. This is because, as Linda 
Alcoff notes,
speaking for others is often born of a desire for mastery, to privilege 
oneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about 
another’s situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus 
achieve glory and praise. And the effect of the practice of speaking for 
others is often, though not always, erasure and a reinscription of sexual, 
national, and other kinds of hierarchies (1991, 32).
Furthermore, I am not attempting to define black thought, nor flatten it out, but 
rather to find some interesting features that relate to recent historical-material 
developments. Similarly, I want to avoid making selected members of com-
munity ventriloquists of black lived experience. In the exercise I am guided by 
Alcoff ’s heuristic, will writing about state violence ‘enable the empowerment of 
oppressed peoples?’ (1991, 32). I am reluctant to declare ‘yes’, for two reasons. 
The first is because doing so strikes me as undue bravado, something Alcoff 
warns about. The second is informed by the sheer contingency of empower-
ment, something the state wishes to mitigate in its favour. With this said, over-
all the goal is to reiterate the salience of structural racism, classism, and sex-
ism in America, all the while demonstrating how the state is responsible for, 
encourages, and condones this violence.
4.1 The Atrophy of Opposition and the Truly Disadvantaged
Racism is insidious, and is one prop of the American social structure. This is 
evident in the vast disparities between blacks and other groups in health and 
wellness (life expectancy, rates of major illnesses, suicide), economic (house-
hold income, property ownership, assets, unemployment,) and social indices 
(educational attainment, incidence of poverty, incarceration). Involved in 
these disparities is that cities and towns present residential segregation which 
introduce school segregation. As Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton noted in 
American Apartheid, ‘racial residential segregation is the principal structural 
feature of American society responsible for the perpetuation of urban poverty 
and represents a primary cause of racial inequality in the United States’ (1993, 
viii). Lastly, there is a scarcity of blacks in the ruling class or in prestigious pro-
fessional careers.
Nevertheless, scarcity does not mean total absence. There are successful 
blacks, and indeed Barack Obama, who associates with the black commu-
nity, won two presidential elections. Moreover, there have been black cabi-
net officials, mayors and Supreme Court appointments and indeed blacks are 
important figures in athletics and the entertainment industry. For this reason, 
Internal Rule and the Other America 79
in Obama’s first term, there was much public discussion about whether the 
US was on the threshold of entering a stage of post-racial political develop-
ment. Generally, the apologist argument went that race’s role in informing life 
chances and prospects was declining; for if the US electorate could vote for a 
black person, so the reasoning went, then there were considerably fewer dis-
criminatory attitudes than, say the late 1950s when the Civil Rights Movement 
was initiated. In short, the current social structure, while imperfect, was tran-
scending past repressions.
Presented in self-congratulatory terms, and notwithstanding sociologi-
cal evidence indicating otherwise, the post-racial society thesis invited poor 
political analysis, the ramifications doing more harm than good. As opposed to 
situating black people in a historically specific social structure, the thesis cast 
black people as authoring their failures. This is irrespective of whether this is by 
lapsed behaviour, poor morals or ethics: The negligent use of personal agency 
explains the social disparity and the lack of individual upward social mobility, 
and not structural oppression.
An added grotesque feature of this thesis is that by implication, the state 
can suspend welfare targeted at racial redress, or establish a sunset clause for 
affirmative action hiring policies. So, in practice, the thesis is less than noble, 
because rather than champion and expand upon the few social gains made thus 
far, it was instead used to challenge and justify dismantling the state’s capacity 
to attend to discrimination. Put simply, the narrow elevation of an elite few 
does little for the material conditions of many others.
Still, the black community is divided on the merits of the post-racial society 
thesis. Consider Obama’s 2013 Morehouse ‘no excuses’ commandment speech 
as emblematic of elite blacks focus on individual drive and ambition:
We’ve got no time for excuses—not because the bitter legacies of slavery 
and segregation have vanished entirely; they haven’t. Not because racism 
and discrimination no longer exist; that’s still out there. It’s just that in 
today’s hyper-connected, hyper-competitive world, with a billion young 
people from China and India and Brazil entering the global workforce 
alongside you, nobody is going to give you anything you haven’t earned. 
And whatever hardships you may experience because of your race, they 
pale in comparison to the hardships previous generations endured—
and overcame. (Coates, 2013)
While Obama does not set aside the problems of race, nor the lack of suffi-
cient redress, but in a sleight of hand, he—indicative here of wealthier blacks—
absconds and redirects blame to the poor. Ta-Nehisi Coates argues that Oba-
ma’s condescending tone is reserved for blacks, which is in poor taste given 
that that constituency provided him significant political support and thereby 
well-positioned him to address larger structural issues.
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But more important than tone, Obama’s remarks reveal a contradiction. 
Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor describes this contradiction well when she writes that 
‘For Black elites, in particular, their success validates the political and economic 
underpinning of US society while reaffirming the apparent personal defects of 
those who have not succeeded’ (2014, 8). Adolf Reed explains this contradic-
tion by pointing to ‘the atrophy of opposition within the black community’. He 
means that certain kinds of blacks have been pacified, such that ‘antagonisms 
have been so depoliticized that they can surface only in alienated forms’ where 
‘traditional forms of opposition have been made obsolete by a new pattern of 
social management’ (1979). The reason for this is that capitalism adjusted to 
black radical protest by co-opting blacks into the elite, and involving them in 
restructuring capitalism. To this extent, this is similar to Derrick Bell’s (1995) 
observation that the American constitution privileges property over justice: 
His interest convergence theory proposes that racial advances and civil eman-
cipation will only occur to the extent that they align with the interests of the 
(white) elite. In other words, the neoliberal ruling class incorporated elements 
of the black community to stall radical protest of the same social structure.
To link this back to the previous point, blacks are not responsible for their 
own predicaments and plight, so there is no basis to claim that black culture, or 
parts thereof, is at fault. Such attributions are a racist denial that culture is built 
upon material conditions. This explanation is used to abscond from examining 
the reason for the material conditions in the first place. But even if one were to 
take on those terms, blaming black culture is akin to saying that blacks have not 
integrated into the broader American society, which itself fails to acknowledge 
how racism and economic imperatives have worked to keep blacks from inte-
grating.26 So ultimately, this explanation preserves the American social struc-
ture while suggesting that blacks create their own burdens.
This is very different from the structural critiques advanced by the social 
movements in the 1960s, including the Civil Rights Movement. Even if Reed 
is correct when he suggests that these struggles for equality failed to produce 
the solidarity required to carry and advance a broader ‘coherent opposition’ 
to the ‘administrative apparatus’, (1979) these movements nevertheless exam-
ined black poverty and disparity using an historical analysis of oppression and 
exploitation of blacks.
Of course, black elites are still victims of discrimination, implicit and insti-
tutional. Indeed, they carry more debt and have less wealth comparatively to 
whites. However, their economic resources still provide them a better position 
from which to address racism or at least buffer themselves from racist social 
structures. The reduction of formal racism, combined with apparent just desert 
component of the post-racial society thesis, means that lower class blacks are 
just that much more susceptible to the damages and harms produced by the 
social structure, and especially so if the state withdraws from welfare provisions 
or redistribution efforts.
Internal Rule and the Other America 81
A good portion of the affinity and subscription to the thesis turns on the 
lived experience of class as it informs different political philosophies, actions 
and conclusions, and it arises from the experience of different kinds, types, 
and intensity of racial inequality and discriminatory actions. While an affluent 
black family living in Bel Air undoubtedly experienced systemic racism it is of a 
quantitatively different sort than that experienced by a black family from West 
Philadelphia and the politics and worldview of these two families would reflect 
that. This can explain why the black community includes theorists as far apart 
as Cornell West and Thomas Sowell, or jurists Thurgood Marshall and Clarence 
Thomas. So like all communities, one must resist reifying Black American as 
a uniform mass, in part because of the pronounced social inequality between 
blacks as well as different explanations for it.
To explain this divergent black politics, in The Declining Significance of Race 
William Wilson argued that there was a historical transition ‘from economic 
racial oppression experienced by virtually all blacks to economic subordination 
for the black underclass’, the result of which was that ‘the Negro class struc-
ture has become more differentiated’ (1978, 152–3). In The Truly Disadvan-
taged (1987), he built upon this claim arguing that with the extension of civil 
rights and the Great Society programs under advanced capitalism the urban 
poor have come to suffer from both race and class subordination, inflected in 
part by the history of marginality and redundancy where class markers start to 
emerge in black society. Although the upper incomes of blacks trailed whites, 
structural changes explain the split in black income where, in the late 1980s, 
income inequality between blacks was greater than those between whites do.
In accounting for this growing social inequality, Wilson observed a mean-
ingful connection between the declining economic prospects of young urban 
black men. With brevity in mind, in 1950, about half of young black men were 
employed as farm labourers in Southern agriculture. However, massive sector-
wide mechanization meant that these jobs had near but vanished by 1970. For 
these reasons, blacks migrated to northern industrial cities where they found 
employment in the manufacturing sector in vehicle and steel production, partly 
because these were jobs that, at most, required completing high school. But 
deindustrialization and off-shoring of production facilities meant that many of 
these jobs disappeared when the manufacturing sector contracted in the late 
1970s and 1980s.
As cities became centres of financial and professional services, there were 
fewer vocation and employment opportunities for the low-skilled uneducated 
black men. These new jobs required more education attainment, something 
their class background made difficult to attain. Concurrently, baby boom-
ers and white women flooded the labour market. So with affirmative action 
policies, necessary to help redress decades of discrimination, better educated, 
higher class blacks were better positioned to take advantage of them. As a 
result, they did relatively well in comparison to poorer blacks and so were thus 
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able to leave the cities like their middle-class white counterparts. Aside from 
losing vital networks of support and community institutions, the poor were left 
further behind in ghettos with concentrated poverty thus making it much more 
difficult to compete for positions. Already precariously positioned, it is easy 
to see how recessions and unemployment disproportionally affect black men. 
This produced class-decomposition and the reduction of working class blacks. 
Altogether, poor urban blacks were severely alienated.
Admirable for giving priority to material developments as opposed to expla-
nations predicated solely upon racist attitudes or helpless dependency, Wilson 
points out these critical economic structural changes produce the social rela-
tions in urban areas. What this means is that it was not that the Great Soci-
ety social programs failed to reduce poverty so much as it did not anticipate a 
changing economic base. Wilson concludes that tolerating high unemployment 
rates does untold damage to the inhabitants of urban ghettos, and this indicates 
that a fiscal policy that gives priority to rentier income over employment main-
tains the underclass. Therefore, the alienation of poor urban blacks is result 
of deindustrialization of production, the financialization of the global process 
of capital accumulation, and the fiscal withering of welfare programs through 
intentional resource starvation by those that controlled the state.
Overall, this economic stratification and segregation are indicative of a social 
structure in which blacks have greater obstacles, fewer life chances, more vio-
lence, and indignity; or what Oscar Gandy (2009) calls ‘cumulative disadvan-
tage’. Due to class and racial positions, poor blacks’ prospects are bleak and 
they are more susceptible to disasters, natural or economic. Illustrative of this 
was Hurricane Katrina which ‘exposed our nation’s amazing tolerance for black 
pain’, argues Jamelle Bouir, it ‘was one of the worst disasters in American his-
tory: It killed more than 1,800 Americans, displaced tens of thousands more, 
and destroyed huge swaths of New Orleans’ (2015) It was not only a storm that 
made landfall, but a social disaster (cf. Smith 2006,) thereby becoming a defin-
ing element within black political consciousness and indicative of the ruling 
class’s indifference and neglect of poor black residents. The lack of provisions 
and treatment plans are enduring aspects of black subjugation, which many 
suspect would not have been the case had it been a white wealthy city. The 
second example arises from the 2008 recession wherein blacks’ wealth was dis-
proportionately tied up in homeownership some of which was the result of dis-
criminatory and corrupt lending practices. Together, these cases set the stage 
for black pessimism with institutional order, and where radical blacks make ‘no 
excuses’ for the ruling class.
4.2 The War on Blacks
Dan Baum, writing in Harpers, claims that John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s White 
House Counsel, admitted that the War on Drugs was a cynical political 
manoeuvre. ‘The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after 
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that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people’, says Ehrlichman. He 
continues:
We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, 
but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and 
blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could dis-
rupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, 
break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening 
news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did. 
(cited in Baum 2016)
Subsequent administrations, Congress, governors and state legislative houses 
have used the state crackdown on narcotics and the War on Drugs as a proxy 
for their particular interests. But irrespective of the particular politics, the out-
come was a social structure where mass incarceration of 2.3 million people and 
governing through crime were key features.
To staff this apparatus, from 1992 to 2010, local and state police personnel 
increased from 603,000 to 794,000, about two-thirds as many active-duty US 
military personnel. Local police expenditures have increased from $40 billion 
in 1982 to over $100 billion in 2012 (Justice Policy Institute, 2012). Including 
federal spending on law enforcement by the FBI, ATF, and Homeland Security 
the figure in 2015 was $265 billion (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). FBI sta-
tistics show that crime fell 19 per cent between 1987 and 2011. This holds even 
in cities where police forces have been subject to budget cuts. This funding 
coincides with an increased use of ‘no-knock’ laws to conduct police raids, the 
instances increased from thousands during the 1980s to 40,000 in 2005, to an 
estimated 80,000 in 2013.
These harrowing figures are not coincidental, but reflect political choices. 
For example, while Clinton’s administration inherited the War on Drugs, he 
nevertheless oversaw and encouraged the largest ever expansion of the penal 
system. This was because, in an attempt to counter the Republican ‘Southern 
Strategy’ and win back white voters, Clinton era Democrats pursued a political 
strategy that scapegoated and sacrificed urban black communities through an 
extensive disciplinary regime that included the withdrawal of welfare and the 
implementation of punishment. The tough on crime agenda coincided with an 
economic collapse caused by offshoring manufacturing and deindustrialization 
that had been particularly hard on urban African Americans and especially so 
on young black men. This lack of decent work resulted in class decomposition 
and a sharp rise in inner city crime, which was compounded by drug epidem-
ics, and racially segregated jobless ghettos.
US legislators have also created a draconian and disproportionate punish-
ment system that uses marginalized populations as inputs for the prison-indus-
trial complex. Indicative of systematic over-imprisonment, in his 1994 State 
of the Union address, Clinton advocated for a federal ‘three strikes’ law and 
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shortly thereafter signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
(1994) that authorized $16 billion for police and prison system. This imprison-
ment of blacks leads to social stigma and economic exclusion, thus reduces 
their life chances and prospects for rehabilitation.
Not only is there a pipeline from schools through the justice system to cor-
porately owned prisons, but while imprisoned inmates are forced to labour 
on behalf of their incarcerators under the guise of rehabilitation. Working for 
excessively low wages, this involuntary labour can generate up to $30,000 a year 
benefiting corporate prisons. Companies, such as Whole Foods, take advantage 
of prisons that are little better then modern day poor houses. As Chris Hedges 
notes,
The bodies of poor, unemployed youths are worth little on the streets 
but become valuable commodities once they are behind bars… The 
criminalization of poverty is a lucrative business, and we have replaced 
the social safety net with a dragnet. (2013, 1)
For-profit-prisons have a stake in incarcerating citizens. This has led to about 
2.2 million people imprisoned at any given time, a 500 per cent increase over 
thirty years. The school to prison pipeline where minors are treated like adults, 
shuttled from underfunded school to a prison complex is particularly egre-
gious. Studies have shown that police and juries estimate black children to be 
older than they are, and more readily try them as adults in court. These crimi-
nal records ensure that young blacks cannot enter adult life as a normal person, 
and at a structural level, leads to political incapacitation.
It is often said that Bill Clinton reduced the unemployment rate. However, 
this is a good example of defining the problem away as prisoners are not 
counted in US statistics for poverty and unemployment rates. Thus record 
low unemployment rates among African Americans are tied to record high 
incarceration rates. In fact, as Michelle Alexander writes, ‘when Clinton left 
office in 2001, the true jobless rate for young, non-college-educated black men 
(including those behind bars) was 42 percent.’ Compounding these problems 
was Clinton’s general redirection of $54 billion from welfare towards the 
penal system. Amongst other things, this introduced means-testing, reduced 
the public housing budget, eliminated Pell grants for prisoners, imposed life-
time bans on welfare for persons convicted of drug offences, and enabled 
bureaucrats to evict families from public housing if a member had a criminal 
history, such as an arrest. Consequently, ‘by the end of Clinton’s presidency,’, 
Alexander writes,
more than half of working-age African-American men in many large 
urban areas were saddled with criminal records and subject to legalized 
discrimination in employment, housing, access to education, and basic 
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public benefits—relegated to a permanent second-class status eerily 
reminiscent of Jim Crow.
In the 15 years since these actions, extreme poverty (an income of less than $2 
per person per day) doubled to 1.5 million people. Instead of this vast penal sys-
tem, this money could have been redirected to investments into urban commu-
nities to help carry the populations from industrial to service based economies.
In contra-distinction to nonsense theories like the ‘culture of poverty’ 
‘color-blindness’, or ‘post-racism’ a forthright historical materialism is a useful 
approach to adopt when seeking to understand the current outcomes for black 
people in the US social structure. It is against this backdrop that the militariza-
tion of law enforcement should be seen. Police militarization is most acutely 
felt in what Martin Luther King Jnr. (1967) called the ‘other America’, where 
instead of finding the ‘experience the opportunity of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness in all its dimensions’, there is instead a ‘daily ugliness’.
Michael Brown’s killing is indicative of the intersection of police-citizen 
encounters that these conditions of daily ugliness produce. It begins with con-
flicting reports of the events, the fact that the incident was not radioed in for 
near to an hour, and that the body was left in the road for an excessive amount 
of time, away from the Brown family. Police deployed SWAT teams who pointed 
assault rifles at citizens so as to subdue the protesters who had assembled. In the 
coming days, tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets were deployed against 
protestors. Journalists were threatened with violence and death (Davidson 
2014), and over the next two weeks, over 100 people were arrested, nominally 
under the pretence of refusing to disperse, but it is unclear whether there was 
an order and whether it was lawful, and whether this was communicated to 
protestors (Amnesty International 2014).
These actions were compounded by the Ferguson Police Department’s refusal 
to release Darren Wilson’s name, an incomplete incident report, and interfer-
ence with journalists trying to report on the event. It extends to the Ferguson 
Police Department where, despite the municipalities population being about 
two-thirds black, of about 55 officers only three were black. So there was an 
existing alienated relationship between the police and the community.
This alienation is exacerbated by municipal police forces seeing citizens as a 
source of revenue. The over-policing of municipalities—like Ferguson—relies 
on revenue generated by fines and penalties for minor legal infringements such 
as driving with a broken headlight. The cost of these fines and penalties, and 
the additional imposition of legal fees, amounts to nothing less than a form of 
government imposed debt bondage. As blacks are disproportionately poor, and 
momentarily setting aside whether these practices were motivated by overt rac-
ism, they are severely affected by these institutional practices. This is the basis 
for institutional oppression, the kind that can occurs independent of any overt 
racist attitudes or actions of the people who enforce these policies.
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4.3 The Daily Ugliness of Police Militarization
Sanctioned by the National Defence Authorization Act (1990), the Pentagon 
has aided the militarization of society through an ongoing transference of 
$4.3 billion worth of military grade weapons to the police department through 
the 1033 programme. Since 2006 alone this Act has seen 432 mine-resistant 
armoured vehicles, 435 other kinds of armoured vehicles, 533 planes and 
helicopters, and near 94,000 machine guns (see Apuzzo 2014) transferred to 
municipal police forces. Weapons and hardware, designed for and deployed on 
battlefields against combatants are now being used in regular policing against 
US citizens. This program has even reached US campuses where more than 100 
campus police forces have received surplus military equipment (Gold 2014). 
In a notable case, Ohio State received a 19-ton armoured vehicle designed to 
protect military personal from roadside bombs (Stuart 2013).
As this militarization has become normalized, SWAT units now undertake 
routine police work like patrols and executing warrants. This indicates a mis-
sion creep where these new resources allow the agencies to seek out, envision, 
and undertake new actionable purposes. Having these weapons on hand intro-
duces a moral cost that is often neglected, in that it elevates possibilities of 
violent police-citizen incidents into probabilities. Police power is less informed 
by principles of justice and keeping the peace and rather functions as an instru-
ment of social pacification as it reflects the political goals of the War on Ter-
ror and the War on Drugs. In other words, these security agendas have meant 
that there is a continuous blurring of the distinction between police and mili-
tary tactics and behaviour, with countless examples of police using excessive, 
unreasonable, and unnecessary force, acting like a standing occupational army. 
This erodes the line between the police and the military, making them all state 
security forces.27
As this military equipment belongs to the DoD, police forces cannot sell 
it. Should police wish to return the items then layers of paperwork, delays in 
communication, and making police departments carry costs, render the return 
process burdensome in an effort to stall it. Lastly, the DoD has to approve the 
return, but they have a vested interest in not carrying the maintenance nor stor-
age costs (Redden 2014).
Advocates for tactical units and military grade equipment suggest these tech-
niques are necessary for modern policing because law enforcement duties place 
police officers in high-risk environments (cf. Skof 2014). In addition, as SWAT 
teams impose excessive physical requirements this virtually excludes female 
officers, subordinating them to support roles. (Dodge, Valcore and Gomez 
2011). The combination of an abundance of caution, overwhelming force, and 
hyper-masculinity is justified as being in the ‘public interest’, but aside from 
the nebulous nature of the ‘public interest’, the approach always presumes a 
worst-case scenario rather than reasonably judging the likelihood of that 
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kind of  outcome. This rationality is how events where 24 police officers with 
an armoured vehicle were tasked to collect a fine from a 75-year-old man in 
Stettin, Wisconsin occur, simply because the litter on his property was an 
apparent eyesore (Chan 2014). This needless aggression is indicative of a social 
structure where the craft of violence is bifurcated when personal safety is dis-
connected from the larger social forces that initially produce violence.
Even if one grants that SWAT teams are useful for narrow purposes, the 
application of extraordinary tactics to ordinary police work creates a climate of 
fear among citizens and police officers. It is also worth noting that the militari-
zation and the general acquisition of military equipment has occurred without 
input, consultation, or oversight from the communities that would be policed 
by this tactic. Indeed, this points to the prime problem; the 1033 programme 
has been used to deploy military grade weapons to police in case there are radi-
cal revolutionary groups, drug dealers, or fundamentalism where extreme force 
is required. However, not only does this not reflect the situational needs of most 
police forces, but these purported dangerous groups simply do not have the 
power that one might presume. This is not the threat is made out to be, so it is 
but a pretence that reveals the absence of basic democratic governance norms.
As an example of absconding from democratic norms, consider the common 
enough tactics of forced entry by battering ram to serve warrants. These raids 
are often predicted upon weak evidence and the fact that a good portion of 
these people are not charged with a crime mocks the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence. As Tom Nolan explains, ‘People who have been charged with 
no crime aren’t only treated like they’re guilty; they’re made to endure a vio-
lent intrusion into their home based on the mere suspicion of low-level crimes’ 
(2014, 1). Furthermore, there are regular reports of bystanders, often African 
Americans, being hurt in police raids. This is coupled by civil forfeiture and the 
seizure of assets.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (2014) report, War Comes 
Home, is testament to these aforementioned norms. They examined over 800 
SWAT incidents between 2011 and 2012, nearly two thirds were for drug 
searches, while less than one tenth were responses to hostage situations. Part 
of the reason for this is because of neoliberal public sector resource starvation. 
To attain funding, police departments have to meet quotas for drug arrests to 
win federal grants.
When the ACLU requested open records for their report on police militari-
zation, some Massachusetts SWAT teams declined to cooperate, claiming that 
they operated as law enforcement councils and as such were private entities. 
Incorporated as 501(c)(3) organizations, they used this legal status to say they 
are private corporations, not government agencies, and so do not have to com-
ply with open record requests. For example, the North Eastern Massachusetts 
Law Enforcement Council has about 50 member agencies. They have a wide 
range of capabilities: As well as a SWAT team METROLEC, has a canine unit, 
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computer crimes unit, motorcycle units, and armoured vehicles. They even 
applied to the FEA for a drone licence. The ACLU reports that,
Approximately 240 of the 351 police departments in Massachusetts 
belong to an LEC. While set up as “corporations,” LECs are funded by 
local and federal taxpayer money, are composed exclusively of public 
police officers and sheriffs, and carry out traditional law enforcement 
functions through specialized units such as SWAT teams.
And:
Police departments and regional SWAT teams are public institutions, 
working with public money, meant to protect and serve the public’s 
interest. If these institutions do not maintain and make public compre-
hensive and comprehensible documents pertaining to their operations 
and tactics, the people cannot judge whether officials are acting appro-
priately or make needed policy changes when problems arise (2014).
Meanwhile, reminiscent of the Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council hid-
ing behind their incorporation papers, local authorities use corporate non-
disclosure clauses as reasons not to respond to judicial requests for information 
about the various technological devices use in police investigations. For exam-
ple, between 2008 and May 2015, the NYPD used Stingrays— ISMI catchers—
over 1,000 times in local domestic politicking. They did so without a formal 
policy, nor warrants (New York Civil Liberties Union 2016). The manufacturers, 
Harris Corporation, sells these products with a non-disclosure clause so it is not 
known how much they are used. In Baltimore’s case, they cited dropped charges 
rather than disclose their policing techniques and technological capabilities. 
This is a system where legal and market institutions are used to shield public 
officials when abusing their power.
Using open source data collection methods, the Justice Policy Institute esti-
mates that police killed 587 people in 2012. In these shootings, young black 
men were 21 times more likely to be shot than white counterparts. Federal data 
reports that were collected demonstrated that between 2010 and 2012 there 
were 1,217 deadly police shootings. Furthermore, of,
[these] 1,217 deadly police shootings from 2010 to 2012...blacks, age 15 
to 19, were killed at a rate of 31.17 per million, while just 1.47 per mil-
lion white males in that age range died at the hands of police. (Gabriel-
son, Grochowski Jones, and Sagara 2014)
This data points to the double standard of policing in the US where various 
agents of the state continue the long chain of suffering that black people have 
experienced at the hands of the state. Michael Dyson calls this ‘America’s blue 
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wall of terror’ (2017). Still, there is an ideological tendency in parts of the 
American public imagination wherein taking crime seriously requires uncon-
stitutional policing and inhumane sentences.
Institutional racism sees a willingness of police to use harsh measures to 
terrorize people of colour. Combined with the widespread criminalization of 
young black males, the possibility of building trust is squandered when police 
do kill innocent people. Instead of apologizing and trying to make amends 
with the families, the police slander their victims, labelling them criminals or 
thugs. This situation is the antithesis of a civilian police force concerned with 
safeguarding a democratic polis. Therefore, African Americans’ distrust of the 
police and the criminal justice system as portrayed in Elijah Anderson’s Street-
wise (1990) or Alice Goffman’s On The Run (2014) is more than reasonable.
When faced with public evidence of wrongdoing, police lie, obfuscate the 
truth, stonewall investigations, or in the case of New York, the police union 
threatens labour boycotts, essentially holding cities hostage and applying polit-
ical pressure to hinder investigations. There are suspicions that prosecutors also 
collude with police to thwart indictments. Consider that federal indictments by 
a grand jury are granted in 99.993 per cent of case, but when police are involved 
it drops to 1.2 per cent. Also consider that about 95 per cent of police shoot-
ings are ruled as ‘justified’, even as body counts rise. Even then, if a case does 
make it to court, laws forbid prosecutors from informing juries about proper 
police training and protocols. This means juries do not have resources to judge 
whether the police action was a deviation from approved behaviour and inter-
action. This rampant impunity deprives the victims of police homicide the 
right to a fair public trial.
What these cases show us is that where there is a tendency towards a dispro-
portionate use of force, it is all too often reserved for use against the underclass. 
There is no due process, and death is deemed acceptable. In the face of such 
violence, the public use smartphones to record police encounters. However, 
despite the right to record police action, the police too often confiscate the 
video footage, or threaten witnesses with arrest. Even when video evidence of 
unnecessary police brutality against those who do not pose a threat is secured 
and circulated via social media networks it does not seem to matter. In the 
case of Eric Garner, whose tragic death was captured on video, the police were 
seen to choke him into submission—a method prohibited by New York Police 
departmental policy. Yet even in this case, with video evidence and a coroner 
report ruling the death a homicide, there was no accountability or punishment 
for police officer crimes.
There have been suggestions that equipping police with body cameras will 
limit the abuse of power. Police departments and some reformers are allied on 
this front. But absent genuine accountability, it is unlikely to have much effect. 
Consider, for example, the recent history of dashboard cameras: one investiga-
tive reporting team examined 1,800 Chicago Police Department maintenance 
logs (Kongol and Biasco 2015) only to reveal that between September 2014 and 
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July 2015 there were 90-recorded incidents where there were no functioning 
microphones in police vehicles. What is particularly troubling about this is that 
police technicians attribute about 80 per cent of silent audio in dash-cam vid-
eos to ‘intentional destruction’ and that there is a backlog to fix them. There are 
also records of several vehicles failing to capture video. Even setting aside the 
lessons from dashboard cameras, where effectiveness depends so much on the 
police departments’ institutional culture and proper archival procedures, this 
technology has mostly helped police. For example, body cameras have been 
used to identify and find protestors. With increased computing power and 
refinements in facial recognition software, this will only become easier. Indeed, 
it might signal the end of the mob as a historical concept. Reformist aspirations 
that are devoid of any understanding of power or interest, seemingly unable 
to recognize that the tools, platforms, and techniques they were celebrating 
as emancipatory, can be turned against activists, dissidents, or the very causes 
they are trying to promote.
Nevertheless, given how biases are often encoded into software, given already 
existing institutional racism, it is likely that software will be used to racial pro-
file populations. Racial profiling is obviously wrong; it presumes a predictive 
power of race, itself an implicit bias and racially motivated prejudice, and is 
thus too simplistic for investigative purposes. Not only are these distortions 
present when arresting, as to are the over-reliance on them, but so are increases 
in police brutality such as humiliating harassment and verbal abuse. This affects 
every aspect of a community, especially when the police steal and destroy the 
property of the people they stop and frisk. The police are rife with misconduct, 
brutality, and corruption—and they are armed with the tools of war. This sim-
ple case demonstrates how technical solutions will not solve social injustice. 
These developments require us to consider how technological implementations 
can introduce social problems.
Several of the aforementioned themes can be seen in Chicago’s Black Sites. 
Between 1972 and 1991, more than 100 people were tortured at these sites. 
This was done with the explicit knowledge of the former Chicago police 
commander Jon Burge. Mostly African American men were tortured using 
mock executions, electric shocks, and sleep deprivation. These actions show 
the institutional willingness to be brutal to the poor and to blacks. In 2003, 
Governor George Ryan pardoned four of ten death row inmates who say they 
were subject to torture. Burge was dismissed in 1993 after an internal inves-
tigation and convicted in 2010 of perjury during civil proceedings. Involved 
in those crimes was Chicago detective Richard Zuley. Zuley is notorious 
for being an interrogator at Guantanamo Bay in 2002. His plan for tortur-
ing Mohamedou Ould Slahi was personally signed off by Donald Rumsfeld. 
Spencer Ackerman’s review of court documents filed in Chicago, interviews 
with Guantanamo Bay prisoners, and Slahi’s Guantanamo Diary ‘suggest a 
continuum between police abuses in urban America and the wartime deten-
tion scandals’ (Ackerman 2015a, 1).
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Burge and Zuley both began their service with the Chicago Police Depart-
ment in the 1970s, rising through the ranks. Assigned to different areas—Burge 
on the south side, Zuley on the north—there is no evidence-showing coopera-
tion between the two. This is perhaps more disconcerting than if they had, for it 
indicates that impunity is not confined to a select group of officers, but diffused 
in a system that condones it.
Sadly, Spencer Ackerman’s reporting has found that the Chicago Police 
Department continues to operate an ‘off-the-books interrogation compound’ 
at Homan Square on Chicago’s west side. Witnesses or suspects, some as young 
as 15, are detained at the site. As they are not booked at a precinct, there is no 
public record of these suspects being in custody (Ackerman 2015b). This is 
akin to the rendition practiced in the early years of the War on Terror. Lawyers 
and families who have tried to enter Homan Square are turned away, while 
their clients and relatives are subjected to a routine violation of their rights to 
legal counsel and coercion into providing statements.
Both are clear violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Chicago civil 
rights lawyer Flint Taylor, who has been in practice for 45 years, has said that 
‘I have reached the conclusion that Chicago police violence is systemic, funda-
mentally racist, and disproportionally impacts the poor and communities of 
color’ (Taylor in Ackerman 2015c, also see Taylor 2013). This is not an anomaly. 
It was designed. As Du Bois noted in Black Reconstruction in America, ‘The 
whole criminal system came to be used as a method of keeping Negroes at work 
and intimidating them. Consequently, there began to be a demand for jails and 
penitentiaries beyond the natural demand due to the rise of crime.’ That Du 
Bois’ words still capture many blacks’ lived experience is indicative of the sali-
ence of this oppression in the development of the American social structure.
This ‘daily ugliness’ reveals the extent to which the US is a political order 
structured around violence. Authoritarian and mechanistic in tone, this gov-
ernance demonstrates how the annihilation of the other is a functional prin-
ciple of institutional practice that punishes the poor and provides profits for 
the security-surveillance industry. That these repressive policies are utterly dis-
connected from human rights shows a militarized police who rarely question 
the limits of their formal authority because informally they have been tasked 
with playing a key role in the process of commodifying the bodies of the poor 
who would otherwise be abandoned due to withdrawn welfare and redistribu-
tion services. Left to confront repression by themselves, this one-dimensional 
understanding of personal safety precludes a social component.
4.4 The Universality of Black Lives Matter
The preceding sections in this chapter addressed how the truly disadvantaged are 
created by enduring structural injustice. It has also illustrated that co-currently 
blacks are managed by a method of selectively co-opting a narrow band of blacks 
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into the elite to deflate and diffuse political opposition as well as a kind of rule 
predicated upon inducing and reproducing weaknesses in poor blacks. The sec-
ond movement has been aided by off-shoring manufacturing jobs, leaving poor 
blacks as surplus labourers, partly to undercut any chance of contention, and 
partly efforts to extract fines and rents by local governments who are themselves 
operating under neo-liberal resource starvation. Nevertheless, central to these 
actions is a logic of repression.
The introduction of new modes of repression also opens up new opportuni-
ties for a ‘double movement’ from activists. Whereas, in the late 1970s political 
scientist Adolf Reed lamented how the US state had adjusted to 1960s black 
radical protests by incorporating agitators, these new modes of repression 
bring with them other counter movements. One of these counter movements 
is Black Lives Matter.
Black Lives Matter, an activist social movement emerged as American citi-
zens saw the death of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir 
Rice as indicative of structural injustice put in place by the racial capitalism 
discussed in Chapter 1. In combination with the local struggle of Black people 
in places like Ferguson, where protests lasted more than 100 days, Black Lives 
Matter sought to blunt racist policing practice across the nation. These needless 
deaths were emblematic of a nationwide endemic that coalesced into a nation-
wide demand for justice and the remedy of structural injustice against blacks. 
An immediate goal of the movement is to stop the criminalization of black life 
and end the endemic of police harassment, brutality, corruption, and murder.
As Christopher Lebron makes clear, ‘the consistent death and abuse at the 
hands of the police to which blacks have been subject constitutes a form of ter-
rorism under the guise of democratic governance.’ Highlighting the ‘disturbing 
parallels between plantation slavery and prisons and correctional facilities con-
vict leasing’ Lebron indicates that systematic oppression is in the structure of 
the US, and that the most recent expressions in stop and frisk, redlining, voter 
suppression, the War on Drugs is but a continuation of this violence where 
African American lives are criminalized (2014, 1). African Americans, who 
as a permanent underclass due to systematic racism, are the main victims of 
this system. This dehumanizing trauma indicates that blacks’ personhood is 
not recognized nor acknowledged.
Black Lives Matter, and local protestors in Ferguson and elsewhere, are using 
a ‘digital repertoire of contention’, to protest and explain American political 
economy, show the flaws in post-racial theories, and advocate against unlaw-
ful extra-judicial police killing and social inequality. These deaths and oth-
ers reveal that black’s everyday life is grounds for suspicion by agents of the 
state. Granted, the proliferation of cellular devices with internet access, cam-
eras, and broadcast social media platforms add new tactics to the repertoire of 
contention. These devices can reduce the lag between an incident and public 
awareness, or undercut fabricated official statements and thus contesting the 
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narrative frame. This is important in Ferguson where cable broadcasters and 
national newspapers initially ignored the death of Michael Brown. But, while 
social media is certainly important to the rise of Black Lives Matter, it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to explain the politics of this moment and the social 
dynamics.
Over and above technology, material conditions explain black uprisings. 
For example, during the Great Recession post-2008, blacks disproportionately 
suffered versus their white peers, losing an estimated $10 billion. Most of this 
was due to predatory sub-prime lending practices that targeted aspiring black 
homeowners who banks suspected would foreclose on mortgages (Henry, 
Resse and Torres, 2013). Near a quarter of a million blacks did, while others 
are at risk. As a result, what little blacks had managed to accumulate through 
intergenerational labour evaporated almost overnight. The ramification is 
downward social mobility and pauperization. American banks have yet to face 
indictment for this fraud.
The outcome of the Great Recession was to see even more wealth concen-
trated in the 1 per cent as the Obama administration did little to redistribute or 
redress this economic hoarding. As egregious, throughout Obama’s presidency, 
black unemployment was above 10 per cent, while in 2014 black college gradu-
ates’ unemployment rate was 12 per cent, more than double the white college 
graduates whose unemployment rate was approximately 5 per cent. Further-
more, since the Recession, median black income fell by near 11 per cent to 
$33,500, while whites incomes have fallen 3.6 per cent to $58,000, near a third 
of blacks live in poverty, and over a quarter of blacks are food insecure. Put 
simply, blacks experience tremendous poverty.28 Perhaps the biggest indicator 
of this crushing and systemic poverty is Mariko Chang’s shocking and morally 
indefensible finding that ‘While white women in the prime working years of 
ages 36–49 have a median wealth of $42,600, the median wealth for women of 
color is only $5’ (2010, 3). This is one of the reasons why black women—who 
carry the consequential burden of the relentless assault on their children, fami-
lies, and communities—are using coalitional politics guided by labour, feminist 
and queer theory to undertake the work of liberation.
In Dissent, Barbara Ransby (2015) highlights the broad agenda of Black 
Lives Matter, an umbrella organization seeking a ‘bold confrontation with state 
power’, because ‘there can be no real economic justice without racial justice.’ 
Adamant that ‘the concerns raised by the Black Lives Matter movement reflect 
the experiences of most black Americans’, Ransby says ‘they also extend beyond 
these communities’ (2015). The goal of this social movement is less a singular 
pursuit of representation and diversity in the ruling class, but rather a total 
revision of the social structure itself to make it more equitable and egalitarian. 
In other words, this not merely a problem of access to the upper reaches of 
the social structure, otherwise the Obama administration’s legacy would not be 
so abysmal, rather it is a structural issue that requires structural and material 
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changes. To that effect, the movement is a ‘class based struggle’ which aims to 
address salient features of racial capitalism.
The various biographies of leading members demonstrate the extensive, deep, 
and long-standing commitments to social activism and community organiza-
tion, much of which is explicitly tied to labour and economic issues. Consider 
Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi, women who, following George 
Zimmerman’s acquittal for Trayvon Martin’s death, created and circulated the 
#BlackLivesMatter hashtag. Ransby portrays them as ‘professional organizers 
working with domestic workers, with immigrants, and against prisons respec-
tively’ (2015, 1). Garzam, Cullors, and Tometic are not isolated examples, but 
show how women are key organizers in the coordination of black resistance 
and protest. From Marcia Chatelain’s vantage, this is an intergenerational par-
ticipation, and one that includes queer scholars and activists, as they under-
stand how bodies are disciplined. Indeed, as Black Lives Matter promotional 
material makes clear,
beyond the narrow nationalism that can be prevalent within Black com-
munities, which merely call on Black people to love Black, live Black and 
buy Black, keeping straight cis Black men in the front of the movement 
while our sisters, queer and trans and disabled folk take up roles in the 
background or not at all.
As Ransby describes the project, ‘This is an unapologetic intersectional analysis 
reflecting the work of black women radicals and feminists such as Sojourner 
Truth, Angela Davis, Audre Lorde, Barbara Smith, bell hooks, Kimberlé Cren-
shaw, Beth Richie, Cathy Cohen, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall’ (2015, 1). Ransby’s 
listing of this diverse set of scholars and activists is not an imposition to minimize 
the range and kinds of thoughts amongst those on the list, hide inter-personal 
rivalries, disagreements, politics or the like. Instead, this kind of grouping is 
a programmatic spirit orientated towards broad-based emancipation, thereby 
demonstrating continuity of key elements of late twentieth-century black femi-
nist thought. Angela Davis says as much in her acknowledgements in Are Pris-
ons Obsolete? (2003):
I should not be listed as the sole author of this book, for its ideas reflect 
various forms of collaboration over the last six years with activists, 
scholars, prisoners, and cultural workers who have tried to reveal and 
contest the impact of the prison industrial complex on the lives of 
people. (2003, 7).
Davis then lists many people and organizations that helped theorize or col-
lect data that informs the project. This wide collaboration with a community 
of academics and activists is a political and intellectual strength of the prison 
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abolitionist movement, a body of theory that has had profound influence on 
the shape and concerns of the Black Lives Matter movement. As such, Marcia 
Chatelain notes that
Black Lives Matter is feminist in its interrogation of state power and its 
critique of structural inequality. It is also forcing a conversation about 
gender and racial politics that we need to have—women at the forefront 
of this movement are articulating that “black lives” does not only mean 
men’s lives or cisgender lives or respectable lives or the lives that are 
legitimated by state power or privilege. (Marcia Chatelain and Kaavya 
Asoka 2015)
On a similar note, consider that in her project to curate black feminist schol-
arship, Patricia Hill Collins was sensitive to the inclusion of many African 
American women who’s ‘multiple voices highlights the diversity, richness, and 
power of Black women’s ideas as part of a long-standing African American 
women’s intellectual community.’ The centre of the analysis is thus the division 
within the black women’s experience and is meant to counter ‘the tendency of 
mainstream scholarship to canonize a few Black women as spokespersons for 
the group and then refuse to listen to any but these select few.’
Much like Reed’s analysis of black co-option, selective inclusion is an attempt 
to curtail access to those scholars seeking redress for social injustices that their 
work highlights. Indeed, the tokenistic elements are but ways to buy off or 
stall contention, and so it is but a method to avert greater sharing of resources 
with subordinate groups in the hope that selective access will stifle and disrupt 
concerted contention, and possibly invite intra-group scrappy battles around 
respectability politics and submission by those invited into ruling class or can-
non. Moreover, as Collins makes clear, ‘assuming that only a few exceptional 
Black women have been able to do theory homogenizes African-American 
women and silences the majority.’ (2000 viii)
Likewise, Black Lives Matter organizers sit at confluence of the personal and 
political that seeks to overcome oppressive state apparatus. As Collins explains,
Like African-American women, many others who occupy societally 
denigrated categories have been similarly silenced. So the voice that I 
now seek is both individual and collective, personal and political, one 
reflecting the intersection of my unique biography with the larger mean-
ing of my historical times. (2000, vi)
In her preface to the second edition of Black Feminist Thought, Collins makes 
clear that ‘Black feminist thought’s purpose [is], namely, fostering both Black 
women’s empowerment and conditions of social justice’ (2000 x). The method 
of social analysis required to achieve this ‘place[s] Black women’s experiences 
96 Capital, State, Empire
and ideas at the center of analysis.’ Collins readily acknowledges this approach 
encounters hostility dressed up as epistemological and historical scepticism 
that attempts to undermine the value of the scholarship: ‘For those accustomed 
to having subordinate groups such as African-American women frame our 
ideas in ways that are convenient for the more powerful, this centrality can be 
unsettling’ (2000 vii). Even here,
Oppressed groups are frequently placed in the situation of being lis-
tened to only if we frame our ideas in the language that is familiar to 
and comfortable for a dominant group. This requirement often changes 
the meaning of our ideas and works to elevate the ideas of dominant 
groups. (2000 vii)
The last component of Black Lives Matter that we will touch on here is the 
way the movement employs Collins’s adage that ‘thought and action can work 
together in generating theory’ as a central political tenet. This social moment 
takes place with the help of academics, but not for academics. It is scholarly 
without being beholden to (admittedly withering) disciplinary conventions 
where self-alienation from subjects is supposedly indicative of good scholar-
ship. In this respect, Black Lives Matter shows that while they will produce 
good analysis, it is for the broader purpose of the radical overhaul of the social 
structure. In other words, their analysis is practitioner based and community 
orientated.
Black women alternate between being an afterthought in public policy, or 
scapegoated as undeserving of welfare or governmental affirmative action posi-
tion. Similarly, news media generally is indifferent to the fate of black women. 
Notwithstanding similar ways and means of activism, the names of Michael 
Brown, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray received considerable more attention and are 
better-known than Rekia Boyd, Michelle Cusseaux, Tanisha Anderson, Shelly 
Frey, Yvette Smith, Eleanor Bumpurs, and others.
The point is not to distract from normalized everyday police brutality, but 
instead to acknowledge that black women are as susceptible, if not more so, to the 
everyday violence by state sanctioned agents. They too are victims of shootings, 
harassments, and racial profiling, while in metropolitan areas, black women are 
as likely to be evicted as black men are to be imprisoned. As the adage goes, ‘black 
men are locked up, black women are locked out’. These facts tend to inform the 
prevailing orthodoxy and framing of police violence and its consequences. Nev-
ertheless, black women too, are victims of domestically orientated imperial rule.
Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor points to the deeper political and social stakes that 
Black Lives Matter addresses. ‘African Americans, of course’, she says
suffer disproportionately from the dismantling of the social welfare 
state, but in a country with growing economic inequality between the 
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richest and poorest Americans, austerity budgets and political attacks 
on social welfare come at the peril of all ordinary people. (2016, 5)
She continues,
It is an example of how, counterintuitively, even ordinary white peo-
ple have an interest in exposing the racist nature of US society, because 
doing so legitimizes the demand or an expansive and robust regime of 
social welfare intended to redistribute wealth and resources from the 
rich back to the working class. (2016, 5)
For this reason, the ruling class have a stake in perpetuating backlash against 
this movement.
It is also why police brutality is a good avenue to discuss the oppressive 
nature of the social structure, something that is at play, but not as evident in 
voter restriction laws and the efforts to roll back the Voting Rights Act. Acting 
as the Attorney General within the Obama administration, Holder was proac-
tive in attending to Republican state controlled legislatures efforts to strategi-
cally suppress voting rights and discriminatory voting restrictions targeted at 
poorer and minority voters. He also sought to undertake a broad reform of the 
criminal justice system seeking to lessen its institutional racism by, for exam-
ple, supporting the Fair Sentencing Act that eliminated differential sentencing 
for crimes involving crack and powder cocaine, which themselves skew along 
racial lines. Another positive development was Holder’s role in reduction of 
mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes, again hoping to ameliorate 
certain kinds of racial injustice. Nonetheless, these laudable efforts to improve 
and strengthen regulatory oversight, and anti-discrimination measures sit 
beside the expansion of the state power detailed above.
What this indicates is that the appropriate target for reform of the social 
 structure requires curtailing then ending capitalism, paired with less impe-
rial aggression abroad. Collins perhaps puts this well when she writes that ‘U.S. 
Black women must continue to struggle for our empowerment, but at the same 
time, we must recognize that U.S. Black feminism participates in a larger context 
of struggling for social justice that transcends U.S. borders’ (Collins 2000, xi). 
Yet, ever more as Black Lives Matter addresses the reproduction of capitalism’s 
structures of exploitation and oppression, the movements and its members 
become a target for capitalism’s surrogates, for their contention threatens the 
established order of things.
While there is still a considerable way to go until liberation, Black Lives 
Matter has had measurable effects, albeit recognizing, as criminologist David 
Pyrooz and his colleagues write, ‘changes in crime trends are slow and rarely 
a product of random shocks’ (Pyrooz et al. 2016, 1). Some municipalities now 
require police to wear body cameras, and in other cases officers have been fired. 
98 Capital, State, Empire
Additionally, there have been some changes in police practice. Most impor-
tantly, the movement has shifted the discourse on crime, police, race ensur-
ing that, for the moment, these topics receive due attention. Likely activists in 
this movement desire more improvements, but the pressure continues. Even 
Obama has started to try a reform of the criminal justice system, and to attend 
to voting rights (he did this at an NAACP national conversion). This is a direct 
result of Black Lives Matter forcing the federal government to account for the 
war against black life, to curb its internal state rule practices, and to lessen its 
militarism.
There are a few key lessons to take away from this discussion. The first is 
a reminder that surveillance technology disproportionately targets the most 
vulnerable. The second is that racial subordination is rarely deemed important 
enough to warrant due attention in mainstream political discourse. For exam-
ple, to the extent that it is covered in the media, it is often a reaction to protests 
framed around the legitimacy of protest rather than the structural injustice and 
the grievances that motivated the protests. This raises a third point. Ever more 
legitimate civilian political contention is presented as a threat to national secu-
rity and established order. Fourth, as Wilson’s research in the 1980s indicates, 
black women shoulder the brunt of poverty and discriminatory policies, and 
even then, their voices and contention are only allowed an audience when they 
articulate and describe black male suffering. In this respect, it is another point 
of the dynamic of testimony where women both speak and are silent. These 
circumstances underscore the importance of a fully-fledged intersectional 
analysis; meaning that it is not race over class, class over gender, or gender over 
race—but rather that a proper analysis pay attention to the totality of factors 
that shape lived experience.
CHAPTER 5
External Rule and ‘Free Trade’
From the Revolutionary War to the Second World War, there were over 100 
US security force interventions abroad to secure American interests, most of 
these on behalf of capitalists. Beginning as probes but gradually increasing in 
intensity and duration, during these interventions the US acquired institutional 
knowledge about how to use force to establish favourable ‘open door’ trade pol-
icies in Latin America and Japan for example. Actions in these places were ulti-
mately a result of US foreign policy that was Eurocentric, either for commerce 
or for confinement to limit European influence in the western hemisphere 
(Stepak and Whitlack 2012). For example, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine pro-
claiming the entire Americas to be in the US sphere of influence was addressed 
to a European audience. Thus European stability and economic growth was to 
be balanced with a degree of military caution as European powers were prime 
trading partners but also posed the greatest economic and security threats. As 
interventions elsewhere in the world were attempts to bracket out European 
influence, the supposition is that imperial actions in a place often have very 
little intrinsically to do with that particular location; rather they are indicative 
of politics orientated elsewhere. This is certainly the case of US involvement in 
the Middle East against the backdrop of the Cold War or Africa in light of the 
‘global power shift’ with China’s emerging power. 
Whereas the previous chapter emphasized the extent to which the truly dis-
advantaged bore the brunt of dispossession and subjugation induced by inter-
nal US state coercion, in this chapter, I survey the role of military power and 
the digital components of imperialism that protect resource extraction or the 
creation of surpluses. The primary concern is with how militarization facilitates 
the insidious creep of capitalism in international affairs. Here it is important to 
examine the coercive elements of foreign labour regimes to illustrate that fully 
functioning capitalism has a tendency to escape the dependence on free labour 
power.29
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5.1 Induced Under- and Combined-Development
Following the First World War, wherein oil became a strategic resource, imperial 
powers jockeyed to control the source via dominating the states that emerged 
from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Initially, Britain had an advantage 
having occupied Baghdad and Mosul late in the war. Aided by an Arab insur-
rection and insurgency emanating from a promise of post-war independ-
ence, the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France outlined 
the anticipated spoils of the Ottoman Empire, dividing the region primarily 
between themselves, with a remainder for Russia. Later the League of Nations 
provided a mandate system redistributing territory held by the defeated Ger-
mans and Ottomans. Mandates allowed colonial administration to continue, 
but without formal annexation. Among other acquisitions around the world, 
Britain received Palestine and Iraq, and France received Syria and Lebanon.
Blatant imperial action triggered a number of revolts across the Middle East, 
but these were suppressed and dissenting nationalists exiled. Still, to deflect the 
appearance of formal colonial incorporation, the British installed Emir Faisal 
I as King of Iraq through whom the British were able to attain favourable trea-
ties and concessions. After the Second World War, relative hegemonic decline 
meant Britain had three primary objectives. The first was to extract as much 
from the empire before these territories acquired independence. The second 
was to bolster West Germany as it was a buffer to the USSR extending control 
over Europe. The third was to manage the ascension of the US, particularly as 
much British capital fled west just prior to and during the First and Second 
World Wars (see Tooze 2006 and 2014 for details). Domination of the Gulf was 
one area gradually ceded to US rule.
When nationalist leaders in Middle Eastern states opposed extraction and 
exploitation, they were overthrown. The quintessential example is Mohammad 
Mosaddegh in Iran in 1953, two years after he nationalized British Petroleum. 
The only feasible options for these states were to align with the USSR, another 
empire, and seek better terms, as did Gamal Abdel Nasser following his 1952 
coup in Egypt and nationalization of the Suez Canal thereafter, or to play the 
empires against one another. In response to this tendency, the US supported 
the repression of nationalists in their client states, particularly by supplying 
weapons after worker’s strikes in 1953 in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
In Iraq, the terms of oil extraction concessions heavily favoured Western 
conglomerations. As these conglomerations also had rights to many oil fields, 
maximizing long-term profits determined when particular fields were develop-
ment. With priority placed elsewhere, the conglomerations installations cov-
ered 0.5 of the Iraq concession with no foreseeable plans to expand. Out of 
frustration, between 1958 and 1963, the Iraqi government asserted its political 
independence. This involved removing the British right to operate the RAF 
Habbaniya base and withdrawing the undeveloped concessions from Western 
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oil companies. Four days after Prime Minister Qasim announced the formation 
of a state oil company he was overthrown in a coup.
Meanwhile, the conglomerations’ oil production did increase, but not nearly 
to the extent it did in US client states, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This 
meant that Iraq’s yield from the concessions was insufficient to undertake 
developmental projects and the economy stagnated. Having attained power via 
a coup, the Ba’ath Party nationalized the conglomerations in 1972, and sought 
technical assistance from the USSR. For the USSR, this was a good regional 
development, for apart from extending a buffer to the US, Iraq had vast oil 
reserves, unlike Syria their other regional client.
This nationalism is not without a broader context. Prior to these events, the 
1967 Arab-Israeli War severed diplomatic ties between the US and Iraq, and 
stoked Arab nationalist anti-Western sentiments. With a retreat from Viet-
nam, President Nixon’s decoupling the US dollar from the gold standard, and 
in 1973 in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, in which OPEC countries asserted 
their independence by instituting an oil embargo against the West unless 
higher prices were paid. This resulted in an economic recession in 1974 and 
1975. Throughout, sensing weakness, subordinate states—particularly in Latin 
America and the Caribbean—sought to leave the US sphere of influence. As 
such, the US caved to OPEC, but as a preventative move, the American ruling 
class begun to take advantage of cheap labour and move some manufacturing 
abroad to mitigate future boycotts.
The Gulf States’ ruling classes hoarded this new wealth, investing it in 
Western banks, or purchasing treasury bills. So while the US paid higher 
prices for oil, most of these funds returned to its financial sector. By con-
trast, Iraq directed the increased revenue to social spending through infra-
structure projects and instituted a domestic industrial policy aimed to 
lessen imports. It also purchased weapons and undertook a project of mili-
tary build-up and chemical weapon armament in an attempt to become a 
regional power. Throughout, the brutal dictatorship repressed dissidents. In 
1979, when Saddam became president, military expenditures cost close to 
9 per cent of GNP. Meanwhile, in Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was over-
thrown in a revolution increasing US concerns about a cascade of similar 
events throughout the region.
The Iranian Revolution and the oil crisis underscored the rationality for US 
capital to capture the Persian Gulf. Without such control, US capital accumula-
tion would be vulnerable. In 1980, President Carter issued the Carter Doctrine, 
which stated, that:
An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United 
States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force (Carter 1980).
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Early in President Reagan’s first term, his administration upgraded a Joint Task 
Force established by Carter to a theater level Command. Central Command 
has an area of responsibility orientated on the trade flow through the Persian 
Gulf and is dedicated to analysing and responding to conflicts in the Middle 
East and East Africa. Initially, one of the Command’s primary planning events 
was to stop the USSR from capturing Iranian oil fields. Since established, the 
Command has managed major conflicts like the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, 
the Afghan War, and the Iraq invasion and occupation, as well as several other 
smaller interventions to limit regional terrorism.
Returning to 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran, many Western companies used 
it as a proverbial gold rush to sell weapons and military technology to arm 
Iraq for this brutal conflict (see Timmerman, 1992). The US provided Iraq with 
information on Iranian troop movements acquired by satellite reconnaissance. 
Crucially, Iraq used chemical weapons on multiple occasions, although the US 
voted against UN Security Council statements condemning use thereof. There 
are also suggestions that the US provided battle plans, such as for the capture of 
the Fao peninsula in 1988 which brought Iran to negotiation. US security forces 
were even involved in attacking Iranian ships and oil platforms late in the war.30 
Nevertheless, Iraq accumulated $80 billion in foreign debt to fund the war. This 
figure gives some indication of the extent to which Iraq and Iran were socially 
shattered by the war. Iraq especially had neglected social investment and devel-
opment of the known existing oil fields had stagnated.
There were several reasons for the US supporting Iraq. The first was that Iraq 
was a strategic retaining wall for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, both US client states. 
(The US arranged for these states to loan Iraq funds for war expenditures). Sec-
ond, by stoking strategic attrition between Iran and Iraq, the US was able to 
bleed their military capabilities and cripple the countries. Finally, by keeping 
Iraq weaker than it would have been if it had not engaged in the conflict helped 
to maintain conditions were it would be easier for the US to install a military 
base in West Asia to check, if not shrink, the USSR’s sphere of influence. With 
this regional consolidation, the US could advance its interest in dispossessing 
Iraqi’s natural resource endowments.
Given their active role as a buffer for US client states in the region, after hos-
tilities ceased the Iraqi regime presumed there would be debt relief from Gulf 
States to reconstruct the Iraq economy. But this was not to be as other Arab 
states increased their production, causing oil prices to dramatically fall, a con-
tinuation of a downward trend since 1986. As oil production was half of the 
Iraqi GDP, this the country’s economy contracted. This increase in production 
functioned to limit Iraq’s ability to rearm. Once it emerged the Kuwait was 
slant drilling into the Rumaila oil field, essentially stealing Iraqi oil, Saddam’s 
regime mobilized to invade Kuwait, using brinkmanship to try bargain debt-
forgiveness and curbing other Gulf states’ oil production to increase the price of 
oil and thereby alleviate Iraq’s fiscal constraints. Seeing no movement on either 
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of these fronts, Iraq invaded Kuwait to dispossess assets and wealth, but this 
miscalculation afforded the US the opportunity to create a broad-based coali-
tion, including Arab states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, to uphold 
the principle of sovereignty.
The US-led coalition began bombing Iraq in 1991. Using a broad definition 
of military infrastructure, over several weeks the scope and scale of the bomb-
ing campaign indicated an agenda of systematic destruction. Once a retreat was 
ordered, many Iraqi troops fled via Highway 80. In accordance with a stand-
ing order to destroy all Iraq military equipment, Coalition air forces bombed 
and strafed a 60-mile stretch of the highway. Once the carnage was broadcast, 
the event became known as the Highway of Death. After flying over the area 
to head to post-war negotiations, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, remarked 
that ‘In every direction we could see the burnt out wrecks of military and civil-
ian vehicles that the Iraqis had used to try flee.’ (1992, 482). One reason for the 
disproportionate brutality of the war to test doctrine and militaries capabilities 
that they had developed and purchased during the Cold War. How did it work? 
‘Beyond our wildest expectation’ Schwarzkopf wrote (1992, 501).
Meantime, as Jean Baudrillard notes in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place 
(1995), the military press briefings upon which the news media draw from for 
broadcasting and publication did not correspond with the bigger reality of the 
conflict, its scale, nor violence. It was a ‘dramatic ritual’, James Compton writes, 
framed as ‘an emotional confrontation between good and evil, personified in 
the characters of US President George [H. W] Bush and Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein’ (2004, 83). In addition, the media emphasis on laser-guided smart 
bombs—for precise targeting supposedly to limit collateral damage, thus more 
humanitarian—neglects that about 93 per cent of munitions were unguided, 
carpet-bombing from B52s. Of the glide bombs, about 70 per cent missed their 
target causing civilian casualties. Best known is the notorious bombing of the 
Amiriyah shelter that killed more than 400 civilians in February 1991. (Laser-
guided bombs were used). This was but the worst horror of common occur-
rence (see Human Rights Watch, 1991).
Although there were several reasons for the US not to capture Iraq, chief 
amongst them was caution at the impending collapse of the USSR. The US had 
to ensure that there were sufficient troops and resources should they be required 
for other kinds of missions. Furthermore, Dick Cheney argued, the Coalition 
did not have enough military resources, nor adequate plans to occupy Iraq, 
given that an occupation would likely lead to a civil war as the country frag-
mented: presumably the southern Shiite region would come under the sway of 
Iran, while Turkey, another US client state, would never permit an independent 
Kurdist state. Therefore, the US sought options to conclude the war satisfactory.
Throughout the conflict, the US mostly preserved the regime. One possible 
explanation for this is that the US wanted to create conditions where mem-
bers of the regime would depose Saddam and a settlement that favoured the 
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US reached. This would account for the concerted efforts to personify Saddam 
Hussein as the regime. Be that as it may, Saddam Hussein was not deposed, and 
so President George H. W. Bush called for an internal Iraq rebellion, hoping to 
provoke the regime’s repression of subjects. It worked. When UNSC 688 (1991) 
called for Iraq to stop repression, the US and Britain used the resolution as a 
pretext to implement a no-fly-zone, which nominally limited the Iraq regime 
from flying north of the 36th parallel or south of the 32nd parallel. The purpose 
was to use daily bombings to stop Iraq from building air or ground defences in 
these areas, thus ensuring that if an invasion were to come, it would be easier 
to execute.
Authorized by UNSC 687, sanctions were to be enforced until Iraq could 
demonstrate that it had dismantled and decommissioned its ‘weapons of 
mass destruction’ and missile programs. These had to verified, thus ensur-
ing a protracted process. Sanctions devastated Iraq: in 1993, the economy 
was a fifth of that in 1979. This forced the Iraqi state to accept the terms of 
UNSC 986—the ‘oil for food’ programme—but this limited the importing of 
goods to maintain or restore the civilian infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, this 
had had an awful cascade of consequences in the agricultural sector and ren-
dered the civil services ineffective. Initially, the maximum amount of money 
paid annually for oil was $170 per Iraqi, of which $51 was set aside for the 
UN Compensation Commission, a fund created to compensate victims of 
the Kuwait invasion. Lastly, a disproportionate amount was directed to the 
Kurds. What little remained was insufficient for effective governance. Later 
this cap was raised, but sanctions made the full rehabilitation of the Iraqi oil 
industry near impossible.
Still, the culmination of sanctions had enormous costs, particularly in 
human life. Inconclusive estimates range from 345,000-530,000 deaths 
between 1990 and 2002. While there is considerable partisan disagreement 
on the absolute numbers, methodology, data collection, generalizations, and 
caveats respectfully, much of this debate seems to miss the point that quibbling 
for 200,000 fewer deaths do not lessen the severity, redeem the harm, or rebut 
the function of the sanctions. When asked about the weight of these deaths by 
Lesley Stahl on 60 Minutes, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright replied, 
‘I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the price is worth it’ 
(see Richman, 2004).
Sanctions presented the US with two binds. First, while they stopped other 
international investments, they also stopped the exploitation of the existing 
oil reserves, known to be about 115 billion barrels of oil, and estimated to be 
twice that. Second, the longer the sanctions were in place, the more deaths 
accumulated, thus increasing hostility to a US presence when it came. In a 
Congressional testimony, General Anthony Zinni, then heading Central 
Command, said that the US ‘must have free access to the region’s resources’ 
(Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 13 April 1999). ‘Free 
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access’ seems to mean direct control of the resources. The 2003 US invasion 
of Iraq was the geopolitical calculus to ensure an ‘open door’ to exploit oil 
but also precluding other states, hopefully at a time when US resentment was 
manageable by an occupying force.
5.2 Contradictions of Global Rule
Concurrent with these Middle Eastern developments, in the early 1980s the 
US involved itself in a proxy war in Afghanistan in an effort to undermine the 
USSR, itself an imperial power. The USSR invaded to support a client regime 
besieged by Islamic fundamentalists, lest the country end up improving ties 
with Iran or China, or even give pause to other states in the Soviet sphere 
to reposition themselves. Implementation of the Carter Doctrine began by 
the CIA providing material support to Afghan insurgents. For the US, the 
effort sought to maintain its Middle East footing and thus access to profitable 
oil reserves. Alongside the Reagan administration’s decision to reinvest in US 
armaments, thereby renewing the Cold War arms race that had been cooled 
by detente, the insurgency was one of the leading causes for the collapse of 
the USSR.
Still, during a decade of brutal war the USSR did incredible damage to 
Afghanistan’s infrastructure and government, producing a failed state. Once 
the Mujahedeen secured power, the country provided a conducive environ-
ment for fundamentalist terror networks to grow. One of these networks cen-
tered on Osama bin Laden. With the momentum of having defeated the USSR 
and incensed by the presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf 
War, plus the ties between the US and Saudi Arabia ruling class, bin Laden 
funded and recruited fellow Islamic zealots to create al-Qaeda, a terrorist net-
work. During the 1990s, al-Qaeda bombed the World Trade Center, hoping to 
collapse the North Tower into the South Tower, as well as several terror attacks 
in Africa including co-ordinated bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam 
and Nairobi. In response, President Clinton authorized cruise missile attacks 
on targets in Sudan and Afghanistan.31
Meanwhile, following the collapse of the USSR, the Bush administration had 
tasked the DoD to review national security policy. Supervised by Paul Wolfow-
itz, then undersecretary of policy in the DoD, the final report Defense Plan-
ning Guidance (1992) indicated that US strategy ‘must refocus on precluding 
the emergence of any potential future global competitor’ (DoD 1992). In the 
1990s, the geopolitical policy introspection among the US ruling class and 
their agents revolved not around whether imperial action was valid, but which 
approach was best. Multilateralists argued co-ordinated actions helped legiti-
mate imperial rule, and co-opted other countries into this system. Additionally, 
the emphasis on human rights, promoting procedural democracy, soft power, 
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and ideology could work to sway other states from the inside out. By contrast, 
unilateralists saw no need for legitimacy, and that indeed multilateral rule 
and exercise were an unnecessary constraint that hindered flexible and rapid 
deployment of resources of rule.
In practice, rule was accomplished using both kinds of approaches as the 
circumstances and conditions dictated. Nonetheless, conspicuous in both 
approaches was the emphasis on the removal and reduction of barriers to 
capital. This process involved the creation of the World Trade Organization 
to complete a regulatory trifecta including the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund to cement global capitalism and transfer the costs of economic 
crisis to the under-developed world. These expansionary dynamics of capital 
are consistent with long standing trends in the US social structure, like domes-
tic uneven development. In this respect, neoliberalisation, geopolitical foreign 
policy, and military actions are three different strategic appearances of the same 
basic impulse catering towards capital accumulation.
While multilateralists and unilateralists debated, the US put economic dis-
tance on its rivals throughout the remainder of the twentieth century to reach 
an unparalleled pre-eminence that allowed near free reign to pursue ambitions. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assessment was that ‘geopolitics has moved from the 
regional to the global dimension, with preponderance over the entire Eura-
sian continent serving as the central basis for global primacy.’ The US, ‘with its 
power directly deployed on three peripheries of the Eurasian continent’ was 
well positioned to establish a ‘hegemony of a new type’, ascending as the ‘the 
first and only truly global power’. (Brzezinski, 1997, 38, 39). These remarks are 
indicative of the US ruling class conceiving of its agenda as planetary in scope, 
and reflecting the accumulative imperative of capital.
The US was perhaps at the pinnacle of its power when bin Laden’s al-Qaeda 
executed a devastating terror attack in New York on 11 September 2001. Trad-
ing on the stock market was suspended for four days. When it re-opened, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than 7 per cent, the worse one day 
drop up until that point. The US economy contracted by 1.1 per cent in the 
third quarter of 2011. Still by October 2002, the Dow was down 30 per cent 
from March 2001. The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (nd) esti-
mates that the property damage and lost production of goods and services 
exceeded $100 billion, but factoring in near incalculable stock market losses, 
the figure approaches $2 trillion.
In retaliation, the US invaded Afghanistan to attempt to kill bin Laden and 
remove the Taliban government. The US installed Hamid Karzai to head a pup-
pet government. Since 9/11, there has been a noticeable shift in the rhetoric 
of American statecraft as the libertarian faction of the US ruling class con-
solidated its ascendance, and used the threat of terror to assert and justify the 
expansion of overt US imperial power. One area where this is evident is in 
the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), which was moulded 
External Rule and ‘Free Trade’ 107
along the DoD’s Defense Planning Guidance (1992) and Project for the New 
American Century’s Rebuilding America’s Defenses (2000). In his preamble to 
the document, President George W. Bush wrote that there was ‘a single sus-
tainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise’ 
(2002, 1). Invoking the common coded connotations for capitalism, President 
George W. Bush implied that states that refused to integrate along this model 
were suspect of being a security threat to the US and thus liable to ‘pre-emptive 
strikes’.
The intellectual background to this unilateral policy comes from many 
places, but several confluences can be represented by Richard Haass a member 
of George Bush’s National Security Council. In 2000, prior to being appointed 
Director of Policy Planning in George W. Bush’s State Department, he wrote 
that ‘The fundamental question that continues to confront American foreign 
policy is what to do with a surplus of power and the many and considerable 
advantages this surplus confers on the United States’ (1999). His recommenda-
tion was for the US to openly embrace imperial logic, that being the establish-
ment of a global order to accelerate capital accumulation.
Even liberal multilateral scholars like Michael Ignatieff who observe, ‘states 
possess independence in name but not in fact. The reason the Americans are 
in Afghanistan, or the Balkans, after all, is to maintain imperial order in zones 
essential to the interest of the United States’ (2003a, 61), maintain that ‘Ameri-
ca’s empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the 
white man’s burden’. On the contrary,
The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political 
science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free 
markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome 
military power the world has ever known (Ignatieff, 2003c).32
Returning to Haass, he indicated that countries reluctant or refusing to inte-
grate into the US designed world order and allow the exploitation of their 
resources would be susceptible to ‘regime change’ and ‘nation-building’ As far 
back as 1994, nation building for Haass involved, ‘defeating and disarming any 
local opposition and establishing a political authority that enjoys a monopoly 
or near-monopoly of control over the legitimate use of force’ (Hasss in Foster 
2003). As well as creating a market for post-conflict social reconstruction, the 
bigger prize was opening trade relations and extracting wealth on US terms. 
Haass writes:
U.S. efforts to use force to bring about changes in political leadership 
failed in the cases of Qaddafi in Libya, Saddam in Iraq, and Aideed in 
Somalia. Force can create a context in which political change is more 
likely, but without extraordinary intelligence and more than a little 
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good fortune, force by itself is unlikely to bring about specific politi-
cal changes. The only way to increase the likelihood of such change is 
through highly intrusive forms of intervention, such as nation-building, 
which involves first eliminating all opposition and then engaging in an 
occupation that allows for substantial engineering of another society. 
(Hasss in Foster 2003)
The US has attempted to install markets economies in the Balkans, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. All three cases have involved ‘regime change’, to install client gov-
ernments. In this respect, blatant militarism and state building are a deliberate 
aggressive attempt to reshape a country to fit the needs of capital accumulation.
Both Haass and Ignatieff allude to the apparently appropriate use to employ 
military force and hegemonic power to secure conditions for economic domi-
nance and expansion. What difference there is between the two, is where Haass 
sees no need to morally justify these actions, Ignatieff offers a legitimation exer-
cise for ‘empire lite’ as ‘the lesser evil.’ (2003b, 2004) But irrespective of whether 
there is a lack of pretence for those like Haass, or the easing of conscience for 
those like Ignatieff, the outcome is the same: greater intervention to shape other 
states to suit the needs of the US ruling class. In saying as much Haass and 
Ignatieff recognize that the expansion of commodification is a feature of the 
American social structure, and of capitalism in general. That these representa-
tives of various wings of the ruling class agree effectively means that changing 
electoral representatives will not necessarily blunt this drive. It might change 
its character and appearance, its tone and rhetoric, but not the intention and 
function. As 2004 Democratic presidential candidate, John Kerry indicated in 
his particular campaign he would continue to advance the military occupation 
of Iraq, but seek a multilateral approach, as if a shared security burden is some-
how better for the people living under occupation.
As mentioned, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq was a timely resolution to install 
a base and expand the US sphere of influence and their regime of extraction. 
The George W. Bush administration used the opportunity afforded by 9/11 to 
claim that Saddam Hussein’s regime had stockpiled weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Iraq sought to ‘deceive; not to disarm’ as Colin Powell said at the United 
Nations (Powell, 2003). In a retrospective confrontation of his complicity, Pow-
ell admitted that prior to the UN presentation, the George W. Bush administra-
tion had already committed to using military force (Breslow 2016).
The US invasion was swift, and a new government was installed. It disbanded 
the army, purged the civil service of Baath party members, and condoned repris-
als. Mass unemployment and an eroding civic infrastructure put conditions 
in place for the emergence of local sectarian self-defence groups, and resulted 
in cycles of violence of incomprehensible complexity and politics, made more 
difficult by Iran supporting factions, and an influx of fanatical ideologically 
motivated combatants seeking to fight the US. This insurgency compounded 
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the developing civil war. Altogether, the invasion produced a failed state, and 
over thirteen years led to the deaths of approximately 250,000 according to Iraq 
Body Count. It was a total civic collapse.
To counteract the insurgency, through 2007–8 the US increased troop num-
bers in a ‘surge’, but most importantly undertook a program of mass bribery 
and begun negotiations with Iran. A relative absence of public knowledge 
about the second and third component has cultivated a myth about the ‘surge’. 
As Daniel Larison points out,
The mythology is responsible for the hawkish delusion that the Iraq war 
had been “won” before Obama “lost” it, which gave war supporters an 
excuse to evade accountability for the catastrophic blunder of the inva-
sion and occupation. (2015)
While somewhat successful in stalling the violence, nevertheless these actions 
undermined the legitimacy of the new ‘democratic’ Iraq. Not helping matters 
was Prime Minster Nouri Al-Maliki excluding and permitting state-based 
reprisals to sectarians and dissidents. All of this ensured that Iraq was unable 
to govern its territory.
In neighbouring Syria, the Assad family had reigned as brutal dictatorship 
since 1970, exploiting sectarian divisions and USSR/Russian support to rule. 
(Since 1971, the USSR, then Russia operated a naval supply base at Tartus, their 
only Mediterranean facility). From about mid-2011, mass protests invoking 
the sentiments of the Arab Spring threatened the Assad government, and cul-
tivated fears of reprisals should it fall. Bashar al-Assad deployed the security 
forces against demonstrators and executed political enemies. Initially the US 
sought to arm factions opposed to Assad and exploit the opportunity to pry 
another country from the Russian sphere of influence. While the factional alli-
ances are impossibly complex to follow, what is important is that the country 
collapsed into a civil war, causing millions of refugees to flee the region, many 
heading to Europe producing the longest post-war mass migration.
As the Civil War unfolded, ISIS emerged as a leading faction somewhat able 
to hold territory in both Syria and Iraq thus drawing support and allegiance 
from other groups. For a variety of reasons, the Iraqi Army generally retreated 
rather than engage in combat with ISIS. With minimal resistance, ISIS captured 
Mosul in 2014 and territory in Northern Iraq, eventually threatening Bagh-
dad. As of writing, alongside the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are bombing ISIS on a 
daily basis. Canada and the US have Special Forces operators deployed. So 
does Russia. Russia’s involvement is to maintain their client state lest the area 
become occupied by US and NATO forces. Still, it is a challenging politics, for 
both Iraq and Syria are failed states, and some members of the Gulf States rul-
ing class fund ISIS. Currently, the US is in a predicament where it desires the 
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fall of the Assad regime, but is also committed to undermining the very forces 
that could topple his rule.
The threat of ISIS has also provided a public reason to increase American 
arms sales to US client states. US Arms sales in 2009 were $31 billion, then $21.4 
billion in 2010, tripled to $66.3 billion in 2011, more than 75% of the global 
arms trade (valued at $85.3 billion in 2011).33 In a distant second was Russia, 
with $4.8 billion in sales. This increase is driven by an arms race in the Middle 
East, as American client states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Oman—respond to the Iranian nuclear enrichment program, ISIS, and internal 
rebellions in the wake of the Arab Spring. Regarding Iran, these sales primarily 
consist of aircraft—in 2011 Saudi Arabia purchased 84 advanced F-15s adding 
to 70 F-15s; Oman bought 18 F-16 for $1.4 billion—and missile defence sys-
tems, such as the United Arab Emirates’ purchase of a Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense, a $3.49 billion advanced anti-missile shield that includes radars 
and is valued at $3.49 billion (Shanker, 2012). The immediate goal is to build, 
country by country, a regionally integrated missile-shield to protect key sites 
like oil refineries, pipelines and military bases from missile attacks.
The regional fallout from the Iraq War and Arab Spring, the sectarian proxy 
wars and the suppression of dissidents in the Middle East has led to more arms 
sales, the most glamorous being the purchasing of US made aircraft and the 
missiles to replenish a stockpile depleted from bombings in Yemen, Bahrain, 
and Syria in 2014. In 2014, Saudi Arabia spent $80 billion on weapons, becom-
ing the fourth largest market for armaments; while the Emirates spent about 
$23 billion, triple what it spent in 2006. Indeed, American arms manufactures 
have opened offices in the regions, hoping that sales here will offset shrinkage 
resulting from a declining US defence budget (Mazzetti and Cooper, 2015). 
Still, one US policy consideration of Middle East regional arms sales has been 
to ensure despite sales to Arab states, Israel maintains ‘qualitative military edge’, 
a long-standing commitment, but enshrined in law since 2008 (Naval Vessel 
Transfer Act of 2008).
To conclude this section, in the early twenty-first century the US has sought 
to consolidate a planetary empire, seeking to dispossess and extract has much 
surplus value as possible from subordinate states, while cornering out rivals. 
Still, this process has brought about a number of contradictions. The quintes-
sential one, I believe, is capital having no option but to rule with and through 
states, either by the use of military forces or regulatory bodies. As Ellen Wood 
puts it,
The very detachment of economic domination from political rule that 
makes it possible for capital to extend its reach beyond the capacity of 
any other imperial power in history is also the source of a fundamental 
weakness… National states implement and enforce the global economy, 
and they remain the most effective means of intervening in it. This 
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means that the state is also the point at which global capital is most vul-
nerable, both as a target of opposition in the dominant economies and 
as a lever of resistance elsewhere. It also means that now more than ever, 
much depends on the particular class forces embodied in the state, and 
that now more than ever, there is scope, as well as need, for class struggle 
(Wood, 2001, 291).
However, the ruling class are seeking to reduce that scope. In reflecting upon 
‘the indispensability of continued American leadership in service of a just and 
liberal order’, and ‘America’s bipartisan commitment to protecting and expand-
ing a community of nations devoted to freedom, market economies and coop-
eration’, Hillary Clinton believes there is ‘really no viable alternative. No other 
nation can bring together the necessary coalitions and provide the necessary 
capabilities to meet today’s complex global threats’ (2014). Reminiscent of 
George W. Bush’s remarks in the National Security Strategy, what she means is 
that there is no other social structure suitably amenable for a capitalist ruling 
class; no other option but uneven development and dispossession will be per-
mitted. Conditional concessions will likely occur, yes, but not at the expense of 
perpetuating profit.
In pointing out that the US is qualitatively and quantitatively different, 
Wood’s and Clinton’s remarks, in different ways and for different purposes, 
highlight how the US is not only driven by the particular interests of capital-
ists, but it is burdened with the task of facilitating global capitalism in a world 
divided into competing nation states. The genuine contradiction is that this 
expansion appears necessary, but it could be otherwise as there is no natural 
imperative to accumulate.
5.3 Bases for Commodities and Containment
The US emerged from the Second World War with a nuclear monopoly as well 
as an extensive system of overseas bases, adding to those acquired during the 
Spanish American War. As but two examples, Guantanamo Bay and Okinawa 
have been in operation for near 115 and 70 years respectfully, demonstrating 
how reluctant the US is to leave a base. It also bears testament to President Tru-
man’s stance that in the post-war era, the US was ‘going to maintain the military 
bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace’ 
(1945). Indeed, this was more or less the case, particularly during the Cold War 
when the policy of ‘strategic denial’, was implemented to limit withdrawal from 
a base lest they become occupied by the USSR. After the end of the Cold War, 
President George H. W. Bush reiterated that the ‘forward presence’ would be 
maintained, but with a quarter fewer troops while the Clinton administration 
addressed this problem by using shorter but more frequent deployments.
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Bill Clinton’s administration oversaw the US establishment of bases in Cen-
tral Asia, continued bombing Iraq, and intervened in Somalia, the Middle East, 
the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. In the last case, the Kosovo bombings were 
formally to stop genocide; it did facilitate the installation of US troops to secure 
bases in territory previously in Russia’s sphere of influence.
After 9/11 there was a rapid increase in bases, many nominally acquired 
during occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, elsewise establishing staging 
posts in countries like Bulgaria and Uzbekistan for the War on Terror. In their 
2009 Base Structure Report, the DoD indicated that they had 716 ‘sites’ in 
38 foreign counties (2009, 7). While the majority of these were in Germany 
(235), Japan (123), and South Korea (87), the locations of the remainder range 
from the United Kingdom and Italy, to Egypt and Djibouti, Bahrain and 
Oman and several others (see DoD 2009). These are the declared sites, and 
do not account for CIA drone bases or Special Forces compounds (See Turse, 
2015). Besides expected places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, one can cobble 
together knowledge of drone bases in Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
and Niger from press reports (See Whitlock 2011, 2012, 2014, Whitlock and 
Miller 2013, Londoño 2014).
But as indicated above it is rare that the US willingly initiates a withdrawal, 
which means that the latent reason for these bases is to expand a geographic 
sphere of influence to establish favourable conditions for ‘free trade’. Much of 
the base development in the early twenty-first century has been using the War 
on Terror as an opportunity to consolidate capital accumulation in Eastern 
Europe, as well as to initiate the same process in Central Asia to check China’s 
westward sphere of influence. For example, bases in Iraq and Bulgaria seek to 
limit Russian extraction in the Middle East and Eastern Europe respectfully. 
But Russia and China have sought to counter these efforts. To take a Russian 
orientated example, in 2014 the Kyrgyzstanian government evicted the US 
from the airbase in Manas. Rented for $60 million a year, the air base was situ-
ated about 400km from the Chinese border and in an area previously part of 
the USSR. The politics behind this eviction are clear: With the extent to which 
Kyrgyzstan’s economy depends on remittance from and exports to Russia; Rus-
sia’s backing of Almazbek Atambayev in the 2011 election; as well as their 2012 
offer to write off $500 million in debt in return for a base for 15 years, it is clear 
Russia believed the US was encroaching on its ‘territory.’
While the US might have been checked in Kyrgyzstan, it does not mean they 
have conceded the region. Given relatively more attention in Iraq, the absence 
of the role of oil and natural gas has been overlooked in the media discussion 
of the war in Afghanistan. War in this region and regime change has made the 
construction of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline polit-
ically possible. The deal for the pipeline was signed in 2002, and construction 
set to begin in 2006, but was delayed due to Taliban control of the development 
corridor. Following sustained military pressure by the US and NATO forces, it 
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was possible to begin construction in 2015, and set to be completed in 2019. 
But like Iraq, without a permanent military presence, it would be near impos-
sible to build a pipeline or further capital’s extractive ends; the goal is to siphon 
resources from the Russian sphere of influence.
Following bases closures in Panama in 1999, and aware that domestic poli-
tics in Latin America states were not conducive to large military complexes, 
the US used the War on Drugs as a publically palatable pretext to create many 
smaller bases in Columbia. Known as ‘Plan Columbia’, this initiative has cre-
ated ‘cooperative security locations’ in Ecuador, Aruba, Curacao, and El Salva-
dor, as well as radar sites in Peru and Colombia. These join bases already in the 
region in Soto Cano, Honduras, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the Naval station 
in Vieques, Puerto Pico, which trains Naval Battle Groups before they deploy to 
the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Elsewhere, the US military uses bases 
belonging to Latin American security forces, like the Joint Peruvian Riverine 
Training Center in Iquitos, Peru.
Bases can also be used to exert regime change. For example, and keeping 
with the Latin America area, the US aided the overthrow of Honduras’ demo-
cratically elected president Jose Manuel Zelaya in 2009. The State Department, 
under Hillary Clinton, sought to provide a legal justification for the coup, while 
President Obama recognized the subsequently installed President Lobo.34 This 
destabilization facilitated organized crime as a power vacuum led to violence 
competition to control drug trafficking. Alongside state sponsored terror and 
assassinations targeting journalists and human rights activists, the increase in 
crime has resulted in Honduras having the highest murder rate in the world. In 
2012, 87 Representatives from Congress petitioned Hillary Clinton to suspend 
military and police aid, but she refused (Frank 2012). The reason for all this, 
according to Dana Frank (2013), is Honduras is intended to be the first domino 
to push back against the left-wing governments that swept to power in Latin 
America from around 2005 onwards. Granted, within this wave, some govern-
ments, like Venezuela, are authoritarian and display low levels of institutional 
investment and capacity building, but several, like Brazil, are democratically 
legitimate.
Aside from security, citadel like bases cement a country’s status as a cli-
ent while from a juridical standpoint sovereignty is preserved. Another 
benefit of bases is the production of favourable military relationship pro-
duced through joint exercises and military assistance programs with the 
host country’s security forces, thus functionally enmeshing them in the US 
Empire. Bases also allow the US to undertake actions on these bases that 
is otherwise prohibited in the US. Guantanamo Bay, where prisoners were 
labelled enemy combatants and so could be held without charge or trial in 
indefinite detention is the best example. The US can also use these bases to 
warehouse rapid deployment equipment, for training and the testing of new 
weapons systems.
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There are drawbacks to foreign military bases. The most obvious is 9/11 and 
the terror directed at the US and its allies. In this instance, the attacks were 
nominally retaliatory for US bases stationed in Saudi Arabia. The bases are far 
from populated areas to preserve the appearance of the House of Saud’s rule 
and sovereignty, but Osama Bin Laden created a rhetoric wherein US security 
forces presence was an occupation of sacred Islamic sites. There are other less 
extreme examples too. In countries where US troops are allowed off base, like 
Okinawa, particular merchants benefit from the commerce, but they do so at 
the expense of other vulnerable members of the community through generat-
ing social problems like forced prostitution. There is therefore a tendency for 
US bases to become an object of domestic politics, co-currently of opportunity 
and scorn.
For these reasons, and with an eye to costs and returns, many new US bases 
are rather minimalist outposts that can be built or discarded as required. Even 
Afghanistan, where the American Army is expected to be deployed until 2024, 
follows this pattern. As another example, the USS Ponce, a former transport 
ship, has been refitted to become a floating forward operating base. Already 
deployed to the Persian Gulf, capabilities include helicopter pads and main-
tenance facilities with the addition of underwater diver support, and barracks 
to support several hundred Special Forces troops. The advantage of this plat-
form is that it is not dependent on foreign nations to provide land for bases. 
The Navy is requesting a further $1.2 billion in its budget for two similar but 
purpose built vessels (Shanker 2012b). This is not to argue for the virtue of 
American citadels occupying foreign soil, but rather to underscore the shift in 
military planning where flexible base system and deployment schedule mirrors 
that of ‘flexible accumulation’.
Another blowback results from the culmination of US actions in a particular 
region. For example, the increased mass migration from Central and South 
America to the US has much to do with the legacies of US occupation in Nica-
ragua and the Dominican Republic in the pre-war era, overthrow of govern-
ments in Guatemala and Chile in the post-war era, as well as the sponsorship of 
the Salvadoran and Guatemalan militaries as they committed endless atrocities 
in the 1980s. Much of this intervention was due to the combination of anti-
communism to thwart nationalization of American business interests.
Poverty and crime are endemic by-products as conditions resulting from 
‘open door’ principles for ‘free trade’ that in turn create uneven-development 
and pliable client states. Responding to uneven-development and the market 
for drugs, it was common to see Latin American special forces, many of whom 
the US trained at the School of the Americas located at Fort Benning, establish 
drug businesses. Los Zetas are but the most notorious recent incarnation of 
this process.
While on the topic, in 2014 mass migration from Central America received 
considerable media coverage due to approximately 70,000 unaccompanied 
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children, and another 70,000 families being smuggled via Mexico to the US 
border. In 2016, of the unaccompanied children 28 per cent were from El 
Salvador, 37 per cent from Guatemala, and 15 per cent from Honduras. To 
stem this, the Obama Administration pressured the Mexican government 
to increase the capacity of the Southern Border Plan to apprehend migrants 
before they reached the US border; capturing about 170,000 people in 2015 
alone (see Chishti and Hipsman 2016). Internally, the Obama administration 
was legally limited from undertaking executive action to provide documenta-
tion to 5 million migrants who qualified under the Deferred Action for Par-
ents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (see US v. Texas, 
Liptak and Shear 2016). But while advancing that project is commendable, it is 
hard to reconcile with that same administration’s mobilisation of the security 
apparatus to intensify mass deportation – about 2.5 million since taking office.
The US international base system is one technique to maintain an economic 
system predicated upon expanding exploitation and extraction without annex-
ation or colonial settlement, but still exerts political controls over other states. 
These bases also provide a general condition of coercion that maintain the cur-
rents in the existing international system, thus leaving few genuine options for 
states and regions in the periphery. Overall, bases seek to maintain the political 
economic hegemony of the US ruling class.
Michael Mann notes how the consequences of climate change will affect food 
and water supplies, making for climate refugees and amplifying the stakes of 
existing tensions, conflicts and crises (see Mann and Toles 2016). In the case of 
crop failure, malnutrition and hunger will be leading drivers of conflicts. Mann 
and Toles write that ‘Climate change will create more competition among a 
growing global population for less food, less water, and less land—a prescrip-
tion for a perfect storm of global conflict’ (2016).
To be sure, the goals of an integrative political economy and the accom-
panying blowback brings another contradiction into focus. Asked in 1998 
whether he regretted supporting bin Laden’s insurgency in Afghanistan given 
his subsequent turn against the US, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s 
National Security Advisor, responded, ‘What is most important to the history 
of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire?’ (Brzezinski 
quoted in Gibbs, 2000, 241). Events such as 9/11 are by-products, probably 
inevitable, of this kind of geopolitical exercise of power. Nevertheless, from a 
cynical geopolitical calculus, perhaps Brzezinski might argue that the prying 
of Central Europe and Central Asia from the Russian sphere of influence and 
the creation of US bases in those regions was worth the risk of this blowback. 
The result of these bases is that Russia is encircled, while China is nearly so. 
But it comes at the expense of the US homeland being put in direct risk, in 
effect unleashing a coercive power of the state directed as much internally as 
externally. As Leo Panitch so eloquently puts it ‘the contradictions of ruling 
the world are great’ (2003, 233).
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5.4 Securing International Circuits of Production
In the post 9/11 world less than 1 per cent of Americans have served in the 
military, these troops disproportionately drawn from economically vulner-
able and impoverished communities. This ‘1% army’, has been equipped and 
mobilized to protect and advance the interests of the economic 1 per cent, the 
power elite who occupy key positions in the security state. But much how the 
0.1 per cent, the super-rich, have an outsized role in shaping the economy, so 
does 0.1 per cent of the military, Special Forces, have an outsized role in shap-
ing military force. In this section I cover how US Special Forces help enforce 
the prevailing international division of labour. It is this labour regime that 
organizes ‘the production of information and information technology today’ 
(Fuchs, 2016b).
Since the end of the Gulf War, Special Forces have become a key foreign 
policy instrument, with one analysis calling them the ‘most innovative, sub-
tle, and adaptable instruments of national power’ (2016, 75). Excluding Iraq 
and Afghanistan, in 2010 near 4,000 Special Forces troops were stationed in 
approximately 60 to 75 countries, with efforts to expand both of those num-
bers. Bearing the hallmarks of a flatter organizational structure and close col-
laborations with intelligence agencies, these units are designed primarily to 
respond in unilateral direct covert action. Training and joint operations with 
security partners, frequently the focus of public attention, are legitimation exer-
cises (Scahill 2010). As these forces are rarely accountable to other branches 
of government, the effective result is a presidency and the security state are 
consolidating a private military force, near 66,000 personal and expanding, to 
complement the CIA (Schmitt, Mazzetti and Shanker 2012). This number has 
doubled since 2001 and includes military personal and DoD employees, with 
spending in the same period increasing from $4.2 billion to $10.5 billion. With 
this funding, 12,000 Special Forces troops have been deployed every day since 
2003, with four-fifths located in the Middle East conducting multiple raids each 
week (Robinson 2012). Therefore, it is an uncontroversial observation that the 
US state is relying upon Special Forces to an unprecedented degree, and this is 
particularly fruitful in times of fiscal restraint.
As per Jeremy Scahill’s reporting, White House counterterrorism direc-
tor John O. Brennan has articulated this agenda as the US ‘will not merely 
respond after the fact’, but will ‘take the fight to al-Qaeda and its extremist 
affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia 
and beyond’ (Scahill 2010). Bureaucratically, this traces to George W. Bush’s 
administration order called the Al-Qaeda Network Execute Order that permits 
Special Forces to deploy beyond the battlefield for lethal and covert operations 
and sanctions cross-border operations. Reflecting on the pace of deployments, 
General Tony Thomas, commander of US Special Operations Command 
describes Special Forces as being,
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very, very kinetic right now; very direct action because we are trying 
to rectify five failed states and an extremist phenomenon that’s gone 
rabid. Once we get that back in the box, eventually, I hope, we can have 
the right sort of access, placement, connective tissue, to retain stability 
(Thomas as cited by McLeary and Rawnsley 2016).
Similarly, General Donald Bolduc, commander of Special Operations 
Command Africa is on record as saying that ‘terrorists, criminals, and non-
state actors aren’t bound by  arbitrary borders’. Accordingly, he reasons that 
this requires that Special Forces cannot organize nor recognize traditional 
borders. ‘In fact’, he says, ‘our whole command philosophy is about enabling 
cross-border solutions, implementing multinational, collective actions and 
empowering African partner nations to work across borders to solve prob-
lems using a regional approach.’ Supporting African states that are waging 
wars or fighting counter-insurgency, or rebel forces, Bolduc has said that these 
forces operate in the ‘gray zone’, which he describes as ‘the spectrum of conflict 
between war and peace’ (as cited by Turse, 2016).35 Due to social media, ‘secret 
wars’ are better described as ‘low-visibility wars’; conflicts which attract inter-
mittent attention, but which agenda setting minimizes.
Under President Obama, Special Forces have initiated and intensified these 
‘gray zone’ activities. For instance, these forces operate in Somalia, attacking 
al-Shabaab who have been added to the War on Terror. Around 1,500 dis-
closed Special Forces operators are deployed in Cameroon, Djibouti, Niger, 
Egypt,  and Libya, many directly in combat roles against African-based ter-
ror groups (Obama 2015). But many of these conflicts cannot be ‘solved’ by 
military power, and US Generals realise this. For example, when testifying at 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Commander of US Africa Com-
mand, General Thomas Waldhauser emphasized how economic scarcity drove 
insurgencies and rebellions. This is particularly acute among African youth, of 
whom over 40 per cent of the population is below 15 years of age. ‘To protect 
and promote U.S. national security interests in Africa’, Waldhauser testified,
diplomacy and development are key efforts, and our partnership with 
the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) is key to achieve enduring success. Together, we work 
to address the root causes of violent extremism, lack of accountable 
government systems, poor education opportunities, and social and eco-
nomic deficiencies to achieve long-term, sustainable impact in Africa. 
(Waldhauser 2017, 2)
Waldhauser is of the opinion that ‘soft power’, that is economic and cultural 
hegemony was vital to combat African extremism. It is against that background 
that Waldhauser illustrates the awareness of a ‘global power shift’:
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Just as the U.S. pursues strategic interests in Africa, international com-
petitors, including China and Russia, are doing the same. Whether with 
trade, natural resource exploitation, or weapons sales, we continue to 
see international competitors engage with African partners in a manner 
contrary to the international norms of transparency and good govern-
ance. These competitors weaken our African partners’ ability to govern 
and will ultimately hinder Africa’s long-term stability and economic 
growth, and they will also undermine and diminish U.S. influence. 
(Waldhauser 2017, 3)
This was a vital concept to keep in mind as President Trump’s budget sought to 
significantly reduce funding to the State Department’s foreign aid and humani-
tarian budgets.
Military theorists generally presume that industrial democracies are loath to 
become involved in protracted conflict. This is because citizens carry the costs 
in the form of taxation or the loss of life as they directly participate in warfare. 
This sentiment is attributed to General George Marshall that ‘a democracy can-
not fight a seven-year war’. Therefore, democracies use representative oversight, 
dissent, and protest to safeguard against needless military efforts. However, 
should the security state desire protracted conflict; one method to alleviate pro-
test would be to insulate the burden of war from the wider civilian population. 
Ending conscription does so as a professional military removes the immediate 
responsibility of war from citizens leaving them relatively untouched by com-
bat. In many respects, a professional military suits the ruling class, military 
officials, and the public. For the ruling class a professional army eases wide-
spread resentment. For the military, it removes ill discipline and insubordina-
tion amongst the troops. And the public, professionals especially, would cease 
to be unwillingly drafted.
Due to domestic politics, in August 2011, the Obama administration began 
defence spending cuts totalling nearly half a trillion dollars over 10 years.36 
In part, the latent rationale is to produce a military that is more efficient by, 
for instance, eliminating obsolete procurement, closing unnecessary bases, 
and streamlining commands. Included in this plan is a reduction of military 
personnel by almost 100,000 by 2017, four fifths of which would be Army 
personnel.
This budgetary squeeze coincides with the US’s reorientation from the Mid-
dle East to the Asia-Pacific region. While I will detail this development below, 
put simply, it means that the US state will try to move beyond both counter-
insurgency and counterterrorism operations and towards more strategic con-
cerns. The ramification for the Army is its attempt to remain central to this new 
strategic re-orientation while active involvement in major combat operations is 
curtailed. But given the strategic reorientation, the former Army Chief of Staff 
General Odierno conceded that the army will be side-lined and relegated to 
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conducting strategically secondary missions such as peacekeeping, regime sta-
bilization, and counterinsurgency (Odierno 2012). Odierno predicts that these 
operating environments will feature ‘regular military and irregular paramili-
tary or civilian adversaries, with the potential for terrorism, criminality, and 
other complications’ (2012, 1).
To meet this diverse mission mandate, the Army is seeking to put logistic 
hubs in key locations, while units seeking regional alignment will have special-
ist equipment, and be provided with linguistic and cultural training to attend to 
different missions and different physical, political, and cultural environments. 
The goal is to have an army that is used as a deterrent as part of a broader secu-
rity plan. Odierno says ‘This means maintaining a force of sufficient size and 
capacity so that potential adversaries understand clearly our ability to compel 
capitulation if necessary.’ He continues, ‘we will increasingly emphasize activi-
ties aimed at deepening our relationships with partners and demonstrating our 
country’s commitment to global security. Ideally, a focus on prevention and 
shaping will keep future conflicts at bay’ (2012).
To supplement this regional realignment, the United States has used private 
military contractors (PMCs)—mercenaries—as auxiliaries to publically claim 
that they have fewer troops committed to an area of operations. In August 
2011, for example, there were more than a quarter of a million mercenaries in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011).
By using volunteers and contractors to undertake military labour, the condi-
tions exist to go to war for extended periods without genuine accountability to 
the public. Indeed, the security state can bypass attempts to garner public legiti-
macy for conflicts and military interventions. In other words, citizens’ views 
are not central to ascertaining the costs of military adventurism and occupa-
tion. Moreover, a volunteer military tends to encourage the ideologically pre-
disposed to sign up. This further distances the military from the values within 
American society.
An additional feature of the Army recalibration of military planning and 
operations are efforts to fully integrate technological capabilities into frontline 
units, thereby extending advanced technology and the information revolution 
to the individual solider. Although Odierno admits that goal is still years away 
from operational deployment, certainly a research agenda involves the con-
struction of an ‘operator suit’ to serve as an infantry force multiplier. Initial 
specifications for this computerized suit include night vision and other tools to 
enhance situational awareness, enhanced strength, ballistic protection, and a 
life support infrastructure. This means that the state requires fewer soldiers to 
deploy similar levels of force, effectively concentrating the skills and capability 
of warfare with a selected and narrow warrior elite.
Internally, the state seeks to lionize the military in an attempt to forestall 
critical appraisals of its activities. This is evident in the rhetorical pairing 
and purposeful conflation of unreserved support of troops with unreserved 
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support for the operations in which they are involved. These moves seek to 
quash criticism while ordinary people unreservedly repeat war apologet-
ics, thereby capitulating to ideological dogma. Indeed, the military and its 
personnel are publically positioned as beyond reproach. The military being 
a prime delivery instrument of humanitarian aid and the subject of gaming 
and cinematic narratives assist in internal public relations exercises. This 
has been so successful that even allegations of atrocities are met with undue 
suspicion and an unqualified blanket defence before an investigations take 
place. Overall, this culture of solider worship blinds the public to the reali-
ties of war and occupation, obscuring rather than addressing the issue of 
imperial conflict.
These forces have more presidential access under President Obama than 
previous administrations, as he is allowing these forces to act in an aggressive, 
secretive, and pre-emptive manner. Emblematic of this mode of operation is the 
group formally known as Task Force 714, a ‘direct-action’ unit conducting ‘high-
intensity hits’ (Ackerman in Horton, 2010). One should not discount the policy 
sway of Special Forces in advocating a move away from large missions to more 
flexible operations (see Ackerman 2009). Special Forces Command has been 
advocating for more autonomy to position troops and equipment as per their 
judgement about global affairs (Schmitt, Mazzetti and Shanker 2012), ostensi-
bly to be able to respond rapidly to broad and emerging threats, while avoiding 
large-scale foreign interventions and occupations. Accordingly, Special Forces 
are seeking new kinds of missions. However, there is dissent in some areas of 
the Pentagon—particularly area commanders and the State Department—
that believe the request for more autonomy would bypass the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Defence Secretary, thus missing democratic oversight (Schmitt, 
Mazzetti and Shanker 2012). This issue here is not legitimacy of using covert 
forces, but who maintains authority.
The political turf wars seem to be regularly won by Special Forces. For exam-
ple, then Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, upon the request of Special Forces, 
broadened their operational purview by granting it a global combatant com-
mand. In addition to global responsibility, this command status effectively gave 
Special Forces the ability to reallocate troops to regional commanders, bypass-
ing Pentagon oversight.37 This modification grants Special Forces a greater 
degree of autonomy to determine threats as per their intelligence operations, 
although operations would still be directed by the president. This allows Special 
Forces to conduct missions that could otherwise be stalled by the Pentagon, 
effectively making them akin to the Praetorian Guard.
The dominant place and influence of Special Forces is so entrenched that the 
US Army, in an effort to remain relevant, is seeking to train its general-purpose 
units to provide logistical support, menial labour, and regional specialization to 
Special Forces units (see Odierno 2012). Cheerleading this development Linda 
Robinson (2012) remarks,
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These changes will allow special operators to deploy in an integrated 
fashion with other elements of the U.S. government, including conven-
tional military forces, in well-thought-out campaigns that will last not 
days but years and achieve durable positive effects.
Even as the military downsizes and refocuses on the Asia-Pacific region there 
is no indication that the Special Forces budget will be reduced, or that unit 
deployments will be curtailed. Rather it appears that their troop levels will stay 
consistent, just reallocated to other regions (see Schmitt, Mazzetti, and Shanker 
2012). It is envisioned that their missions will be to stay on call for direct action 
against terrorist targets and hostage rescue operations. Further, using the pre-
tence of training and liaison missions, they will be used to collect information 
in unorthodox ways. In short, the Obama administration has made Special 
Forces a central tool in enforcing global rule.
As mentioned, Special Forces operate on the African continent where one of 
their main tasks is to protect international circuits of production. The conflicts 
in the Great Lakes region and the Iraq War are associated—even driven to a 
certain extent—in an international circuit of production that use conflict min-
erals to create networked and handheld computing (see Fuchs, 2014). These 
devices are assembled in China using energy secured by the US in Iraq. Fur-
thermore, the Great Lakes War is aided and abetted by arms manufacturers that 
sell small arms to African countries as a business venture to keep states fragile, 
and thus make it relatively easier to extract resources and wealth; deliberately 
destabilized just enough to make resource extraction efficient. Lastly, these 
international circuits of production have obvious racial significance.
5.5 The Military Response to a ‘Global Power Shift’
Given a ‘global power shift’, (Hoge 2004) US Foreign Policy is becoming Sino-
centric. Arguably, the Nixon administration’s opening of relations with China 
to exploit a Sino-Soviet split was the first step in the direction, but with the col-
lapse of the USSR, Clinton’s administration deemphasized a Eurocentric pos-
ture, and undertook military planning with a rising China in mind (Stepak and 
Whitlack 2012). This was a defence priority in the George W. Bush administra-
tion until 9/11 provided an opportunity to advance interests in the Middle East. 
However, the Obama administration reinitiated a ‘pivot to Asia’.
This reorientation is present in the various Presidential and Pentagon Strategic 
documents (see Department of Defense 2012a, 2012b, Daggett 2010, Obama 
2007). In much the same way that the US viewed European economic growth 
and trade as beneficial while being circumspect about security concerns, the 
US has adopted the same stance to China in an attempt to cater simultaneously 
towards strategic balancing and economic development. To accomplish this goal, 
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the US will continue trading with China while establishing and maintaining 
military superiority (see Department of Defense 2012a, 2012b, Daggett 2010). 
This military presence takes the form of large naval exercises with allies, redis-
tributing troops from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines, and Australia, 
and other parts of the region, and donating equipment (Burke 2013, Gonzanga 
2013). Other actions include deploying littoral combat ships in Singapore. This 
is because the Malacca Strait is an energy chokepoint for China: as the majority 
of the country’s energy flows through this region, it is ripe for blockade. These 
developments are acute additions to an existing infrastructure of bases in Japan 
and South Korea, and aside to ongoing military support for Taiwan.
Given that much trade travels via sea, the orthodox understanding of global 
trade is that it is underwritten by naval power. States that have the ability and 
power to enforce the movement of goods in such a way that they are insulated 
from regional violence are the economic hegemons. In line with orthodoxy, 
the US deploys its Navy to enforce trade on its terms. This power is backed by 
the ability to direct sustained combat operations on, over, under, and adjacent 
to the sea using naval aircraft, marines, or missiles. China, while not yet pos-
sessing the naval presence or the force for direct confrontation nevertheless 
has, the US believes, sufficient force to disrupt US hegemony in the Western 
Pacific. This force is characterized by the deployment of the Liaoning, China’s 
first aircraft carrier, which reports indicate became combat ready in November 
2016. A second carrier is being built (CSIS 2016a). Although the Liaoning is 
not as capable as US aircraft carriers, it can be supported by land-based air-
craft. Finally, China’s military spending went from about 25 billion US dollars 
in 1990 to over 200 billion by 2015 (SIPRI 2016).
In the 21st century the US stance towards China involves a combination of 
engagement, interdependence and competition, with the US aware of Chinese 
intentions to become the regional hegemonic power and so diminishing US 
influence in the Western Pacific. Much of this comes to a head in the South 
China Sea as China seeks to use the Spratly Islands to assert its claims within 
the nine-dash line. Multiple states—like Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia—
have claims in the region, and these interests play off one another, increasing 
tensions. As of late 2016 ‘China appears to have built significant point-defense 
capabilities, in the form of large anti-aircraft guns and probable close-in weap-
ons systems (CIWS), at each of its outposts in the Spratly Islands’ (CSIS 2016b). 
The public analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies indi-
cates that,
China has nearly completed structures intended to house surface-to-
air missile (SAM) systems on its three largest outposts in the Spratly 
Islands. The deployment of SAM batteries to Fiery Cross, Mischief, and 
Subi Reefs would be in keeping with China’s efforts to extend its defense 
capabilities throughout the nine-dash line. (CSIS 2017)
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Periodically the US conducts freedom of navigation exercises with destroyers 
in the South China Sea or training exercises with carrier battle groups in the 
Western Pacific (Perlez 2016). Some of these exercises pass well within what 
would be considered Chinese territory if the US legitimated the claims. The 
stakes are significant: $5 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea 
each year. And so little surprise that the Chinese state spends $10 billion per 
year on international public relations, some of this is used to recruit client states 
to support China’s regional interest.
It is with strategic caution over economy hegemony that despite military 
spending cuts, the Navy will not reduce any of its 11 aircraft carrier task forces 
(New York Times Editorial 2012), while 34 of the 57 US nuclear submarines 
are based in the Pacific (Heginbotham and Samuels 2016). Rather, there is 
renewed investment into these kinds of military resources. Take for instance 
the new Ford class carrier. This is the first new aircraft carrier class since the 
USS Nimitz in 1968, and America’s first new carrier of any kind since the USS 
George H.W. Bush was completed in 2003. At 47,000 tons this carrier class 
features a redesigned flight deck to launch and recover aircraft far more effi-
ciently than the currently operating Nimitz generation. Additional improve-
ments include new designed propulsion systems, reactors, and radar (Terdi-
man 2013). Carrier groups are re-locatable airports, bases, and factories and 
are used to coordinate force projection; a form of twenty-first-century gun-
boat diplomacy. At the same time, the development of three Zumwalt stealth 
destroyers will cost approximately $22 billion, and the first is expected to be 
combat ready in December 2019. Reportedly, these ships can fire precision 
projectiles 70 miles.
The aforementioned orthodoxy holds that military pre-eminence yields sig-
nificant economic benefits through reducing security tensions thereby assuring 
safety to investors. That said, Dan Drezner (2013) is sceptical about the extent 
to which this naval orthodoxy fulfils the promise of structured economic bene-
fit. Roughly, his reasoning is that international security threats are less likely for 
stable states, but rather more likely for failing states and those resisting global 
integration, so there is no need for a sizable naval presence. Here US military 
bases in the Middle East are intended to safeguard against energy insecurity 
by countering the hegemony while concurrently deterring Russian or China 
from entrenching their presence in the region. However, year by year the US 
becomes less reliant on foreign oil supplies, in part through domestic frack-
ing shale reserves. Presently, less than a quarter of gas consumed in the US is 
imported, and of that figure less than a fifth comes from the Middle East. So 
there may be some reconsideration about the degree to which the US needs to 
secure this region. At the same time, both Russia and China will for the foresee-
able future lack the capability to project more than token military power into 
the Gulf. In Russia’s case this is because of domestic economic weaknesses, and 
in China’s case, their present priority is the South China Sea. But even then, the 
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resources in this region are consumed more by China and India and decreas-
ingly by the US—so there should be burden sharing.
Nevertheless, Drezner’s argument is one of degree, not one of kind. What I 
mean is that he does acknowledge how the US Navy allows the US to dictate 
the terms of global economic and political integration. The purpose of the US 
Navy is not to expunge rivals, but to use the prospect of force to consolidate 
control over economic activity, and the standards and norms that govern that 
activity. David Graeber’s observations about military force and contemporary 
international political economy complement this view. He argues that a state 
can use their military power to control financial liquidity.
The essence of U.S. military predominance in the world is, ultimately, 
the fact that it can, at will, drop bombs, with only a few hours’ notice, 
at absolutely any point on the surface of the planet. No other govern-
ment has ever had anything remotely like this sort of capability. In fact, 
a case could well be made that it is this very power that holds the entire 
world military system, organized around the dollar, together. (Graeber 
2011, 365)
To elaborate, the US uses their money supply to act as an international reserve 
currency. Much like how once Britain established the gold standard, the net-
work externalities and path dependency of British imperial rule meant that 
other states had to consider the benefits of monetary convergence, so too do 
states have to weigh the incentives of monetary convergence on the US dol-
lar. This technique is particularly effective when there is ‘gunboat’ issuing of 
US treasury bonds as a form of tribute together with the aggressive deploy-
ment of financial instruments and institutions in rolling out and maintaining 
US hegemony.
Considered from this vantage, what appears as the loss of centralized US con-
trol of capital is rather a strategy of indirect extraction that involves demanding 
that other states pay tribute to the US. Within this order, transnational enter-
prises are enabled by US policy to further entrench indirect rule. In return, the 
US, through the Navy and other agencies, provides security to corporationsto 
do business. This is accomplished through either rigging international treaties, 
capturing international organizations, or lobbying and bullying for favourable 
business relations in host countries. In short, the US security state seeks to cre-
ate global governing structures to maintain a rule in which other countries 
must abide, and in which labour is suppressed, and surpluses are channelled 
to the US.
CHAPTER 6
Minds, Brains, and Disciplinary Programs
In this last chapter I discussed the general turn to quantified cognitive-
behaviourism, particularly its combination of abstracted empiricism and psy-
chologism, as it seeks to forge a ‘Grand Theory’ of the social sciences from the 
mind and its genetic basis and then apply this model in matters of governance. 
Accordingly, I want to consider the ideological assumptions that underwrite a 
series of turns occurring in a broad range of fields, including behavioural eco-
nomics, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology and information systems 
as well as elements within artificial intelligence research as they seek to exam-
ine how the universally shared features of human cognition code and recode 
historically specific forms of cultural practice. To their credit, proponents and 
practitioners in these disciplines rightly do think that cognitive findings—when 
put in their social, historical, and comparative context—are truly illuminat-
ing.38 Nonetheless, I argue that they fall foul of cognitive behaviourism because 
they have a weak and unsustainable theory of the mind. My inquiry considers 
the ramifications of these paradigms as they have sought to integrate with one 
another based upon several common commitments to a kind of computational 
economy in the brain, and that once understood, can be replicated in informa-
tion systems, but can also explain historical and social development by refer-
ring to the brain. Indeed, despite these diverse elements, I argue that they are 
manifestations of a definable core insofar that these disciplines share strong 
claims are over-interpretations of small evidence and reflect more the prevail-
ing ideological conditions than genuine insight. In the course of this chapter, I 
explain why this intellectual artifice is not only an alienated understanding of 
human beings, but one that when backed by institutional sanction via ‘nudge’ 
like programs, will create new techniques of oppression, ensure social stratifi-
cation, and further legitimate exploitation.
Altogether, the goal in this chapter is to address several interrelated kinds 
of questions, which include the evolution and social nature of the human 
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brain, the possibility of embodied intersubjectivety through mirror neurons 
and the extent to which social life has neuro supports, the neurosociology of 
emotion and its relation to cognition and decision making, and the degree 
to which consciousness is computational. What is more, this development 
trades on the promise that it can reveal the cognitive continuities that under-
lie particular collective responses to cultural forms. In doing so, the project 
seeks to explain how particular mental rules cross boundaries of time and 
place and underlie perceptual and cognitive abilities. This implies that groups 
of persons are not only historically socially situated, but historically cogni-
tively situated. Underwriting all of this is the presumption of the convergent 
combination of the cognitive-computational revolution that will be the most 
far-reaching intellectual development of the early twenty-first century. Still, 
I think there are several conceptual errors that require attention before one 
wholeheartedly boards this train.
Animating my critique is a principled rather than practical end. To elaborate, 
what I mean is that my critique does not aim at a premature project that has 
not yet been able to deliver on its promises. Rather, this project is built upon 
several suppressed contradictions that beget errors in axiomatic reasoning that 
then accumulate. This is not a pedantic exercise: what is at stake is the interlink-
ing nature of knowledge, cognition, and reality as they inform prospects for 
human flourishing. By this, I mean how events are described and explained, 
how factual reports are constructed and how cognitive states are attributed. 
Too often mental states are said to orientate themselves to discursive construc-
tions, themselves predicated upon an interplay between a person’s situated 
cognition and material context; thus these are expressions of the context of 
their occurrences. Therefore, to a speaker their own mind is unknown; but it is 
available to the expert whose hermeneutic hammer beats down on a person’s 
lived experience and intentions. This makes the analyst have final say over the 
descriptions and meanings of social actions. To me, too much sway is given to 
the discursive power of cognitive behaviourism. This dominant stage presence 
in current intellectual inquiry is a peculiar naturalization that sidelines more 
plausible explanations.
I begin by tracing some key developments in the attempts to date, on the 
part of researchers and theorists, to constitute an interdisciplinary venture on 
cognitive behaviourism axioms, and to develop links between different pro-
jects. I address both pioneering and transitional attempts to describe cognition 
in terms of the computational process of coded symbols and the relation to 
embodied experience. Thereafter I show how the accumulation of errors in axi-
omatic reasoning combined with unwarranted enthusiasm for cognitive behav-
iourism and cherry-picking evidence harms social science. These emblematic 
cases seem to me to go most directly to the heart of what is at stake in the gen-
eral turn to cognitive behaviourism. In this respect, I am interested in the social 
production of the substantive claims.
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Much of this debate would be conceptual, except that cognitive behaviour-
ism is already being used to guide policy makers. Although carried out in 
technical terms, and so rendered neutral and natural, the implementation of 
cognitive behaviourism functions to limit political struggle and judgements 
about politics. As such, there is much at stake, particularly when one recalls 
how many fashionable twentieth-century social policies appealing to rational-
ity qua neutrality were extremely harmful. Similarly, this practice of presuming 
that persons can be better understood and governed by social policy informed 
by cognitive behaviourism is the application of misguided assumptions, which 
once coded in bureaucratic decision systems would then condition much of 
our life and leave little room to contend. To better understand this develop-
ment, one needs some familiarity with post-war twentieth-century American 
social thought.
6.1 The First AI Revolution and the Legacies of Political 
Behaviourism
During the Second World War, political science in the United States came into 
its own as the study of order. This meant that the study of politics was less 
textual and canonical, leaving behind its philosophical and legal-historical 
orientation, and instead was put in service of the state to understand politi-
cal behaviour and social cohesion (Skocpol 1985, 4). This project even drew 
in many of the European émigrés such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, 
Herbert Marcuse and other political refugees who proverbially ‘had to pay the 
rent’ and spent their wartime activities modelling personality, propaganda, and 
the influence of information exchange (Wilson, 2004, Chapter 2). This project 
borrowed significantly from psychology and organizational economics, but it 
was also influenced by nascent behaviourism.
Behaviourism, as practiced by B. F. Skinner, reduced behaviour to the simple 
set of associations between an action and its subsequent reward or punishment. 
This approach applied an empirical statistical analysis to predict the future as a 
function of the past. Here ‘a vague sense of order emerges from any sustained 
observation of human behaviour’. Furthermore, ‘direct observation of the mind 
comparable with the observation of the nervous system has not proved feasi-
ble’. This brackets aside intentions, along with other ‘conceptual inner causes’ 
a valid science of behaviour (Skinner, 1953, 16, 29, 31). With its success, there 
were spill over effects for other disciplines, and became the foundation of what 
Robert Dahl (1961) called the ‘behavioural revolution’ in the social sciences.
This approach was meant to reconcile the differences between expectations 
and practice with persons in organizational settings, and the extent to which 
people did not follow rules and procedures, and how did they become influ-
enced to do what actions as well as their attitudes to events. Part of this research 
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agenda was enabled by the technologies of mass public opinion surveying that 
informed researchers of discrepancy between normative and institutional 
rationality and people’s everyday decision-making practices.
The critical error that behaviourists of all kinds made was ruling out the 
importance of subjective, mental phenomena simply because it was difficult 
to observe or measure. Deficiency of method is insufficient grounds for a con-
ceptual grounding; this points to the social setting of this idea. Accordingly, 
Noam Chomsky’s 1967 critical review of Skinners’ Verbal Behaviour torpe-
doed Skinner’s attempt to explain linguistic ability by behavourial principles. 
Instead, Chomsky (1959) argued that the human mind had a linguistic capacity 
founded on a universal grammar which itself was innate. Languages could only 
be developed if they conformed to the deep structure of the brain.
Along with advances in computer science, the computational turn reduced 
behaviourism’s stranding in American social sciences. Following the Second 
World War, computer scientists actively sought to build machines that could 
compute rationally to mimic human cognitive processes. The computational 
turn pulled from Alan Turing (1950) and the Claude Shannon’s (1948) infor-
mation science—which itself relied upon formal mathematical logic developed 
by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell—whose work argued that computers 
resembled the human brain, and that these machines would eventually mani-
fest an artificial intelligence indistinguishable from human intelligence. In the 
1950s, computer scientist John McCarty (1979) called the study of intelligence 
and its replication of essential features on a computational system artificial 
intelligence. The goal of this project was to create intelligent devices and robots 
that could undertake labour while also demonstrating how biological intelli-
gence functioned. Herein computation is understood as anything that can be 
represented as information can be computed.
This project intersected with Chomsky insofar that his work uses natu-
ral attributes to explain ordinary language practice and linguistic ability. In 
making the deep structure of the brain responsible for syntax, effectively giv-
ing it priority over semantics, Chomsky’s critics argued that he could not 
account for meaning (cf. Searle 1972). This focus on the biological rather 
than the social pushed both social sciences and cognitive scientists to shift 
attention to trace the distinct patterns produced by the brain so that comput-
ers could replicate these patterns, hoping that this would replicate the form 
of consciousness.
These successes, however, were arguably limited. This was because there were 
severe errors with the foundational assumption about rationality. While com-
puter programs could be written to manipulate symbols within logical finite 
systems this was not successful outside those systems. The scope of comprehen-
sion for a computer using natural language was limited, and computer scien-
tists encountered the same barriers as philosophers of language in the ideal and 
ordinary language debates (see Rorty 1967).39
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A good demonstration of these conceptual inadequacies can be represented 
by John Searle’s (1980) famous ‘Chinese Room’ argument wherein he presents a 
strong case for the distinction between meaning making and information pro-
cessing. Herein symbol manipulation via a set of predetermined logical rules 
cannot match how humans relate symbols to meaningful events. This fits with 
Chomsky’s conception of language wherein the complexity of internal rep-
resentations is a result of a genetic endowment maturing in an environment. 
This opens up the possibility of rich, creative, meaningful activity. This simply 
cannot be reduced to computational associations as practiced by behaviour-
ists. Chomsky’s approaches to the understanding of the mind are anathema 
to behaviourism. Their emphasis on the internal structure and characteristics 
enable it to perform a task is different from the external associations formed by 
relying on patterns of past behaviour and the environment.
As meaning making is still out of reach of computation, Hubert Dreyfus has 
good grounds to state that, ‘the research program based on the assumption that 
human beings produce intelligence using facts and rules has reached a dead 
end, and there is no reason to think it could ever succeed’ (1992 ix). In short, 
the first artificial intelligence (AI) revolution was limited by an overly rational 
model of mind wherein consciousness was understood as the computation of 
information processing as opposed to making meaningful interactive relation-
ships and associations with the world.
6.2 The Second AI Revolution and Embodied Computation
Following Chomsky’s critique of artificial intelligence and the jettisoning of 
positivist logic methodology, there was an emergence of technological power 
in the computation area. The aforementioned critiques of ‘good old fashioned 
AI’ heralded a turn to probabilistic and statistical models and analysis. This was 
in part attributed because advancements in engineering and robotics, achiev-
ing goals, being successful, was more professionally rewarding than addressing 
fundamental scientific questions. This led AI researchers to use computers to 
model the architecture of the brain. The advanced computing power allowed 
models of networks rather than logical serial processing.
There was also an additional development where there was some limited 
modification to the presumptions to the mind. Cognitive scientists tended to 
understand a mind that is biological, embodied, and affective, that is linked 
to thought processes that are apparently ‘illogical’ relative to previous mod-
els of the mind that stressed the separation of emotions from cognition that 
was endemic to early cognitive theory. However, the empirical methodological 
re-orientation of the second AI revolution saw mental processes classified as 
information processing, and moreover, the best model for a cognitively active 
human being is a computer running a program. This change is a selective 
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inversion of the where the mind does not pre-exist discourse or culture, but 
rather is continually accomplished in and through its production and inter-
pretation. This newer approach sought out alternatives to a strictly logical view 
of cognition and incorporated findings and axioms from psychology, anthro-
pology, and linguistics, in short stressing the network nature of cognition as a 
computational problem.
These intellectual sentiments, supported by cognitive linguistics, demon-
strate the complex and reciprocal relationship between culture and the embod-
ied mind in forming the human subject; here the brain is the material site 
where language, culture, and the body meet and form each other. These sen-
timents are present in Foucauldian philosophical anthropology regarding the 
contextual shaping of cultural artefacts that then redirects questions about the 
author’s cognitive process to questions of authorship in material culture more 
broadly. An axiom in this analysis is that there needs to be a thorough under-
standing of the existence, circulation, and disciplining of a discourse within the 
author’s material body. By inference, reading texts can reveal ideological forma-
tions, but also cognitive processes. There seems to be a contradiction between 
the role given to the shaping power of culture on the brain, while seeking to 
preserve and stress universal innate constrained cognitive actions that hold 
across cultural and historical eras. A similar impulse is present in the Derridean 
critique of rationalism, wherein rational thought is not a reflection of natural 
functioning of human cognition. As Jacques Derrida argues, ‘there is nothing 
outside the text.’ The key difference between post-structuralism deconstruction 
and Chomskian cognitive science is where Derrida kept good portions of Sau-
ssurean arbitrariness, although making it less phonocentic, Chomsky argued 
that meaning was not arbitrary, but rather motivated by innate characteristics 
bounded by physical attributes that were refined by environmental factors.
From the Chomskian vantage, cognitive science embraces a framework 
wherein culture intersects with human cognition and material forces as they 
influence and shape each other. There is an emphasis on how human cognition 
is deeply tied to materiality and embodiment, even to the extent that persons 
are themselves unaware of the process by which the brain is the site where cul-
ture and biology meet and shape each other.
Nonetheless, current renditions of AI are little more than behavioural prin-
ciples cloaked by sophisticated computational techniques. This can be seen in 
the reliance on statistical learning techniques to better mine massive datasets. 
Implicit in this endeavour is the assumption that with sufficient statistical tools 
and enough data, interesting signals can be isolated from the noise of hereunto 
poorly understood systems. While the urge to gather more data is strong, it is 
not always clear whether this is a path to meaningful explication. What I mean 
relates to the conception of the purpose of scientific practice and emblematic 
of the struggle between the efficiency of using computing power to distinguish 
between signal and noise, or whether it is more meaningful to find the essential 
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basic principles that underlie and provide explanatory insights of the system. 
This is reminiscent of Sydney Brenner’s dismissal of the sequencing revolution 
in the biological sciences as ‘low input, high throughput, no output science’ 
(Friedberg, 2008). What the second AI revolution is attempting is to reverse 
engineer systems and networks whose nature is a mystery, although it is not 
always clear what theoretical framework this data fits. To paraphrase David 
Berry, ‘the destabilizing amount of knowledge’ produced by this computa-
tional turn ‘lack the regulating force of philosophy’ (Berry, 2011). Appreciating 
physical differences can help limit claims of the comparative similarity between 
brains and computers.
Aside from the major difference that brains have bodies, while computers 
are digital, brains are analogue. Neurons can fire in relative synchrony or rela-
tive disarray and fluctuating membrane potentials are a factor. Additionally, 
computers use byte-addressable memory, but memory in the brain is asso-
ciational. Another appreciable difference is that computers are modular and 
serial whereas the brain has distributed and domain-general neural circuits. 
For example, the hippocampus is important for memory, but also imagination, 
navigation, and other functions. This means that unlike computers, processing 
and memory are performed by the same components in the brain. Moreover, 
the brain has no system clock akin to the speed of a microprocessor. Together 
these differences show that synapses are far more complex than electrical logic 
gates. Lastly, the brain can repair itself after injury. In this respect, the brain is 
a self-organizing system and adapts to experience in ways that simply do not 
happen with microprocessors.
In short, attempts to develop artificial neural networks to replicate the brain 
are nowhere near like the actual intricate and massive connection of neurons. 
This means that they are limited in how useful they are in testing theories about 
basic cognitive functions. Moreover, there is a kind of paradox: the attempt to 
prove that the mind is logically computational, and thus digitally replicable, 
trades upon associational strategies, biases, and biological things.
6.3 The Role of Economics and Psychology
Reminiscent of ethnology, evolutionary psychology roughly states that the mind 
is the way that it is because of adaptions to the environment, and that insights of 
evolutionary biology can be used to bring new light onto the human brain, and 
human behaviour more generally. These neo-Darwinists have sought to apply 
natural selection to social organization much like Herbert Spencer’s meek jus-
tification that the social stratification and colonial domination of expansionist 
industrial capitalism reflected natural selection. Evolutionary psychology takes 
mundane observations—such as cells being spherical—to claim that physical 
principles provide channels of development that extend up to individual action 
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and social organization. It does so by explaining human behaviour by referenc-
ing a competitive environment as understood by cost and benefits anchoring 
in economic modelling. Here the presumption is that everyday human behav-
iour can be well explained by this framework, where replication of genetics is 
the purpose of human beings, and that this action is guided by calculations 
undertaken by the brain directly and indirectly largely at the unconscious level 
regarding an economy of energy consumption and expenditure.
This has the hallmarks of Gary Becker’s project, which he described as ‘the 
economic approach to analyse social issues that range beyond those usually 
considered by economists’, (Becker, 1992) or as he said elsewhere, an ‘approach 
to human behavior’ (Becker, 1976). However, the crucial oversight of this 
project is that market rationality is substituted for pure rationality, meaning 
that social interactions are assessed in relation to the market. This treats all 
social interactions as transactions. Having set all relations to the market metro-
nome, the market is presented as an omnipresent system of distributing goods, 
rewards, and privileges. However, this presumption is unwarranted; rather a 
case must be made for relating things to the market, not the other way round. 
So the mistake is presuming what ought to be proven.
Construing ecology as economy does not explain much because there are 
always retrospective appeals to the two principles of mutation and selec-
tion to explain humanity’s remarkable attributes. The paradigm is so flexible 
that it is immune to experimental and observational tests. Therefore, when 
evolutionary psychologists are found wanting they can simply weasel out by 
saying that they now have more information at their disposal. In doing so 
they seek to escape assessing, whether in principle their research agenda is 
theoretically well grounded. This does not explain much and so is not sat-
isfactory. Like Spencer, it is philosophically convenient for social Darwin-
ism to skip over the political installation of institutions such as the market. 
Instead, social adaption has less to do with natural and biological processes 
than political and social processes.
To the extent that one can see the economic principles of Gary Becker’s pro-
ject in evolutionary psychology, similarly one can see the economics of Daniel 
Kahneman who sought to model the ‘intuitive mode in which judgments and 
decisions are made automatically’ in affect theory (Kahneman 2002, 470). In 
Kahneman’s theory, ‘an automatic affective valuation – the emotional core of an 
attitude – is the main determinant of many judgments and behaviors.’ (Kahne-
man 2002, 470). As this applies to the affective turn, there is the latent promise 
that it can account in some cases for how the material environment triggers 
specific kinds of intensities of awareness which elude description, representa-
tion, or intentional formation, but which Kahneman speculates, developed in 
‘evolutionary history’ (Kahneman 2002, 470).
Kahneman’s research demonstrated that persons are susceptible to anchor-
ing, availability, and representativeness biases. When combined with a lack of 
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knowledge in strategic settings, inertia, and sunk costs, the general claim is 
people are fallible and do not act in accordance with strict rationality. Further 
to that, one tenet of affective evolutionary psychology is that brains evolve to 
develop and function in social networks and have an appreciation of the costs 
of reproduction, and that these are impulses that shape our actions, oftentimes 
which are not well understood by persons themselves, that there are pre-con-
scious motives that drive action.
This is hardly controversial—indeed, it can be understood as necessary 
humanization of economic research to acknowledge that preferences are not 
consistent. However, a quick follow up proposition is that persons are ‘pre-
dictably irrational’ to use Dan Ariely’s (2009) turn of phrase, and so they can 
be systematically and strategically manipulated by savvy architects of choice. 
These architects are often employers and governments—those with power—
and depending on their intentions, the architecture can be for social ameliora-
tion or exploitation.
The depoliticized language of ‘nudges’ cloaks this manipulation as if to con-
note mild direction rather than paternalistic intervention by the ruling class. 
Proponents of nudges like Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein point out that as 
policy is the architecture of choice and so can be used to correct for a person’s 
predictably irrational preferences (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). But people have 
contradictory and inconsistent views and practices, so it falls to the nudges and 
their preferences as to how they will design the architecture that informs the 
setting of other’s choices: for if consistent preferences do not exist then there is 
no way to nudge people to what they want or need; it can only be what paternal-
ists think they want, which is but what paternalists want. In this respect, nudg-
ing is more than creating incentives that a person can then exercise options 
over, but rather an intervention to try rig the system that triggers an affect in a 
person so they then undertake the ruling class’s subjectively preferred behav-
iour. Additionally, as nudging is built into a social system it is a cost effective 
means to shape subjects (See McMahon, 2015, Cromby & Willis Martin, 2014, 
Leggett, 2014).
The ethics of this kind of governance warrant scrutiny. While Thaler (2015) 
claims that there is little chance of manipulative nudges causing harm because 
most nudges are visible, even if one suspends disbelief simply on his say so, his 
defence neglects to incorporate the need for the transparency over, and indeed 
justification for, active intervention to shape subjects. In doing so Thaler over-
looks that the political purpose of nudging is to for policy to make itself incon-
spicuous and so circumvent a public gaze.
There are other problems here too. While certain decisions which were once 
thought to be self-consciously produced are automatic, this does not mean that 
all or most of our actions are automatically pre-conscious or without intent. 
So when affective evolutionary psychologists use neuroscience to underwrite 
behavioural economics they have little to say about the individual person or 
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even consciousness. Accordingly, when using the same axiomatic paradigm it 
is unlikely to have anything valid to say about social organization and politics.
6.4 Computing Means and Social Ends
The social and political consequences of the computational turn have a near 
unprecedented impact on governmental practice. Setting aside for present pur-
poses the role of government in collecting information and creating profiles of 
people—itself extremely problematic in nature—there are other kinds of insidi-
ous epistemic problems that skew the conception of persons and their actions. 
In this section, I use the example of algorithmic regulation to demonstrate that 
there are principled arguments for keeping neuroscience out of social policy.
Algorithmic regulation is an approach to governance that seeks to apply AI 
learning principles to process the data produced by sensors to adapt to chang-
ing circumstances, induce stability, and shape social actions. The main promise 
of algorithmic regulation is that it makes governance more effective, and thus 
harnesses the state for democratic purposes by improving service delivery. This 
is justified by harnessing ‘a deep understanding of the desired outcome’, as one 
proponent calls it (O’Reilly 2013, 289). But make no mistake, algorithmic regu-
lation is a political programme that seeks to quell politics.
Algorithmic regulation marries anticipatory adaption of the environment 
with the various kinds of technologies of surveillance such as dynamic biomet-
rics and smart environments of those same environments to guide public inter-
ventions according to what particular people are susceptible to do. It does so 
to ‘nudge’ or influence a person’s decisions to adopt preferred social actions. In 
doing so, it seeks to minimize the contingency of human actions for governors 
to better stabilize their regimes. In other words, its target is to delimit what a 
person could do and prevent those actions from being actualized.
It has a pre-emptive character that seeks to create affects or nudge persons 
based upon an anticipatory evaluation of what a person could do and what 
the political regime wants them to do. It then masks this gentle pressure as a 
person’s agency to decide to act. This means that algorithmic regulation under-
mines the person as a moral agent because it seeks to even slightly displace 
their preferences and intentions for the regime’s own.
The error here is disconnecting the means of doing politics from its ends, 
and so reveals the several simplistic and naïve assumptions about politics 
and power. The fault is presuming that behaviours discovered via data min-
ing are independent of power, and overlooks how the process of politics 
shapes the contents of politics. This political agnosticism can be seen in 
cases where the imperative to evaluate and demonstrate efficiency, results, 
and the like presupposes that the goal of policy is optimising the already 
agreed upon, or already instituted. So positioned, algorithmic regulation is 
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posed as politically neutral and thus able to generate objective and inoffen-
sive universal remedies to social ills.
It neglects that most political discussions and struggles are about beliefs, 
and so are not amenable to quantifiable. So the appeals to efficiency and 
rationality in the form of ‘crunching numbers’ does not improve on weak-
nesses of human judgement, rather the profiling and digital transcription 
enabled by predictive data mining bypasses human interpretation altogether. 
This in turn changes a person’s relationship to knowledge as it is applied in 
a social setting.
To be clear, the issue is not quantification, or statistics. Quantification 
requires epistemic communities that evaluate interpretations, uses, and find-
ings. By contrast, automated algorithmic regulation is not accountable to an 
epistemic community at large. Rather it is privy to proprietary bureaucracies 
whose programmers and administrators are not directly accountable to the 
people they seek to nudge. The lack of transparency emerges again when deal-
ing with methodological concerns. The absence of a broader epistemic commu-
nity that is not employed by these bureaucracies means that there is no inde-
pendent process of testing and evaluating the code.
The computational turn has a pretence to an analysis anchored in empirical 
experiment and deductive–causal—logic. Rather it interpolates people through 
induction as shadows of themselves. This indifference to causes in heterogene-
ous contexts has a direct impact on the presumed existence of causal interactions 
particularly with how to understand a person’s actions and intentions. Algorith-
mic systems are appealing because it relieves governors from the burden of being 
accountable and transparent in their assessments of people. This phenomenon 
deflects attention away from causality and intentional agency or individual and 
collective ability to give account of their actions and related encumbered mean-
ings thereof.
In doing so, it is seen as the ability to disrupt existing deliberate governance, 
and instead ‘hack’ people. Here, getting people to adopt a welfare program, 
or forestall civil disobedience. The commonality between these two kinds of 
actions is that they are treated as an equation that needs a solution suitable 
to an epistemic government problem, the problem being inducing people to 
be lessen radical indeterminacy and the incommensurability of contexts and 
behaviours. In doing so, this upends existing conventions regarding the pro-
duction and enforcement of norms.
One can contrast this to circumstances where persons encounter institu-
tional due processes. This particular kind of interaction requires persons to use 
intentional language to provide explanations and motivations for their actions. 
In this respect, it is a moment for people to give account of themselves and in so 
doing, the institution provides a moment for a person to challenge the norms 
that organize that very process as the norms are relatively more visible, intel-
ligible, and contestable. It is not automated and scripted by code.
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As the purpose of algorithmic regulation is to assist bureaucracies anticipate 
what bodies could do, and then nudge these bodies to undertake subjectively 
desirable actions, this undermines the agency that is foundational to the per-
son-as-citizen. Rather people are objectified, while the process itself is con-
currently mystified and reified such that accounts for and about the data and 
its uses are unexamined. This kind of regulation limits a person’s capacity to 
develop as an autonomous agent who engages in collective action.
This has the hallmarks of Marcuse’s one-dimensional society. Recall that he 
argued that the process of near total social integration due to consumer and 
administrative driven logics flattens the scope for discourse, imagination, and 
understanding. Instead what is substituted is the perspective of the domi-
nant order which uses various mechanisms to create social closure. While the 
mechanical forms he identified—punditry and media systems—are different, 
the mechanical functional remains the same: the appearance of contentment in 
service of capital, but not essential contentment independent thereof.
Rendering politics devoid of class concerns, the struggle for power to distrib-
ute goods, or disagreements about belief, relegates contention and confronta-
tion to but accepting different unintentional driven tastes and preferences. I 
cannot see how this could be considered emancipatory, for it renders demo-
cratic governance as aesthetic rather than normative.
6.5 Lazy Definitions and Weak Epistemology
In at least one strand of contemporary philosophy of mind, talk of perception 
has fallen out of favour. Indeed, most writers deny perception altogether, or 
claim it does not matter. Instead, they reduce perception to reality, or speak 
of the ‘really real’. Perceptions are said to be ‘nothing but’ particles or waves 
or structured brain events. Paul Churchland  (1996) replaces the perceiver 
with functioning biological bodies. The perceiver is reduced to an organized 
body, mind becomes the brain, body motions become actions, man becomes 
the person. Churchland redefines phenomenal qualities as being nothing but 
properties of the brain. Cognitive events such as understanding, recognising, 
feeling, and perceiving are replaced with neural analogues. Here psychological 
events are treated solely as neural events. Here this is always already nothing 
but the really real of matter and motion. And this is the prevailing view in 
cognitive science.
These contemporary materialists have two claims. This first claim is that all per-
ceptions can be explained in terms of or by reference to neural events and the like. 
The second claim is that there are only neural events (and other physical events in 
the environment). At the heart of the dismissal of perception is the combination 
of two beliefs. The first is that science, especially neurological science, has access 
to reality; and second, the distrust of perceiver-dependent events.
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The critique is that neuroscience practices an epistemology that seeks to 
associate properties. Take connectomics for example. Here the goal is to map 
the neurons in the human cerebral cortex as a preliminary step to digitally 
reproducing that circuitry (see Alivisatos et al. 2012). Google Brain is a very 
good example of this kind of project. Then again, this approach is an error: it 
merely seeks the surface manifestation rather than the logic and operations that 
performs the task, what is the brain actually doing. Therefore, it is difficult to 
discover this by seeing where synaptic connections are being strengthened or 
where there is neural activity. Information of this sort may well be useful, but it 
does not address the fundamental question about mechanisms.
In part, this is because there are real problems with the working definition. 
Describing consciousness as ‘the feeling of processing information’ cannot be 
correct because it implies consciousness is perceived by something else. This 
is a problem when trying to construct computationally based artificial intel-
ligence: For unless a mathematical pattern can perceive its own existence, then 
consciousness is but well described by that mathematical pattern.
Besides, considering humans’ have approximately 100 trillion possible 
arrangements of synapses, even if were possible to map out the exact pattern of 
brain waves that gives rises to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that 
mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it 
would not be them. Experiences are irreducibly real, but different from brain 
waves. Still, it is an error to mistake consciousness as being well described by 
mathematics or computation for being mathematical or computational. Pre-
suming otherwise is to reify a description. Overall, these are incomplete rep-
resentations and partial understandings of physical, biological, psychological, 
and social reality.
There are other methodological errors. Researchers rely upon fMRIs to com-
pare brain activity with visual stimuli by examining increases in blood flow in 
order to infer associations. But this neuroimaging is little more than neo-phre-
nology and misleading. Four points are relevant here. First, as Lilienfied et al. 
(2015) point out, ‘the bright red and orange colors seen on functional brain 
imaging scans are superimposed by researchers to reflect regions of higher brain 
activation.’ Moreover, this increased illumination is not a direct measure of neu-
ral activity; rather ‘they reflect oxygen uptake by neurons and are at best indirect 
proxies of brain activity.’ So changes in blood flow are not a clear indicator of 
what the precise relationship between cerebral blood flow and neural activity 
happens to be (Sirotin & Aniruddha, 2009). Besides, it is not as if other parts 
of the brain are dimmed when there is a stimulus. As Lilienfied et al. write, 
‘the activations observed on brain scans are the products of subtraction of one 
experimental condition from another. Hence, they typically do not reflect the 
raw levels of neural activation in response to an experimental manipulation.’ So 
increased blood flow indicates little about what is occurring in other parts of the 
brain that are active. So controversies regarding the assumptions read ‘into’ and 
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‘out of ’ brain scans are left unattended (see Dumit 2004), or dealt this at the level 
of technical improvements of data capturing technology at the larger expense 
of what is trying to be captured, in others words, a poor understanding of the 
problem, hoping that the technical refinements will provide insights. However, 
this largely leaves the question of how thoughts and consciousness relate to each 
other under-attended.
One final point Lilienfied et al. raise is that ‘depending on the neurotrans-
mitters released and the brain areas in which they are released, the regions 
that are “activated” in a brain scan may actually be being inhibited rather than 
excited.’ So functionally, it could be that these areas are be being ‘lit down’ 
rather than ‘lit up’. In other words, it is premature to try to isolate individual 
components from a working whole. Even the most basic tasks require the 
integrated unit.
Granted, researchers tend to study what they know how to study, but this 
points to the deficiency of the developing experimental techniques or meth-
ods that seek to find the right target. While more data and better statistical 
analysis can provide a better approximation to mapping mechanical relations, 
it reveals little about the principles behind those mechanical relations. Statis-
tical analysis is all well and fine, but one should not confuse understanding 
what is happening for why it is happening. Moreover, one can be easily mis-
lead by data mining that seems to work because one does not know enough 
about what to look for.
A more appropriate approach is to understand the fundamental principles. 
Take the example of medical practice. Without a strong grounding in biological 
principles a doctor will not be able to examine and explain variations to bod-
ies, all they will have is knowledge of techniques that come in and out of fash-
ion, and while these techniques may be successfully applied, their use does not 
demonstrate fundamental knowledge of a human body’s biological processes. 
So their medical knowledge is predicated upon techniques rather than princi-
ples, which is a problem, should techniques change or a new kind of variation 
is uncovered. Without fundamental knowledge of the causal processes, one is 
only in the catalogue business, and this does not tell us about how structures 
were acquired or developed. In short, one is dealing with a different conceptual 
problem.
Probability theory and statistics are misapplied to biology and cognitive 
science because they seek to find correlations within noisy data rather than 
examining how biological and cognitive systems select and filter out the 
noise; these systems are not trying to duplicate the noise, but rather to filter 
it out. Using the example of human infants, although initially confronted 
by noise, they reflexively acquire language because they have the genetic 
endowment to do so.
In addition to theoretical problems inherent in using statistical induction, 
practical problems emerge when researchers use or amalgamate large data sets. 
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This is because of unknowns in the selection criteria and quality of data. These 
limitations produce errors that compound upon each other and are rarely 
acknowledged. So there are intrinsic limitations to data as well as interpretive 
elements involved so it would be an egregious mistake to believe that quantifi-
cation necessarily brings social science closer to objective truths.
A popular stance is the definition that assumes that all mental representa-
tions derive from brain activity, and so every mental state has an associated 
neural state. The difficulty with this definitional understanding of conscious-
ness is that it does little to aid and address the more relevant question, at least 
for the present discussion, about how it arises. In avoiding the metaphysical 
grounding of consciousness it becomes trapped in a circle where the con-
tents of consciousness consist of whatever we happened to be aware of. In this 
respect, the present generation of AI researchers are describing perception, not 
consciousness.
Cognitive functionalists posit that ‘the mind is what the brain does’, as two 
commentators put it (Kosslyn and Koenig 1992, 4), while Paul Churchland 
explains this, ‘whether or not mental states turn out to be physical states of 
the brain is a matter of whether or not cognitive neuroscience eventually suc-
ceeds in discovering systematic neural analogs for all the intrinsic properties 
of mental states’ (1996, 206). But this way of understanding the mind is pre-
mature, for the model—the computational theory of mind—is hardly a settled 
question in the philosophy of mind. It is rather, as Thomas Nagel has written a 
kind of ‘physical-chemical reductionism’ (Nagel 2012, 5). To give some back-
ground, John Searle regards the mind body problem as resting upon the faulty 
presumption that these terms reflect ‘mutually exclusive categories of reality.’ It 
exists because there is a reluctance to see that ‘our conscious states qua subjec-
tive, private, qualitative etc. cannot be ordinary physical, biological features of 
our brain.’ (Searle 2007, 39). Searle writes that if we drop the mutually exclusive 
criteria then a solution is possible. To his mind,
All of our mental states are caused by neurobiological processes in the 
brain, and they are themselves realized in the brain as its higher level or 
system features. So, for example, if you have a pain, your pain is caused 
by sequences of neuron firings, and the actual realization of the pain 
experience is in the brain. (Searle, 2007, 39–40).
But, this introduces a problem insofar that it requires one to specify how con-
scious states come into being. This attends to not only questions of making 
sense of perceptions and experience, but also the extent to which a person’s 
consciousness is evoked by material circumstances independent to the body. 
This defence requires us to defend the person as a perceiving agent; the nature 
of the object of perception; the role of mental contents; and the causal and sig-
nificatory relation between perceptions and objects.
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Keeping these points in mind, it is worth returning to the AI research. These 
efforts, as notable as they have been in their disciplines, are mimicking intelli-
gence. In addition, AI is deterministic: if presented with the same inputs, it will 
produce the same outputs if the program were run again.40 Beyond practical 
problems, in principle there remains little understanding of the brain. Presently, 
cognitive behaviourists describe intelligence in a way that boils down to ‘being 
able to do everything person can do’. This circular reasoning demonstrates that 
scientists do not know what these computations are trying to mimic. So even 
once we set aside the hubris from executives who seek to sell software systems, 
there is considerable distance between producing things that even remotely 
resemble the breadth of actual human intelligence, let along consciousness. To 
reiterate the points made above, without a principle-based understanding of 
consciousness there is little way to know what you have designed to act in a 
particular way is actually successful in being sentient. The working definitions 
of intelligence in artificial intelligence are descriptive low bars and are nowhere 
near self-awareness or consciousness.
In the attempt to remedy the faulty theory of mind, social scientists would do 
well to reassess their relationship with metaphysics, and discard the coextensive 
hyper-materialism that characterizes the AI researcher paradigm. Treating per-
ceptions, ideas and emotions as little more than electrical impulses misses the 
emergent properties where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This 
perspective, it seems to me, stems from a cramped, hyper-reductive view of 
causality: one that is materialist, but not historical, instead of viewing the mind 
and its mental activity as distinct from mere and reductive material impulses. 
So one needs to take seriously that minds are a distinct realm of existence that 
cannot be fully explained by physicalists. In other words, there is a remain-
der after taking account of cognitive evolution, computational models, or the 
economy of mind. Neither chemical reactions predicated upon a base economy 
of natural selection can account for the creation of the mind. While physical 
evolution is causally necessary, by itself it is an insufficient condition for con-
sciousness. These bold claims about neurological support are but an epistemol-
ogy of excessive reductionism.
There is one last bit of hubris where researchers believe that mathematically 
based speculations resolve or dissolve long standing political conundrums, but 
do so without seriously engaging with those philosophical debates. It is related 
to the belief that all reality can be fully comprehended in terms of physics. But 
this is a fantasy. While it is easy to understand, for instance, the interaction of 
light and nerve impulses, this cannot account for the gaze outwards. Cogni-
tive behaviourism falls at this first hurdle while still being far away from being 
able to account for other aspects of human consciousness like the formation of 
intentions and undertaking voluntary action. So if cognitive functionalism has 
little to say about the person and consciousness, it is certainly not well posi-
tioned to claim relevant meaningful contributions to social policy.
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6.6 The Psychologism of Abstracted Empiricism
Having discussed potions of the intellectual inheritance of cognitive behaviour-
ism from twentieth-century social thought, I now want to turn my attention 
to a critical branch of sociological thought from the same period to assist in 
analysing this set of ideas. C. Wright Mills worked in the immediate post-war 
period as a research assistant to Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld’s research on 
the media effects of mass communication. The majority of their work sought to 
understand the persuasive influence of mediated messages in print and broad-
cast communication technologies to shape and control the ideas, attitudes, and 
behaviours of members of a society. Mills thought that most of the findings 
suggested that the media effects of mass communication sat in concert, if not 
over-determined, by other factors like differentiated cultural practice of com-
posite audiences and their agency. And for this reason, he never shook his dis-
taste for behaviourism and its presuppositions.
Shaped by this post-war infatuation with coding mass behaviour and his cri-
tique thereof, in The Sociological Imagination, Mills identified the emergence 
of Grand Theory (the term Mills used to mock Talcott Parsons’s work) and 
Abstracted Empiricism (a comment on Daniel Bell’s work). Stemming from his 
close experience with large public opinion survey research and alongside ques-
tions about the legitimacy of power, epistemologically, Mills was dissatisfied 
with the attempt to induce correlative relations but at the expense of under-
standing social forces. With an excessive focus on individuals, these aforemen-
tioned studies did not consider social relations, real world politics, nor were 
they well grounded in the sociological theoretical tradition. Altogether, this 
reflected what Mills described as a pervasive ‘psychologism.’ What he meant by 
this was ‘the attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of facts and theories 
about the make-up of individuals’ (Mills 2000, 67 fn 12). He writes,
Historically, as a doctrine, it rests upon an explicit metaphysical denial 
of the reality of social structure. At other times, its adherents may set 
forth a conception of structure which reduces it, so far as explanations 
are concerned, to a set of milieux. In a still more general way…pyschol-
ogism rests upon the idea that if we study a series of individuals and 
their milieux, the results of our studies in some way can be added up to 
knowledge of social structure. (Mills 2000, 67 fn 12)
Abstracted empiricists, had according to Mills, adopted a research approach 
that sought to replicate the demonstrated success of the physical sciences, 
but in doing so had prioritized method over substance. In this respect, it was 
‘systematically a-historical and non-comparative’ (Mills 2000, 68). Quantita-
tive survey methods were presumed to be more rigorous than other kinds of 
social inquiry. But this kind of research was costly, required significant staff 
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to distribute, collect, and tally the findings in preparation for basic computa-
tional analysis. These actions required large budgets and resources, and so led 
to the bureaucratization of social research that resembled industrial scale pro-
duction. In this industrial scale, research the sunk costs of the scale of invest-
ment trumps self-critique and modification. This mind-set makes it difficult to 
understand change and contradiction in social, economic, and political institu-
tions let alone wider social and political development. As Mills observed:
one reason for the thin formality or even emptiness of these fact-cluttered 
studies is that they contain very little or no direct observation by those 
who are in charge of them. The ‘empirical facts’ are facts collected by a 
bureaucratically guided set of usually semi-skilled individuals. It has been 
forgotten that social observation requires high skill and acute sensibility; 
that discovery often occurs precisely when an imaginative mind sets itself 
down in the middle of social realities. (Mills 2000 70 fn 13)
Together, these enable the pre-conditions for the domestication of critique. So 
being enamoured with cognitive behaviourism often leads to but one kind of 
approach to the study of human action. But this has direct and distinct disad-
vantages because the information produced tends to be a-historical and de-
contextualized. This kind of theoretical mindset makes it difficult to deal with 
change in social, economic, and political institutions.
Abstraction, without context, Mills believed, led to disengaged scholarship, 
alienated from the true dimensions of the problems under investigation. Exces-
sively functional, behavioural, and naïve empirical approaches fail to perceive the 
wider social and political settings that organize those particular arrangements. 
These approaches count the countable because they are easily countable. This is 
not to elevate context above all else, but to suggest that historical circumstance, 
contingency if one will, cannot be discounted in any analysis. So, the spirit of 
Mills’ critique is perhaps as important now, given that there is a prevailing belief 
that technological management is necessarily required given the rise of ever more 
complex societies and the discussions over the selection of basic values is closed.
As I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, the psychologism produced 
by Grand Theory and Abstracted Empiricism has come about through the dis-
missal of reasoning and intention. This is the product of two beliefs: the first is 
that science, especially neurological science, has access to reality; and second, 
the distrust of perceiver-dependent events. But this is little more than bringing 
the hermeneutic hammer down on lived experience, holding that people are 
not best positioned to relate to an observer their reasons for actions. Instead, 
one has the judgement of the theorist or unaccountable bureaucratic code. 
Moreover, it concedes that the investigation of social problems can be best 
approached via methodologies defined by computation not humanism; this is 
disciplinary supplication, not supplementation.
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All of this is to say that there is a tremendous intellectual stake in cogni-
tive behaviourism being correct. So much so that criticisms are brushed away 
and considered professional contrarians rabble rousing for their attention. This 
neglects though that in the attempt to impose a synthesis on approximately 25 
years of research, the hubris and generalisations that have emerged therefrom 
there has been a significant intellectual citadel build upon a shaky foundation 
of over generalized eclecticism. It has created a messy soup in which the ‘cogni-
tive’ elements are insufficiently grasped by the technicians, and the technical 
elements are insufficiently grasped by the social sciences, all of which creates a 
few leads and insights but much commotion and confusion. While this piece-
meal approach presumes as-yet-unconnected little particulars to be the whole, 
it is rather nothing but a kind of naïve empiricism.
To conclude, capitalism’s rule requires more than military force, more that 
favourable laws, more than coercion and legitimation. A dangerous, impov-
erished, exploited and oppressed, urban class requires the development of a 
system of beliefs with several mechanisms to get the subjects themselves to 
justify the prevailing social inequality and social order. Calculated nudges are 
helpful in that regard. So, notwithstanding C. Wright Mills ‘well known critique 
of methodological, conceptual, and organizational flaws American social sci-
ence research has continued to accommodate the wishes of the US ruling class, 
and has heeded calls to serve the state. Ultimately, and this is what is at stake 
with this epistemology, is that the anticipatory uses of big data will destroy the 
concept and practice of habeas corpus.

CONCLUSION
Digital Coercion and the Tendency 
Towards Unfree Labour
Triumphant in the Cold War, wary of decline, and compelled by capitalism 
to expand, the US’ imperialist inclination has expressed itself on continental, 
hemispheric, and global scales. Still, the goal has not been to control but one 
part, several parts, or even large parts of the globe. Rather is it the attempt to 
control the planet itself. In this sense, US imperialism is a manifestation of 
the desire to create space and mechanisms for the accumulation of value, a 
more basic component of capitalism than profit. It concerns forming a world 
dedicated to capital accumulation primarily benefiting the US ruling class, and, 
as a secondary consideration, the ruling classes of tribunes and client states 
such that they continue to support US rule. However, it is social structure that 
also produces increasing inequality and authoritarianism almost everywhere, 
whether that be in the America itself or other places in the international sys-
tem. Thomas Jefferson called this the ‘empire of liberty’. But the rhetoric clouds 
the extent to which dispossession, exploitation, and oppression are the mecha-
nisms of this expansion.
Capitalism is a globally expansive system, one hierarchically structured 
between metropole and hinterland, core and periphery; which seeks to open 
up the later with its supply of cheap raw materials and labour for investment, 
extraction of surplus value, and a site for exporting surplus goods. Since the 
emergence of capitalism in Europe, economies in the periphery have been 
restructured to meet the needs of the core, rather than their own needs, and 
as but one example, this has resulted in debt bondage for poor states. Indeed, 
capitalism requires an expansionary dynamic to postpone economic crises. 
This postponement can be achieved by using indirect or direct coercion from 
security forces, or the establishment of domestic and international institutions 
to structurally adjust places to serve the interests of the US ruling class.
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Put in different terms, the US security state is the outcome of a capitalist state, 
using its security forces to ‘accumulate by dispossession’, oversee the extraction 
of commodities, and to enforce a global labour regime that to one degree or 
another has an elective affinity with unfree labour practices. These are features 
present in both internal and external components of the New American Way of 
War. The harnessing of this labour power is used to extract surplus value that 
in turn is converted into a ‘security surplus’ that is spent to enforce a global 
imperial order that in service of the aforementioned regime of accumulation. 
Politically, it is a system that no longer seeks the basic pretence of governing 
with public accountability in mind. Militarily, it is a system with the capacity to 
deploy force against internal dissidents and rivals at will. Internationally, it is a 
system of indirect rule on a global scale.
So the more violence seems unavoidable and incomprehensible, the more it 
is an expression of an underlying social structure, and irrespective of whether 
it is carried out by security forces, or patterns of investment, the outcome is 
to strengthen the position of the ruling class. When and where rulers have a 
monopoly of force and can acquire their resources without necessarily bargain-
ing with producers that rulers can extract at a rate of their discretion. This com-
bination creates an unstable social system prone to inequalities. Domestically, 
the struggle between subjects and rulers that led to democratization will likely 
be eroded as increasingly portions of the subject-population cannot offer items 
rulers require for their strategic pursuits. Therefore, these persons are deemed 
politically dispensable and basic services and welfare provisions are curtailed 
or withdrawn because this mode of accumulation has no functional need to be 
accountable to those who provide the necessary labour power required to pro-
duce the state. Instead, the state will make strategic selections catering to those 
it deems valuable or whose support it requires to continue ruling. This has 
domestic as well as global ramifications for governance. If this social structure 
continues, it is likely that arbitrary rule, militarization, and wide inequality will 
be the order of the day. How this politics is meant to promote the well-being 
and human flourishing of ordinary Americans and persons living elsewhere, is 
unclear.
This is a good place to revisit the main topic of this book: the relationship 
of capital to constraint. I have illustrated contemporary constraint as being 
organized by a security state managing a particular labour regime (Chapter 1) 
which itself has long institutional antecedents (Chapter 2), but which now 
works through various mechanisms like calculated conflict (Chapter 3). One 
can see the securitization dynamics internally, for instance in policing the most 
vulnerable (Chapter 4), and externally, for instance in international uneven-
development (Chapter 5). New techniques of ideological manipulation are 
being developed to mystify this process (Chapter 6).
Common to all of these processes is the role of unfree labour. Indeed, given 
the intensity and scope of exploitation in capitalism, the need for a reserve 
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army of labour, debt bondage, market dependency for social and personal 
reproduction, and induced underdevelopment, without a doubt unfree labour 
is a labour model in fully-functioning capitalism. One might say that there is a 
tendency to replace free labour with unfree equivalents. This is telling about the 
prospects for mass prosperity.
Amongst apologetic analysts, unfree labour is normally attributed to momen-
tary instances of dispossession as previously unconnected parts of the globe 
are being integrated into the global economy. In this kind of explanation, it is 
temporary measure that will apparently subside, leading to free wage labour as 
fully functioning capitalism takes hold. Setting aside the questionable assump-
tion that dispossession and fully functioning capitalism are incompatible, the 
main deficiency of this interpretation is that it neglects the extent to which 
labour power is unfree precisely because of the capital accrued by the ruling 
class, which itself is because of an extended period of accumulation by dispos-
session through extraction, expropriation and exploitation. Related, apologists 
proclaim that the need for labour-power to be a freely traded commodity in a 
capitalist economy. But nothing prohibits unfree labour from being bought and 
sold. If anything, it is the preservation of this hard distinction that obscures one 
from witnessing the mechanics of capital in places with unfree labour while 
furthering dividing workers to ensure that they cannot form and then act upon 
a proletariat class-consciousness. The exploitation of unfree labour then is a 
sign of mature capitalism and is the imposition of class struggle ‘from above’ 
to ensure than labour-power is entirely directed by their discretion and inten-
tions, and ultimately to keep value of commodities higher than the value of 
labour.
The rise of unfree labour is related to two economic considerations. The 
first is that unfree labour is easier to control than free labour, thus making it 
cheaper to employ and reproduce. With global markets, ruthless competition, 
and demands for maximum profit, unfree labour becomes an option to reduce 
labour costs, perhaps even a preferred form of labour regime in the twenty-first 
century in the absence of economic growth and with the rate of profit fall-
ing. To be clear: this does not mean that all labour will become unfree, rather 
that first there are degrees of freedom, and second that the tendency to adopt 
this practice when competition is most acute where class struggle ‘from below’ 
could jeopardize profit making.
Returning to the apologists for unfree labour, they claim that the remunera-
tion in this set of production relations is beneficial to the worker, for at least it 
provides some subsistence, thereby providing opportunities that those persons 
might not otherwise had have, and indeed the possibility of increased status. 
However, such positive appraisals wilfully dismiss the many reports about 
working conditions in the garment industry in South East Asia, construction in 
the Emirates, or assembly plants in China. Here, workers are worked to death, 
in unsafe environments, and face sexual harassment with limited recourse to 
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report abusers. Still, it is telling about the apologists’ moral character to suggest 
that even an oppressive subsistence job is sufficient for a person. However, aside 
from this, the existence of unfree labour is a functional by-product of class 
struggle ‘from above’ where capitalists seek to lower pay to increase profits.
Attention to the spectrum of free and unfree labour is vital for two reasons. 
The first is the extent of coercion that hinders class struggle ‘from below,’ thus 
limiting prospects for the development of not only class-consciousness, but 
also the necessary organizing required to make this consciousness a prominent 
political force able to contest for racial structural transcendence. Further to this 
point, a labour regime that seeks to convert a workforce from free to unfree 
needs to understand the conditions under which this is likely, and so informs 
class struggle.
There are two problems here. The first is that the imposition of unfree labour 
means that it is difficult for workers to form a proletariat class-consciousness; 
instead their subjugation means that they defer to social pre-political identi-
ties that ensure their particularity and otherness. Here class identity is replaced 
by an identity based in race, gender, sexuality, vocation, leisure, or national-
ism. In this respect, one of the benefits of unfree labour is that capitalists can 
stall, retard, or diminish the production or reproduction of class-conscious-
ness. There other identities are reifications that displace a politics of society for 
one of particularity. This is a form by which capitalists are successfully able to 
restructure and thwart opposition; it is successful class struggle ‘from above.’
In the end, American imperialism is the net result of politics, policies, cor-
poration actions, and trade relations, the nurturing of local collaborators in 
dependent societies, and fiscal instruments to compliment security forces seek-
ing to ensure that there are no insurmountable barriers to capital accumula-
tion. Demilitarisation is a necessary step to reduce the power of fully function-
ing capitalism. Granted the orderly conversion and redirection of human and 
material resources employed in military activities to human and environmental 
development can do much to help the truly disadvantaged. While this pro-
cess will have short-term costs, such as assisting industries in transition, the 
‘peace dividend’ will be considerable. Ending unchecked US imperialism will 
not issue in an era of global lawlessness and war. If anything, the opposite is 
more likely because great wars are the result of uneven development. While 
this will do much to limit the coercive constraints of capitalism, the elimination 
of security forces is necessary but insufficient. Accordingly, it is vital to move 
beyond a narrow understanding of demilitarisation and end the accumulation 
drive itself. Doing so requires taking away the capitalist ruling class source of 
power, the private ownership of property.
Notes
 1 Data collected by the Centre for Responsible Politics, https://docs.google.com/
spreadsheets/d/1-7PdCI2NawSgP1QE-cGYVYedetYqepR-4jBweaJyqFo/ 
edit#gid=1782600961. Since 9/11, less than 150 Americans have been killed 
by terrorist attacks, while 450,000 have been killed in domestic gun violence. 
In 2015, there were about 165,000 separate gunshots recorded in 62 different 
urban municipalities (Frankel, 2016).
 2 Uber, Airbnb, YouTube, Snapchat, Instagram, Twitter, Fitbit, Spotify, Drop-
box, WhatsApp, Tumblr, Pinterest are examples of billion dollar companies 
created after 2005.
 3 In March 2016, Google had 32 billion visitors, while Facebook had 30 bil-
lion (See Eavis 2016).
 4 See http://www.bostondynamics.com/robot_Atlas.html.
 5 By no means are these contradictions universal. Nor are they ‘necessary 
inconvenient truths’ or general empirical facts about the unfortunate by-
product of economic development, but rather specific features of rule by 
capital.
 6 The DoD also manages 826,000 in the National Guard and a benefits pro-
gram that serves over 2 million persons.
 7 It is worth remembering that ‘Capital is dead labour that, vampire-like, 
only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it 
sucks. The time during which the labourer works, is the time during which 
the capitalist consumes the labour-power he has purchased of him.’ (Marx 
1977, 342).
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 8 The mechanisms for producing this wealth, accumulation and inequality 
involve a diverse number of causes. An abbreviated list includes how the 
fall of the Soviet Union allowed capitalism to unilaterally dictate global 
trade conditions, the deindustrialization of North America paired with 
outsourcing to the Global South, the displacement of labour by automa-
tion, intensifying work concurrent with a general suppression of wages, the 
developmental state capitalism of China with its vast cheap and unorgan-
ized labour pool lowering production costs, the induction of demand for 
products through consumerism, re-regulation to create corporate financial 
rentierism, and the creation of new markets in information and commu-
nicative technologies as the rate of profits fell in established sectors. Com-
mon to all of these mechanisms is widespread domination and exploitation, 
oppression and coercion which comes at the expense of a more stable and 
equitable economy. This points towards how production is controlled.
 9 Although as Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, General Douglas 
MacArthur, during the Occupation of Japan, can be considered as a Viceroy – 
as can Paul Bremer in his role as Presidential Envoy to Iraq at the Coalition 
Provisional Authority.
 10 Genuine free labour implies: first, that workers chose their jobs voluntar-
ily; second, that the terms are specified and well understood by each party; 
third, that workers have unrestrained exit rights; and fourth, incentives are 
financial rather than coercive. This is a standard that most jobs in capital-
ism fail to meet, because as Marx notes, almost all work in this social struc-
ture is really exploitation or subordination. What appears to be ‘freedom’ is 
essentially coercion. But this coercion is mystified by the rise of a bourgeois 
ideology.
 11 Historically, dispossession was a feature of colonized territories were 
destroyed by the forced labour or indigenous people, or importing slaves; 
in Europe, industrialism required the destruction of traditional ways of life 
to force a migration from rural areas to cities to create a new factory labour 
force. Overall, colonialism and commodification were intertwined with the 
continued strengthening in European societies creating new means for sub-
jugating and governing populations all in the pursuit of profit.
 12 The moral sanction and badness of theft hinges on depriving a person of the 
means to reproduce their life, and this is particularly acute in circumstances 
where a person’s labour was vital in producing the item. But the moral harm 
is reduced with digital items because as they can be easily reproduced, no 
thus one is deprived. Digital ownerships rights then are more a matter of 
law, and less a moral bad.
 13 Much of this theory develops out of the study of European polities. While 
Tilly cautions against universalizing the European state-formation modal for 
other spaces and times ‘our ability to infer the probable events and sequences 
in contemporary states from an informed reading of European history is 
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close to nil’ (1975, 82)—he nevertheless thinks it is useful for regional and 
historical comparative and contrastive work. He writes that ‘the European 
historical experience, for all its special features, is long enough, well-enough 
documented, and a large enough influence on the rest of the world that any 
systematic conclusions which did hold up well in light of that experience 
would almost automatically become plausible working hypotheses to be 
tried out elsewhere.’ (Tilly, 1975, 13–14).
 14 Notwithstanding the value that Polanyi offers by correctly rendering reci-
procity and redistribution as social, he incorrectly fails to label the market 
economy as stemming from the same social system. Instead he views it is as 
disembedded and distinct and so able to devour the social.
 15 The ‘end of monetary policy history’ was a commitment was to price sta-
bility above all else using inflation targeting at around 2 per cent to lower 
market volatility. This was accomplished using an operationally politically 
insulated central bank using one instrument (the short-term interest rate,) 
for one objective (controlling inflation via a consumer price index,) over a 
medium term (six to eight quarters,) using assert prices to detect emerging 
financial imbalances thereby minimising excessive fluctuations. Transpar-
ent communications was deemed importance around the uses and rationale 
of that instrument as a way to smooth out micro-fluctuations.
 16 Abstractly, the Great Recession was just another partial capitalist economic 
crisis that comes from the contradiction between the individual desire for 
profit and the necessity of a social division of labour. Specifically, it was 
caused by Wall Street using digital technical to implement 24-hour trading, 
improve records management, and invest into emerging markets due to bet-
ter oversight. Aside from the rapid inflows and outflows of capital causing 
economic and social instability, the speculative investment into new online 
businesses and enterprises eventually led to the 2000 dot.com crash that in 
turn heralded a new regime of low interest rates. Bankers took advantage of 
these conditions and invested into property speculation and debt, deliber-
ately using sub-prime mortgages to financed people unlikely to pay them. 
Returns on investments were good because of a high interest rate on the debt. 
When defaults occurred, assets could be seized or refinanced, thus yielding 
better returns. These financial instruments were bundled with other loans 
and packaged as investment funds. While selling these products to clients, 
banks themselves insured against these debts. Being so exposed to these 
risks, when one financial house fell it had a cascading effect across the finan-
cial sector leading to a good portion of the economy falling into recession.
 17 This is why from about 1915 onwards solders were equipped with metal 
helmets to protect them from head injuries. This was one of many mili-
tary changes that states made to adapt to the circumstances and conditions 
of modern industrial warfare. A modern solder’s personal equipment still 
more or less reflects this concern.
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 18 Comparatively, in the Second Boer War, 1899–1902, it is estimated that the 
British Army fired 273,000 rounds. One outcome of the war was a rapid 
modernization program to design and equip artillery as a good portion of 
the guns fielded in the conflict had been in service in the Crimean War. The 
new specifications were for a gun that could fire a 12.5lb shell 6,000 yards 
(Norris, 2000, 164-165).
 19 Petraeus was then appointed to command in Iraq, where he had some suc-
cess. He was later appointed to command in Afghanistan to replace General 
Stanley McChrystal, before making his way to the CIA.
 20 Roberto Gonzalez (2015) argues that the program had an internal ideologi-
cal function in that it sought to do public relations work with American citi-
zens to convince then that there were humanitarian motivations attached to 
the occupation, and that social science was being enrolled to limit the use of 
force and limit cultural conflicts that might lead to unnecessary casualties. 
It sought to counter the narrative and images of the US occupation as brutal 
that emerged after Abu Ghraib.
 21 See http://minerva.dtic.mil/funded.html, http://semantics.ling.utexas.edu/, 
http://vivo.cornell.edu/display/grant72804.
 22 See http://www.apa.org/news/press/statements/interrogations.aspx – also 
see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence published a voluminous 
account of the CIA‘s program.




 24 When Risen initially drafted the article in 2003 for the New York Times, he 
asked the CIA for comment. In April 2003, George Tenet and Condoleezza 
Rice, the director of the CIA and the National Security Advisor respect-
fully, met with Risen and Jill Abramson, the Times Washington bureau 
chief. Appealing to national security and the possible endangering of a CIA 
agent’s life Tenet and Rice requested that the Times hold the article. The 
Times complied.
 25 The Senate Judiciary Committee passed, by a bipartisan margin of 13–5, 
such a proposed law, but it did not receive a Senate vote.
 26 There is also something to be said about the latent presumption that Black 
intergrate and adapt the behavioural norms associated with ‘whiteness.’
 27 Granted, the 1033 program does also include the distribution of items like 
blankets, office furniture, computers and so on. See http://www.dla.mil/
dispositionservices.
 28 Relatively smaller compared to the great Recession, but still nevertheless 
still worth noting, due to justifiable affirmative action the 2013 US govern-
ment shutdown disproportionately affected Blacks. The shutdown was due 
to a showdown over funding the Affordable Care Act (2010), legislation 
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which would have dramatically improved the conditions for at least 16 mil-
lion people, most of whom are persons of color (U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Services 2015).
 29 One result of an unfree labour regime is that it generates a crisis of under-
consumption, usually because it drives down wages or leads to job losses 
in other contexts; thus the consumption practices of workers are affected 
by this capitalist restructuring of the labour regime. In this respect, unfree 
labour is a contributing factor in a capitalist economic crisis.
 30 The US redacted 8,000 pages prior to non-permanent Security Council 
member states viewing the report on Iraq’s weapon’s program.
 31 A Hollywood film, The Siege, (1998) starring Denzel Washington and Bruce 
Willis, revolved about a hypothetical situation where a terrorist leader 
Ahmed bin Talal—a facsimile for bin Laden—was captured, kickstarting 
terror attacks in New York.
 32 Normatively, a coercive imposition of democracy is an intellectual contra-
diction in orthodox democracy theory.
 33 With a combined profit of $16.2 billion, in 2014, the combined sales of 
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and General 
Dynamics, five of the world’s largest arms manufacturers defence companies, 
amount to $125 billion out of global combined arms sales of $401 billion, 
account for about 0.001 per cent of the US $16.77 trillion Gross Domestic 
Product (2013). Together they employ 450,000 people in the US and abroad. 
While each company has multiple business lines ranging from electronic sys-
tems, to aeronautics, and naval systems, all aside from Boeing, receive the 
majority of their business from arms sales, both domestic and foreign.
 34 Few other heads of state did.
 35 Special Forces have also supported the Drug Enforcement Agency in Latin 
America (Scahill 2010) as well as conducting independent operations. For 
example, in Honduras Special Forces use Forward Operating Base Moc-
oron to train counter-narcotics Honduran troops in counter-insurgency 
tactics (Turse 2012). Even more worrying in some respects is that using 
military forces in an international policing capacity, involves the militariza-
tion of police forces and other government agencies. For instance, there is 
little to differentiate a DEA Foreign deployed Assistance & Support Team 
agent from a Special Forces operator. The same has held for tactical units 
in domestic policing for some time (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Shank and 
Beavers 2013).
 36 Although discretionary spending is set to increase by approximately $109 
billion, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2013/assets/defense.pdf.
 37 Regional commands could appeal to the Pentagon for adjudication, but 
given that Special Forces are shielded by Presidential authority, the Penta-
gon’s scope for discretion is it is not yet clear.
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 38 While there are few critical, sociological engagements with the social shap-
ing of neuroscience (cf. Pickersgill 2013), this is not to downplay or dimin-
ish the achievements of neuroscience research and its medical treatments. 
It is the opposite. Efforts to treat neuroscience seriously involve ensuring it 
does not become a discursive pawn to supplement ideological claims that 
techno-shaman sell as they misinterpret medical research in an effort to 
peddle their intellectually unsatisfying speculative philosophy.
 39 The similarity I want to stress is disagreement as to whether the cogni-
tive can be understood either through reforming models of cognition to 
become more computational, or rather to pursue a better understanding of 
the mind’s abilities.
 40 One could quibble here and point to random numbers included in calcula-
tions and so on. However, this pseudo-randomness must be written into 
code. If pseudo-random numbers were the same, the output would be the 
same.
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CAPITAL, STATE, EMPIRE 
The United States presents the greatest source of global geo-political violence and instability. Guided by the radical political economy tradition, this book offers an analysis of the USA’s historical impulse to 
weaponize communication technologies.
 Scott Timcke explores the foundations of this impulse and how the 
militarization of digital society creates structural injustices and social 
inequalities. He analyses how new digital communication technologies 
support American paramountcy and conditions for worldwide capital 
accumulation. Identifying selected features of contemporary American 
society, Capital, State, Empire undertakes a materialist critique of this 
digital society and of the New American Way of War.  At the same time it 
demonstrates how the American security state represses activists—such as 
Black Lives Matter—who resist this emerging security leviathan. The book 
also critiques the digital positivism behind the algorithmic regulation used 
to control labour and further diminish prospects for human flourishing for 
the ‘99%’.
 Capital, State, Empire contributes to a broader understanding of the 
dynamics of global capitalism and political power in the early 21st century.
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